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THE

RELATION 0/JOHN LOCKE
TO ENGLISH DEISM

By

S. G. HEFELBOWER

Professor of Philosophy in Washburn College
Tofeka, Kansas

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

COPYRIGHT 1918 BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

All Rights Reserved

Published December 1918

Composed and Printed By

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

PREFACE

Probably all students of English thought of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries recognize some sort
of relation between John Locke and English Deism, but
they differ as to how they are related. Some writers
make him a part of the movement, others consider him
its father, and several of the leading historians of philos
ophy merely note the fact that there is some relation
without denning it.

This monograph undertakes to show that these
statements are wrong or inadequate, and that Locke and
English Deism are related as co-ordinate parts of the
larger progressive movement of the age.

When widely accepted historical opinions are chal
lenged, proof of the thesis to be established should be
made accessible to the reader and should be as complete
as possible. Accordingly the book is to a great extent
a tediously detailed marshaling of evidence.

The discussion of the belief in Providence and the
statement of the attitude of the progressive leaders
toward toleration in the fifth chapter do not contribute
to the solution of the problem. The former is introduced
here because it is generally believed that the "absentee
God" was a characteristic of Deism, which it was not;
and the presentation of the latter is necessary because
some writers use it to prove that Locke was a Deist,
which it does not prove.

The quotations from Locke are from Eraser's edition
of the Essay and from the tenth edition of his works.

TOPEKA, KANSAS
June, 1918

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION i

i. The Remote Historical Background I

-J 2. English Thought in the Seventeenth Century . . 6

*3. The Problem u

4. Possible Solutions 12

II. SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM THAT HAVE BEEN OFFERED 1 7

1. In the Histories of Philosophy and Related Studies 17 •

2. In the Special Study by Crous 24

3. Resume 27

III. THE METHOD 31

1. A Possible Source of Error in the Genetic Method . 31

2. The Nature of the Problem Determines the Method 32

3. The Method Indicated for This Problem .... 33

4. Result of This Study of Method 42

IV. THE Two FOCAL CONCEPTS 45

i. Origin of the Two Focal Concepts of Rationalistic-
Critical Speculation 45

The Use of the Concept of Nature 50

A. The Rational Theologians 50

B. The Philosophers 53

C. The Deists 57

D. Conclusion 61

3. The Use of the Concept of Reason 63

A. The Rational Theologians .' 64

B. The Philosophers 67

C. The Deists ........ f .... 74

D. Conclusion 78

viii Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

V. THE MAIN POINTS IN THE RELIGIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF
THIS PERIOD 83

1. Concerning God I ..... 83

A. Proofs of the Existence of God 83

B. The Relation of God to the World .... 90

a) Providence 90

b) Miracles 94

2. Revelation and Scripture 101

3. Religion 116

A. The Importance of Natural Religion . . . .117

a) The Rational Theologians 118

ft) The Philosophers . . . . . . . .120

c) The Deists 126

B. Religion Denned as Morality 133

4. Toleration 141

VI. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE RELATION OF THE ENGLISH
DEISTS TO LOCKE 151

1. Locke's Influence in England after 1688 . . . .151

2. The Temporal Relation of Locke and the Deists . 153

3. Direct Evidence of Locke's Influence on the Deists 154

A. Toland 156

B. Collins 159

C. Tindal 160

D. Wollaston . . . ,165

E. Bolingbroke 165

F. Morgan 167

4. Conclusion 169

VII. CONCLUSION 172

1. Resume . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 172

2 . Definition and Comparison of Locke's Religious Opin
ions and Deism 176

3. Theories Tested by Facts 178

INDEX 187

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE REMOTE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The problem concerning the relation of John Locke
and English Deism arises out of a situation that had been
developing slowly for a long time. A full account of its
origin would lead us back centuries to the beginnings of
the New Learning in Italy. The scene had shifted,
other interests had appeared; but the dominant motives
were essentially the same. In the political, the social,
the religious, the philosophical, and the scientific strife
and movements of this time we have the age-old struggle
of humanity for freedom. Man is so constituted that
awareness of limitations is felt as a perpetual challenge
to throw them off. Men felt this in Italy in the thir
teenth century; they were conscious of it in England in
the seventeenth century; the resulting movements
differ because conditions had changed.

When the Renaissance dawned in Italy, it did not
find the general confusion that we often associate with
the Middle Ages. On the contrary, the civilization at
that time was strongly organized. There was one cen
tral authority that dominated everything everywhere.
Henry IV defied it, and in order to carry out his political
plans he found it necessary to make peace with Pope
Hildebrand at Canossa. Abelard was condemned by
councils, and he was imprisoned and his books were

2 John Locke and English Deism

burned because his views were not approved. In the
period of the Renaissance we see the same centralized
authority dictating what men should think. Pompo-
nazzi changed his teaching concerning immortality, fear
ing the anathema of Leo X; Bruno was burned; Galileo
denied scientific conclusions to escape a like fate.
Ecclesiastical authority approved and established sys
tems of philosophy and theories of the universe; and
to think differently was a sin against God, punishable
by his vicegerent upon earth. Of course such a con
dition could not last; it must break down sooner or
later, for "the thrust and kick of life" is felt also in the
realm of man's spiritual interests, and whatever hinders
here becomes intolerable. But men of the late Middle
Ages probably did not feel the hampering conditions
under which they lived as keenly as we might think,
for the horizon of life's interests was narrow, and
religion was their chief concern: the value of things
here was estimated largely in terms of the life to
come.

But a new spirit was making itself felt; at the
/* \ beginning of the fourteenth century Dante drew mate-
'A> \-rials for his masterpiece from classical as well as from
«T" biblical sources, and even acknowledged Virgil to be his
teacher and master. And a generation later Petrarch
as largely instrumental in starting that contagious
, enthusiasm for all things of the ancient Roman and
Grecian civilizations which resulted in raising up a body
of men who loved learning for its own sake, and in giving
European culture another center. Along with this
growing interest in the humanities there also developed
a scientific impulse. As early as the thirteenth century

Introduction 3

Roger Bacon had a fairly clear grasp of scientific
methods, and characterized scholastic disputes as vain
battles of words. Two hundred years later the Aris
totelian cosmology collapsed before the new science.
Man's horizon grew; he learned to know himself as a
citizen of this world, and to think of the earth as a
little member of the great universe. Conflict was
inevitable; it was as if he were dethroning God and
reverting to paganism. The wine of the new learn
ing burst the old bottles of authoritatively given
systems.

In the northern country the Renaissance was soon
accompanied by the Reformation; or, if you prefer, it
soon became the Reformation. There were, of course,
many and varied motives that helped to determine that
complex movement of the sixteenth century; but it
was fundamentally a revolt against human authority
in matters of religion. As Luther put it: If a man is
to be persecuted for his religious opinions, the hangman
is the best theologian.1

This was a logical deduction from the right of private
judgment, which was a basal principle of the Reforma
tion. Unfortunately this was to remain but an ideal
for another hundred years; that is, liberty of thought
was the privilege only of those who had power to assert
it. The new learning and the new religious movement
were so entangled in the seesaw of the fortunes of
political and personal interests on the Continent and in
England that this toleration, which they had promised,
remained, in part at least, unrealized. The English

1 Luther's W erke (Weimar Ausgabe), VI, 455.

4 John Locke and English Deism

statute of 1400, which decreed death at the stake for
heretics, yielded to the new spirit in 1533; but it was
re-enacted under Mary and, nominally at least and
sometimes actually, continued in force until I676.1
Even as late as 1648 Puritan zeal for orthodox belief
caused an ordinance to be passed which made anyone
liable to the death penalty "who denied the Trinity,
Christ's Divinity, the inspiration of the scriptures, or a
future state," and set prison penalties for other heresies.2
Fortunately this act did not result in persecution unto
death. But in those troubled times in England, about
the middle of the seventeenth century, the lot of the
confessor of a disapproved dogma was very uncertain;
thousands of clergymen were thrown out of their pulpits
because they did not agree with the party in power;
and, judging from the successive changes at Oxford,
academic freedom was far from realization.3

However the right to private opinion was more and
more recognized. Protestantism, in its appeal from
papal authority, recognized the right of appeal; and this
was resulting in greater freedom of thought. In the
seventeenth century Holland in particular was the land
of liberty, the place where Arminians and Socinians and
Racovians lived and taught with practically no restraints.
And in England many leaders had appeared who forsook
the beaten paths, and yet were undisturbed. Important
independent religious movements, more or less organ
ized, were able to grow up and continue. Compared
with almost all other countries, England was a land of

1 J. B. Bury, History of Freedom of Thought (London, 1913), p. 59.

2 Ibid., pp. 79-86.

3 H. R. F. Bourne, Life of John Locke (London, 1876), I, 27 ff.

Introduction 5

liberty. And yet with that liberty often went persecu
tion. As Bloimt, quoting another in the dedicatorial
letter to his Religio Laid, very aptly expressed it:
" Every opinion makes a sect, every sect a faction: and
every faction (when it is able) a war: and every such
war is the cause of God: and the cause of God can never
be prosecuted with too much violence."

It seems almost impossible that Protestantism
should have been untrue to its fundamental principle,
that liberty of thought should be denied by the party
in power. And yet it is not so strange when we consider
all the circumstances. Europe had long been schooled
in the right of might, and it unlearned the lesson slowly.
There was the usual inertia of hoary tradition, and the
necessity of self-defense against those who would crush
all who differed from them in religious matters; and
what more complete defense than to overwhelm any who
would steal away their hard-won liberties ! Furthermore,
the strife and stress of theological controversies mingled
with political conflicts required creedal definitions and
the formation of systems of divinity. And once these
were made it was easy to be intolerantly loyal to one's
own religious beliefs. Perhaps it was necessary to
defend them; and, ere they realized it, the anomalous
condition of Protestant intolerance was a fact. When
those confessions and systems became authoritative
standards of types of religious conviction and eccle
siastical organization, we have the age of dogmatism,
when the spontaneous, living, inquiring spirit of the
Reformation is replaced by dead orthodoxy. However,
this hampered the development of religious thought less
in England than in Germany.

6 John Locke and English Deism

2. ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The century of the Stuarts and the Commonwealth
was a turbulent time of beginnings. Much that is best
in England today can be traced to this age. The old
order, stubbornly resisting every change, was slowly
yielding to the new; and the waning, outlived notions in
the various fields of interest mingled with the ideals that
marked the opening of "anoOier epoch in England's
history. The divine right of kings was crumbling; the
Laudian scheme, which "was to exterminate all individu
ality and freedom of conscience" and to enthrone
"Prelatic tyranny" was becoming impossible.1 The
struggle for liberty was slowly getting the victory. In
science and philosophy a new spirit was moving; men
were turning from ancient masters to nature herself to
learn of nature's ways — the Baconian method was
gaining followers. In the forties a group of interested
scholars met weekly in London to foster experimental
investigation. This is probably what Boyle called "the
invisible college," which later became the Royal Society.2
Sydenham founded the new study of medicine on induc
tive methods in England, and Boyle practically revolu
tionized chemistry by championing "the empirical
method in chemistry against the Alchemist."3

But still a great deal of serious thinking moved in the
old scholastic ruts: When the Protestant theologians
made their confessions and theological systems, they

1 John Tulloch, English Puritanism and Its Leaders (London, 1861),
P- i?9-

2 C. R. Weld, History of the Royal Society (London, 1848), I, chap. ii.

3 H. Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy (London, 1900), I, 378.

Introduction 7

used the thought-forms, that is the philosophy, of the
age; and in doing this they were conservative, as theolo
gians generally were; they chose for the most part the
old and accepted formulas of the traditional systems.
Thus the metaphysical background of most English
theology of this period was drawn from scholasticism.
Now "men had become weary of Protestant scholas- /
ticism. "J Toland's calling it a "scholastic jargon" was ^
not altogether the hostile gibe of an unsympathetic
critic.2 In fact Protestant theologians everywhere
simply used the philosophical concepts that had been
handed down to them from the former period. "The
Reformation produced no immediate change in
philosophy."3

Descartes was taught scholastic philosophy at La
Fleche ; but this was to be expected in a Roman Catholic
school. Bacon never wearies of exhibiting scholastic
systems and methods as the great obstacles to progress.
Philosophy was in ill repute because it concerned itself
"in a multitude of barking questions, fruitful of con
troversy, but barren of effect." One of the "distempers
of learning" was the "contentious" learning, which
must be removed if we are ever to advance. Even when
Locke studied at Oxford in the middle of the century, it is
evident that he received little more than the old scho
lasticism, for he complained that the tune he spent in
the study of philosophy was almost wasted, "because
the only philosophy then known at Oxford was the

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, art. "Deism."

2 J. Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious (London, 1702), Preface,
p. xi.

* A. Weber, History of Philosophy (New York, 1896), p. 277.

8 John Locke and English Deism

peripatetic, perplexed with obscure terms and useless
questions."1 The situation was somewhat different at
Cambridge; there the dominance of the old system had
been broken before Locke's student days at Oxford. In
the closing years of the sixteenth century the new philos
ophy was opposed by Digby, "a zealous scholastic and
mystic." He was in turn attacked by Temple, who had
largely adopted the point of view of Ramus, and thus
Cambridge became the chief center of Ramism.
Temple's successful opposition to scholasticism broke
down hindering traditions and made Cambridge the
center of the progressive tendency in philosophy, where
later the school of Platonists flourished.2

Thus in England of the seventeenth century the
general progress of civilization had not fully achieved
freedom of thought; there was still such a thing as
persecution for opinions' sake. Even Locke's Letter on
Toleration, which was probably the greatest plea for(i£)
that had been heard in England, expressly denied full
liberty to atheists and papists. In theology much of
the thinking looked backward rather than forward; it
was content to appeal to symbols and authorities; it
loved the traditional and was prone to heap scolding
epithets upon innovators. And in philosophy there was
still a vigorous contest between the outworn scholasticism
of the Middle Ages and the new philosophy. Even as
late as the last decade of the century Locke's Essay was
refused recognition at Oxford.3 Such in general was the

1 Bourne, op. cit., I, 48.

2 Weber, op. cit., p. 277; R. Falkenberg, History of Modern Philos
ophy (New York, 1897), p. 63; Hoffding, op. cit., I, 187, 288, 377.

* Hoffding, op. cit., I, 381.

Introduction 9

conservative tendency in English thought in the seven
teenth century.

But the fundamental principles of the Renaissance
and the Reformation were progressively asserting them
selves. The right of private judgment and the duty of
free inquiry were claimed and exercised by an ever-
increasing circle of independent thinkers. They did not,
it is true, form a school or have any bond save this
common recognition of the necessity of a change; but
they represented the progressive spirit of the age. They
saw that there was much truth that could not be forced
into old forms, that the inherited systems were not
adequate to meet the demands of new discoveries.
Hence they undertook to adapt, to amend, to enlarge,
or even to supplant the old. They sought to serve their
age by giving it a system fitted to meet the new require
ments.

They represented practically all fields of thought-
theology, philosophy, politics, literature, and the
sciences. And they were of practically every shade of
opinion, from the relatively conservative thinker, who
with hesitation departs as little as possible from tradi
tional views, to the revolutionary innovator, who would
make all things new. But whatever their field of
interest and whatever their tendency, they agreed in
this, that the old systems and methods were inadequate.
They saw the need of new adjustments to meet new
problems, and of freedom of thought in making these
adjustments. Among themselves they disagreed in
many ways and criticized each other freely. But as a
group of thinkers they stand out in contrast with the
conservative tradition-loving leaders described above.

io John Locke and English Deism

The line of demarcation, it is true, cannot be sharply

drawn; it is difficult to determine where some men

properly belong. But this is not necessary. It is

sufficient to recognize the fact that at this time there was

a conservative group of leaders who tended to maintain

' things as they had been, and that opposed to them,

perhaps sometimes unconsciously opposed to them, there

/was a group of progressive leaders who recognized the

^F

need of change and undertook to effect it.

It is not necessary to call the entire roll of honor of
England's sons who rightly grasped the problems of their
age and made their contributions toward their solution;
but it will be worth while to mention the leaders. The
catalogue of the progressive thinkers of England in the
seventeenth century begins with Hooker, although his

' work really lies in the previous century. In his great
treatise on Ecclesiastical Law he marked a departure from
servile tradition, and did not hesitate to appeal to reason,
"sound reason," and "the higher reason," and to nature
and to natural law. He is frequently quoted by his
successors; Locke refers to him in the Essay as the
"learned Doctor Hooker." Then there were the philos
ophers Bacon, Hobbes, the Cambridge Platonists, and
Locke; and such theologians as Hales, Taylor, Culver-
well, Chillingworth, Tillotson, and others; and the
statesmen Faulkland and Cromwell, and the poet-
statesman Milton; and the whole generation of Deists
beginning with Herbert; and the scientists, among
whom Boyle, Sydenham, and Newton were the most

, important. These were the leaders, men who left their
mark on their times. This age had its share of great
men; some of them are among the greatest the world

Introduction

ii

has ever known. And together they broke away
from tradition and raised English thought to world-
leadership in their generation. We fail to appreci
ate the heritage that we have received from them
because we use it daily.

3. THE PROBLEM

For the present purpose we are concerned only with
the party of progress in England of the seventeenth
century. The conservative element comes into con
sideration only as the common object of attack and
criticism, because, in greater or less degree, it represents
the spirit of opposition to free inquiry, which would
check progress by clinging to systems and methods that
had outlived their usefulness.

We find that in a general way Locke and the Deists
opposed the same tendencies "or principles. They are
also associated closely in time. Locke entered upon his
Westminster schooldays in the midst of the struggles that
resulted in the establishment of the Commonwealth.
In 1652 he became a student at Christ Church, Oxford,
from which he received his Bachelor's degree in 1656 and
his Master's degree in 1658. He continued as a member
of the University in various relations until 1684. During
his maturing youth and manhood he witnessed at close
range two revolutions and the disorders that they
occasioned particularly at the University. He began
writing during the early sixties, although he published
nothing until twenty-five years later. From this time
until his death in 1704 he expressed himself through the
press on a number of subjects — political, economic,
theological, scientific, and philosophical. The period of

12 John Locke and English Deism

his greatest activities lies between 1685 and the time
of his death.

Deism is dated from the closing years of the seven-
%/ teenth century to about the middle of the eighteenth
century — at least this is the period when it was at its
height. Its beginnings in England, however, reach back
more than sixty years, and a decade or more before the
appearance of Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious it
was so strong as to call forth criticisms. Locke's years
of greatest activity and the period of Deism overlapped,
though the movement did not reach its highest point
until after his death.

Furthermore, as will appear more fully later, they
have much in common, they often seem to speak the
same language; in the midst of differences there are
suggestive likenesses.

In a general way Locke and Deism face the same foe,
they are associated in time, and they show resemblances
that seem to indicate a close relation of some sort. Our
problem is to determine, so far as possible, what sort of
relation exists between them. Is it merely a tempo
ral elation, and are these resemblances without sig
nificance ? Or if they have significance, what do they
mean, what are we to infer from them, how are we
to link together Locke and Deism in this period of
English thought? Such is the task that is before us
in this investigation.

4. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

It will be well to begin this study by denning the
possible relations that may exist.

Introduction 13

The solution of our problem might lie in the estab
lishment of some sort of a causal relation between them ;
in the theory that the one in some way and to some
extent accounts for the other. Temporal connection
would then have significance, and any likenesses that
might be found could be explained quite easily — the
child would resemble the parent, and the parent the
child. But then a further problem would appear: this
causal relation can work in either one of two opposite
ways.

A. It is possible that students of this period might
be led to conclude that Deism was the source of the
religious philosophical views of Locke; that, when we i.'lu
find Locke and the Deists discussing the same problems lj^ 9 „
and setting forth similar views, Locke is dependent upon

the Deists. But, as we shall see later, this theory is \.
historically untenable.

B. Or it may be that the causal linkage works in the
other direction, that Locke accounts for Deism. This
would be much more in harmony with what we know of
Locke's relation to a number of other movements. He
was a leader, a pioneer in thought; he dominated intel
lectually his own and the succeeding period. He has
gone down in history as the father of English Empiricism,
the molder of the political ideas of the revolution of
1688; and various other movements had their origin in
him or were deeply influenced by him. Even without
any historical data bearing immediately on the question,
one would be tempted to conclude that Locke was in
some degree responsible for Deism. There might be
some trouble with dates, especially if we should empha
size the earliest beginnings of Deism; but this theory

14 John Locke and English Deism

would easily explain the resemblances. We shall see
in the next chapter that this view has been held by a
number of historians, who cite facts that tend to support
their position.

Another possible theory that might co-ordinate the
facts and define the relation between Locke and English
Deism is the theory that they belong together, that they
constitute one and the same movement, that, whatever
else he may be, Locke is one of that group of men
commonly known as Deists, who fostered free and
critical thinking on religious problems. This hypothesis
would have no chronological problem and would be
supported by any resemblances that might be found.
It could also account for many of the differences that
would certainly appear; for Deism continued to develop
after Locke's time; and it could be urged, with great
plausibility, that the more extreme views, which did not
altogether agree with Locke's relatively conservative
positions, represented a further stage in the development
of the same principles. The Deism of Tindal and
Morgan is but the Deism of Locke grown up. Such a
theory would have the advantage of simplicity, but it
must be tested by facts. We shall find some scholars
who hold this view.

But there is another possible solution. The prob
lem arises, as we saw, from the likenesses and differ
ences between Locke and the Deists, who were adjacent
in time. It may be that they are relatively inde
pendent so far as causal linkages are concerned; it is
quite possible that they do not form one group ; and yet
they may be closely related in another way. Perhaps
we can do fuller justice to the known facts if we consider

Introduction 1 5

Locke and the Deists related as elements which, with -J
others, constitute a larger whole; that is, as parts of one
and the same general movement. Lockian thought and
Deism could then be represented as products or mani
festations of the same Zeitgeist. They would appear as
protesting against the same scholastic tradition and
intolerance. But they were not the only ones who
insisted upon the right of free inquiry. The spirit of
progress was abroad; a new epoch was dawning, and it
had many heralds. There was what we have already
described as the progressive movement, which was made
up of several different elements. There were the inde
pendent and more or less rationalistic thinkers in the field
of theology, there were the founders of English philos
ophy, and the Cambridge Platonists, and the Deists
beginning with Herbert, and many others. All these
movements and men taken together constitute one
general movement; and within it Locke and Deism
appeared as co-ordinate parts. This would account for
all resemblances, would leave room for differences, and
would not exclude a certain degree of interaction. This
position is not certainly and clearly taken by any of those
who have studied this period, though Windleband and
von Hertling seem to approach it.

However we should not consider these possible
theories concerning the relation of Locke and English
Deism mutually exclusive. They rather point out the
element in the relation that should be regarded as central,
which determines the general type of explanation that
is offered; they suggest points of view from which we
can study the period. The acceptance of one theory
does not mean that the others were entirely wrong; it

1 6 John Locke and English Deism

does not exclude the presence, in a subordinate way, of
elements that are central in other theories. We have
a complex historical field which we can view from many
points ; we are seeking the point of view that will enable
us to do fullest justice to known facts.

CHAPTER II

i

SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM THAT HAVE BEEN
OFFERED

I. IN THE HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY AND
RELATED STUDIES

The problem concerning the relation of John Locke
and English Deism is not new; there are, in fact, very
few students of the history of English thought who have
not expressed their views on it. The conditions that
gave rise to it are so patent that one cannot well read
Locke and the Deists without coming upon it. You
find men close to each other in time who frequently
discuss the same problems and often use the same
concepts in doing so ; and the question as to their relation
is simply thrust upon you.

As might be expected, there is not full agreement as
to just what that relation is. Students of the history
of philosophy are clearly aware of the problem, but there
are perplexing elements in it that can be explained in
different ways. The result is that the explanations that
have been offered do not agree. Yet in spite of their
divergence they tend strongly to emphasize all those
factors that suggest a close causal linkage between Locke
and Deism.

Uberweg barely touches the problem. He very
cautiously observes that "the philosophy of the so-called
English Deists was more or less affected by the school

17

1 8 John Locke and English Deism

of Locke."1 What does he mean by "the philosophy
of the so-called English Deists"? Strictly speaking
the Deists as a group had no philosophy. However,
we may speak of a deistic philosophy of religion. If this
is what he means, he makes Locke "more or less"
responsible for Deism.

Kuno Fischer does not really discuss the relation of
Locke and the deistic movement; he calls attention,
however, to the dependence of Toland upon the Lockian
epistemology. He says: "Locke's Reasonableness of
Christianity appeared the year before Toland's book.
Toland went farther in this direction and denied every
thing that transcends reason. He based his religious
doctrine especially on Locke's epistemology; and the
bitter struggle, which he called forth against himself,
occasioned the attack of Bishop Stillingfleet on Locke."2
This is one of the most circumspect statements that we
have found. What he says is fact; and he makes no
sweeping generalizations. As will be shown later,
Lockian epistemology is unimportant in the develop
ment of Toland's thesis. However, Fischer's statement
is open to several interpretations: "Toland went farther
in this direction." It is evident from the context that
he meant in the direction of rationalism. Was Locke
responsible for Toland, or were they representatives of the
same general movement, their respective points of view
marking different stages in its progress ? Fischer does
not tell us. Perhaps he was more prudent than others
in refraining from making a more definite statement.

1 Uberweg, History of Philosophy (New York, 1903), II, 375.
3 Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophic (Heidelberg,
1904), X, 514.

Solutions of the Problem 19

Lechler touches upon this problem several times, but
is also not very specific. After describing the develop
ment of deistic thought up until the last decades of the
seventeenth century, he says that there were but two
things necessary for Deism to become a power: the one,
the freedom of the press, which came in 1694; the other,
an intellectual leader who could speak the watchword,
and Locke was the man.1 Later, in speaking of Locke's
repudiation of the views of Toland in his controversy
with Stillingfleet, Lechler observes: "Yet we cannot
avoid the conviction that Locke was self-deceived, and
that he failed to recognize the germs of opposition in his
own system, which must necessarily develop in his
school, because in his personal convictions he did not
wish to oppose in any way the existing systems of faith."
Locke's influence in shaping the deistic movement is
recognized; but he is not expressly called a Deist. Yet
his systems of philosophical and religious speculation are
treated as if they marked a stage, perhaps as if they
formed a stage in the development of the deistic move
ment.

Leslie Stephen, in his generally thorough but some
times confusingly detailed study of English Thought
in the Eighteenth Century, makes a clear statement of his
views. After speaking of the suggestiveness of the
almost simultaneous appearance of Locke's Reasonable
ness of Christianity and Toland's Christianity Not
Mysterious, he mentions Locke's spirited repudiation
of Toland, which he justifies, for "no child or clergyman of
the present time could accept the plenary inspiration of

1 G. V. Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus (Stuttgart, 1841),
P- 153-

2O John Locke and English Deism

the Scriptures with a simpler faith than this intellectual
progenitor of the whole generation of eighteenth-century
iconoclasts — the teacher of Toland and Collins, the
legitimate precursor of Hume and Condillac, the phi
losopher before whom Voltaire is never tired of prostrat
ing himself with unwonted reverence." Later, in his
discussion of Toland, we learn that "the whole of his
philosophy was substantially derived from his Master,
Locke"; that he "is a follower of Locke, and in the path
which leads to the purely sceptical solution of Hume";
that "Locke, the Unitarians, Toland, form a genuine
series, in which Christianity is being gradually trans
muted by larger infusions of rationalism"; and that
"Collins was a favored disciple of Locke."1

Thus according to Stephen, Locke is the father of the
revolutionary systems of the next century. It is true
Locke himself strongly held to the supernatural factors
in religion and saw no conflict between revelation and
reason ; but he was the teacher of a generation that more
and more denied all positive religion. "Locke strikes,
in all subjects of which he treats, the keynote of English
speculation in the eighteenth century."2 Stephen makes
him very largely responsible for later Deism.

Very much in the same spirit we read under "Deism,"
in the latest edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica:
"In England the new philosophy had broken with time-
honored beliefs more completely than it had done even
in France. Hobbes was more startling than Bacon.
Locke's philosophy, as well as his theology, served as a

1 Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New
York, 1876), I, 94 ff., 109, no.
3 Ibid., p. 94.

Solutions of the Problem 21

school for the Deists. Men had become weary of
Protestant scholasticism."

Though Falkenberg says but little that bears directly
on this problem, that which he does say is very clear.
In his History of Modern Philosophy he tells us that
"Locke's demand for the subjection of faith to rational
criticism assures him an honorable place in the history
of English Deism" and that the " development of Deism
from Toland on is under the direct influence of Rational
Christianity. "x

Windleband holds a more conservative view and
states it very circumspectly. He places Locke as the
leader of the English Enlightenment.2 Then later,
in his discussion of natural religion, he notes the tendency
of the Enlightenment to seek "the universal true
Christianity by means of philosophy. True Christianity
is in this sense identified with the religion of reason or

1 Pp. 175, 181. Weber in his History of Philosophy, p. 391, says:
"The freethinkers, who flourished in Great Britain and on the continent
at the end of this period, and the philosophers proper, whom we have
still to consider, are likewise descendants of Locke." Apparently Locke
is as responsible for Deism as he is for Empiricism. H. E. Cushman
in his Beginner's History of Philosophy (Boston, 1911) takes the same
position as Weber. He traces various movements back to Locke, such
as the empirical idealism of Berkeley and Hume, the sensationalism of
the French and Deism. The Lockian philosophy of religion is made
responsible for the deistic movement. And A. K. Rogers in his Student's
History of Philosophy (New York, 1910) expresses almost the same!/
views. He says, "Deism was an attempt to get rid of the supposed!
irrational elements of Christianity. It begins with a desire to explain \\
away the mysteries of church dogma, and to show that between revelation
and reason there is no contradiction. Thus, in Locke, it calls man back \
from theology to the simplicity and reasonableness of the New Testa
ment, whose one essential article of faith is the Messiahship of Christ." \
Deism is in the writings of Locke.

* W. Windleband, A History of Philosophy (New York, 1893), p. 439-

22 John Locke and English Deism

natural religion."1 This universal, true Christianity
was at first " allowed the character of a revealed religion,"
which was in complete agreement with reason; revela
tion is above reason but in harmony with it. Such was
the position of Locke and Leibnitz. "Proceeding from
this idea," the Socinians had gone farther, and, though
recognizing the necessity of revelation, they accepted
only that as revealed which was rationally accessible.
The next step was to set aside revelation as superfluous,
which was done by the English Deists. Thus Windle-
band clearly places Locke in this historical lineage of
Deism, but stops short of definitely identifying him with
the movement; he suggests, but does not emphasize, his
causal relation to it.

Hoffding's view seems to be very much like that of
Windleband, though he expresses it less cautiously. In
his larger History of Modern Philosophy, it is merely
touched upon. "The displeasure at Locke's theological
standpoint was increased by the fact that it approxi
mated so closely to that of the Deists that a work such
as John Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious, which
appeared in 1696, and which was publicly burnt at
Dublin the following year, seemed only to be its natural
outcome."2 In his Brief History of Modern Philosophy,
he states his views more plainly, without, however,
committing himself very clearly to any theory which
would make Locke the progenitor of the Deists. He
says: " The English, j^efithiiikers (the so-called Deists)
developed Locke's philosophy of religion more""fulI)Tiri

'W. Windleband, A History of Philosophy (New York, 1893),
pp. 487, 488.

1 Op. cit., p. 381.

Solutions of the Problem 23

the direction of a more pronounced rationalism."1 He
sees that there is a close resemblance between Locke's
views and those of the Deists; so much so that Toland's
book seemed to be the natural outcome of the Lockian
position. The Deists merely developed Locke's philos
ophy of religion farther in the direction of rationalism.
He does not say that Locke is a Deist; but he holds that
his philosophy of religion and the deistic doctrines form
a continuous line of development.

In the views of Windleband and Hoffding there is /\T
some suggestion of the theory which presents Locke
and the Deists as one movement, the acknowledged
divergence being due to the fact that the Deists V>J
from Toland on simply carry out that which was
implicitly present in Locke's religious views from
the beginning. Radical Deism would then be a
later and more fully developed stage in the same
movement.

It is either this view, or the one which makes Locke
and the Deists constituent parts of one larger movement
embracing other elements, that we find in von Hertling.
He says : "Deism marks a further stage in the advancing
development of rationalism in England. Locke and the
theologians of Cambridge belong to an earlier period;
but the development is thoroughly consistent."2 How
much does "ra^iojiaJism^Jn^England'' include? Is it Vj
made up only of the Cambridge Platonists, Locke and
the Deists; or are there also other similar elements,
which with these constitute one movement ? From the

1 A Brief History of Modern Philosophy (New York, 1912), p. 95.

2 G. von Hertling, John Locke und die Schule von Cambridge,
p. 176.

24 John Locke and English Deism

context we may infer that perhaps Tillotson belonged
here; but we get no definite answer.1

2. IN THE SPECIAL STUDY BY CROUS

In 1910 there appeared as No. 34 in the series
Abhandlungen zur Philosophic und ihrer Geschichte a
pamphlet by Ernst Crous, under the title Die Religions-
philosophischen Lehren Lockes und ihre Stellung zu dem
Deismus seiner Zeit. The fore part of this, that is Die
Religionsphilosophischen Lehren Lockes, had been pub
lished before as his Doctor's thesis, prepared under the
guidance of Benno Erdmann. So far as is known to the
writer, this is the only special study of the relation of
Locke to Deism that has appeared; and it is limited to
contemporary Deism. Crous devotes a little more than
one page to the influence of Locke on later Deism. We
give both his arguments and his conclusions in condensed
form.

After a brief presentation of the views of Herbert and
Hobbes, he sets forth the essential elements of the Deism
of this early stage as follows :

Reason is to be thoroughly applied to every field of religious
life: It decides concerning the claims of revelation; .... it
investigates the essence and origin of religion; it places all religions,
Paganism as well as Christianity, on the same basis, in that it
brings them all before its own judgment seat; it seeks in all

1 A. C. McGiffert in Protestant Thought before Kant (New York,
1911) discusses rationalism in England from almost the same point of
view (pp. 189 ff.). He puts Deism and at least some of the liberal
theologians in one group, but he distinguishes men like Tillotson,
Clarke, and Locke from the Deists and describes them as "supernatural

Solutions of the Problem 25

religions the higher unity of the religion of reason and nature,
and undertakes to reduce Christianity as nearly as possible
to this ideal; .... it finds the essence of piety in morality
(pp. 96 ff.)-

Toland, Collins, Blount, and Locke accepted this
program, though Locke refused to go as far as Blount and
Collins, who make reason our only source of religious
knowledge. But in determining the relation between
reason and revelation, which now becomes the great \/
question, Locke was the leader. He recognizes both as
sources of human knowledge; however reason must
decide upon the genuineness and sense of revelation.
Thus in reality revelation is subjected to reason. This
was a clear statement of the deistic doctrines. It is
true we find certain modifications, but everywhere are
the thoughts of Locke (p. 103).

Though Locke, in the matter of biblical criticism, is
much more careful than the Deists of his time, he agrees
with them concerning the interpretation of the Bible.
He "demands that we understand the Scripture in the
literal sense, considering, however, the whole background
and all the conditions that influenced its composition"
(p. 104).

According to the Deists the chief characteristics of
true religion are clearness and reasonableness; reason
can reveal to us all that is necessary to salvation;
natural religion is superior to revealed religion. Locke
did not share these views (pp. 105-6).

But when we come to the teachings concerning God, -,t
Locke again becomes the leader of the Deists. "He
examines the formation of our idea of God and proves
the existence of God, not from revelation or experience,

26 John Locke and English Deism

but from reason; and asserts that God's being is incom
prehensible to us, though God can be known so far as
such a knowledge is necessary for life and happiness."
The writings of the Deists show plainly how influential
Locke's teachings on this point were (p. 107).
\/' "In complete agreement with contemporary Deism,
and without any distinctive character of conception or
statement, Locke holds that prayer, thanksgiving, and a
virtuous life constitute the true worship of God. In
agreement with Blount and Bury he considers morality
the most important element in religion" (p. 109).

That Christianity must be reasonable, and that it is
/ really nothing else than natural religion, which the
Deists sought to show, was essentially the opinion of
Locke (pp. 110-12).

"In the demand for toleration Locke stands on the
same ground with all the Deists" (p. 112).

According to Crous we can sum up the relation of
Locke's philosophy of religion to contemporary Deism
thus:

Locke is a Deist in so far as he appeals to reason in all religious
matters. In the Deism of that period and in its field of interest
, sometimes he is the leader, sometimes he is a fellow-worker; now
he is forerunner, again he opposes the movement which is pressing
; forward irresistibly. In demanding tolerance he was the leader
; among the Deists. In the doctrine concerning God he advanced
' their cause when he applied his theory of knowledge also to the
idea of God and furnished his own particular proof of His existence.
; In delimiting reason and revelation he brought to a close the
' attempts of older Deism, and at the same time provided a basis
for further discussion. It is true that in the question as to the
essence of Christianity he offers no new thoughts, but he gave to
the old deistic doctrines their most fitting expression. In his

Solutions of the Problem 27

explanation of the Bible, in his conception of worship, and in his
judgment concerning heathenism he shared, on the whole, the
current views of Deism without enriching them by his own con
tributions. In his judgment concerning the meaning and value
of Christianity he sought to mediate between the Deists and their
opponents, and, finally, in biblical criticism he turns altogether
away from Deism (pp. 113-14).

Later Deism was not able to add anything to the
discussion concerning the idea and being of God, or to say
anything new on toleration. In the spirit of Locke it
recognized the possibility of an external revelation but
made its authority depend upon its conformity to reason
and moral truth and evaluated it as a means of instruc
tion or training. In the treatment of the problem of
miracles they went far beyond Locke. In outspoken
opposition to Locke, Tindal, Chubb, and Morgan limit
Christianity to a renewal of natural religion. But later
Deists show the influence of Locke: "Morgan especially
conceives the meaning of Christian revelation exactly
as Locke did" (pp. 114-15).

3. RESUME

It is not difficult to sum up the results at which the
authors quoted have arrived. Several of them, espe
cially Uberweg and Fischer, say little that bears directly
on our problem. They are content to state the most
important facts and stop there. They clearly recognize
that there is some sort of relation between Locke and
Deism, but they venture no theory as to what it is.
Windleband recognizes a close relation between them,
but does not place Locke among the Deists, though he
clearly holds that he influenced the movement. Von

a8 John Locke and English Deism

Hertling recognizes Locke and Deism and the Cambridge
Platonists as distinguishable parts of a larger movement,
which he calls "rationalism in England," and which is
not further denned. But a large majority of those who
have offered solutions to the problem which we are
studying consider Locke very closely related to Deism
in a causal way, if he is not one of them: he is their
"progenitor"; they "are the descendants of Locke";
"from his theory of religion came Deism"; he "has an
honorable place in the history of Deism." In almost all
essential respects he is one of them — sometimes their
leader, sometimes one who goes with them. There is a
strong tendency to link him up very closely with the
movement, to make him largely responsible for it or to
identify him with it.

The investigators in the field of the history of
philosophy whose views have been set forth, with the
exception of Crous, have given us their results, not their
methods. However they had no occasion to do so.
Their task was the reconstruction, in the form of a
written account, of the course of the development of
thought, more especially of philosophical speculation.
Accordingly their chief purpose was to present to us the
results of their investigations; they may or may not
indicate the methods that they followed. And yet they
frequently present their results in such a way that one
can guess their methods with some degree of certainty.

Looking over the passages cited above and studying
them in their context, one cannot avoid the conclusion
that the writers laid great emphasis upon the genetic or
developmental way of viewing history. The individual
systems appear as links in one great chain which extends

Solutions of the Problem 29

from age to age, from epoch to epoch, in the record of
human thought. Locke's system was the normal devel
opment of that which preceded him and had in it the
germs of that which was to follow; or, using Stephen's
figure, he was the progenitor of the eighteenth-century
iconoclasts. That is the linear, the one-dimensional
character of the development of thought is emphasized;
the various systems are made to appear as successive
units in a linear series. This way of looking at things
in the past is modified somewhat in certain instances,
particularly by Windleband (perhaps also by von Hert-
ling), whose purpose is to trace the development of
concepts rather than individual systems. As a result
he emphasizes more than others the contemporary
relations of the great leaders. Historical movements
are made to appear as the work of many minds; the
great men cease to be the sole bearers of progress;
however they still remain leaders. That is Windleband
emphasizes the fact that the course of the development
of thought in any given period has breadth as well as
the linear character: it is more like a web than a single
line.

In the special study of Crous we have a complete
record of his investigations; we can follow him step by
step to his conclusions; his method is as clear as his
results. He too emphasizes the genetic way of interpret
ing history; but in selecting his characteristic factors
or characteristic points of view, which he traces from
early Deism through Locke to later Deism, as well as in
determining Locke's relation to contemporary Deism,
he is satisfied when he establishes resemblance. Herbert,
Hobbes, Toland, Blount, and Collins assign a certain

30 John Locke and English Deism

authority to reason in matters of religion; Locke does
the same: therefore in this respect he is a Deist. All the
Deists advocate toleration; so does Locke, and utters his
plea more powerfully than any of them; therefore "in
the demand for toleration he was the leader among the
Deists." Without any critical study resemblance is
naively taken as a criterion for relatedness ; the historical
background, in which the resemblance appears, seems
to have no meaning for him.

CHAPTER III
THE METHOD

I. A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF ERROR IN THE
GENETIC METHOD

We saw that in the study of the history of the
development of thought the genetic method was pre
ferred by those who have investigated this particular
field. It is the method that now prevails in historical
investigations. The idea of development shapes our
thinking when we attempt to reconstruct the past; our
age is under the spell of evolution. But there lurk in
the genetic method, when it is applied to a study of the
progress of thought, certain dangers that we must be
careful to avoid. It is a selective method; it takes from
the period that is under consideration that which later
became historically significant. But there is danger
here, for when you center attention on one factor in a
period you are likely to ignore or underestimate the
importance of other motives. That which later became
historically important may eclipse all else. The result
is that the history as reconstructed lacks elements that
were influential in shaping the course of events when the
history was being made. The genetic or linear view of
the development of thought is that which we get when
we travel the main highways of progress: we learn to
know the great men whose thought marked epochs in
the world's history; but we often miss their lesser fellows

31

32 John Locke and English Deism

who formed, as it were, the background on which the
great men appeared, which helped to determine their
positions, and without which it is impossible to make any
historical reconstruction of a period that will do full
justice to all its elements. The genetic method in the
study of the history of philosophy is not rejected here;
but attention is called to a possible source of error in its
use. If it is not applied comprehensively and critically,
we are likely to miss factors that were influential in
determining the movements in the period that is under
consideration. It will be used in this study, but it will
be applied in such manner as is best suited to our present
problem.

2. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM DETERMINES
THE METHOD

In one sense it is not difficult to define a proper
method. In general we can say that a right method is
such a mode of procedure as will enable us to realize our
purposes. Now these, our purposes, whatever else
they may be, are not capriciously chosen goals but are
relevant to some particular field of interest. The tiller
of the soil has problems pertaining to his sphere of action,
which are determined by the needs to be supplied and
by the other factors with which he deals. The questions
that an architect must answer grow out of the situation
that he, as an architect, is called upon to meet — a build
ing is to be reared by labor from certain materials, and
his method of procedure at each stage is chosen in view
of these factors. Likewise the student of history finds
that his plan for reconstructing the past is determined
both by the sort of reconstruction that is desired and by

The Method 33

the character of the materials that are available. The
sort of reconstruction that is desired and the character
of the given data are the two factors that constitute the
nature of a historical problem. That is, the nature of a
given historical problem determines the method to be
followed in solving it.

3. THE METHOD INDICATED FOR THIS PROBLEM

This investigation undertakes to determine, as far
as possible, what sort of relation exists between Locke
and English Deism. Or putting it in another form, How
can we best conceive their relation, from what point of
view can we get the best understanding of it? Which
one of the possible theories concerning their relation
enables us to co-ordinate the largest number of relevant
facts in a significant way ?

As has been shown, they are near each other in time.
The span of Locke's life from 1632 to 1704 extended over
at least a part of the life of almost every one of the
Deists. But during their productive periods he was a
contemporary of only a few of them; the deistic move
ment proper did not reach its period of greatest activity
until after his death. Furthermore Locke and Deism
have much in common; in rational speculation in the
field of religion they often discuss the same problems,
and in doing so they use largely the same concepts.

^ This would suggest the possibility of his having
influenced it, that Deism was in some way and to some
extent dependent on Locke; for it is a well-known fact
that he exerted some molding influence on almost every
movement of consequence of his own and the succeeding
generation.

34 John Locke and English Deism

There are two lines of investigation that are open to
us here. On the one hand, we may compare the respec
tive systems and note the resemblances and differences
and then interpret this simple relation of resemblance
in terms of some other relation which may be closer,
perhaps in terms of causal linkage or of co-ordinate
relation as members of a larger whole. And on the other
hand, we can search the contemporary literature for
data that may help us to define the sort of relation that
exists between them, for in order to know how Deism
is related to Locke we must know how both are related
to thinkers of their own and previous periods.

With the situation stated in this way, it would seem
that the methodological problem is simple. Get your
catalogue of likenesses and differences and interpret them
critically, collect your other data and draw your con
clusions. But in making any comparisons whatsoever
between Locke and Deism for the purpose of establish
ing likenesses and differences, and in searching out
historical linkages between them, we have already tacitly
assumed that we know what we mean when we speak of
Locke and English Deism; we presuppose that they are
clearly defined historical units. Now a clear definition
of a system of thought, either for the purpose of com
parison or with a view to searching out its historical
connections, is such a description as contains all of its
characteristic features, that is, those elements that mark
it as different from other systems of thought, that set
boundaries so that you can treat it as something definite
and clearly distinguishable. Hence if you want to find
out what a system of thought really is, you cannot do
so by studying it in its isolation; you must study it in

The Method 35

connection with other related systems; definition points
you beyond the thing defined to the background in
which it appears.

Furthermore when you undertake to define two
systems of thought for the purpose of making a com
parison between them, it is assumed that the comparison
shall have meaning relevant to some purpose. In the
present instance the comparison between Locke and
English Deism is to have significance for the determina
tion of the sort and degree of relation that exists between
them. For this end mere likeness is of little or no value.
It could have no more sense or significance for the
purpose in view than there would be in saying that two
men resemble each other in that both have excellent
health, when the purpose is to compare them as scholars.
If likenesses and differences, which constitute com
parison, are to have meaning, they must be relevant
to the field of interest, which is determined by our
purposes.

But a further question now arises. How can we
know when a given likeness or difference has significance
for the determination of the kind and degree of relation,
or when is a comparison meaningful for our purpose ?
To answer this concretely : We find both Locke and the
Deists urging toleration. Is it significant for the solu
tion of "our problem to say that Locke and the Deists are
alike in this respect ? Not at all, for we shall see other
men and other groups of men advocating it also. Again
we find both Locke and the Deists magnifying the impor
tance of grounding religion rationally and emphasizing
natural religion. Here we have another resemblance,
but we cannot tell what it means until we have examined

36 John Locke and English Deism

other systems adjacent in time and have determined
what role these motives played in them. That is, if,
in the determination of the relation between Locke and
Deism, we are to use comparison, the likenesses and
differences that we use must be significant for our
purposes, and we can recognize such significance only by
studying them on the background of the thought of the
age in which these systems appeared.

One feature, therefore, of our problem is a study of
Locke and Deism in relation to English thought in the
seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth
century, which is the period in which these systems were
developed.

However it may not be necessary for us to concern
ourselves with all the various fields of human interest
of this age; it is possible that that which is relevant to
our purpose can be found within a comparatively small
and well-defined portion of it. But in order to get the
general background and to define in it our particular
field of investigation, we must first make a survey in
large outline of the thought of the age. We must, in a
general way, see what men are thinking about and what
motives control their thinking. We must note what
general tendencies prevail. Then we can define systems,
first in terms of interests or subjects thought about, and
second in terms of tendencies of thought or points of
view. And having defined Locke and Deism in this way,
we shall have a foundation for making comparisons and
getting other historical data that will enlighten us con
cerning the relation that exists between them.

When we seek to bring the thought of this age into
a comprehensive outline, we can probably do it to best

The Method 37

advantage by grouping it about four chief, centers of
interest.

First, there were the politico-economic interests
which concerned everybody. Probably in no other
sphere of life is the evidence so plain that this was a
period of transition. Within less than half a century
the government had been overthrown three times.
Perhaps in no other period of English history has
political life been so intense. There were long-continued
and bitter parliamentary and military conflicts, and
the public debate by means of books and pamphlets was
most vigorous.1

Second, there were the religion and theological
interests, in which we, at least for the seventeenth '
century, include the ethical. Perhaps the age was more
noted for sectarian rivalry than for piety. But be
that as it may, the situation in the field of organized
religion — and this included almost everybody — was
intense. The principles of toleration were slowly
gaining; but the rule of the Peace of Augsburg was to a
large extent enforced by the party in power.2 The
administration of the affairs of the church was entangled
with the political fortunes of the nation. All parties

1 "It has been computed that within the twenty years from 1640 to
1660, not less than thirty thousand pamphlets and treatises issued from
the press on the subject of ecclesiastical and civil government." — M.
Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy (Leipzig, 1890), p. 4.

2 During the controversies that accompanied and followed the
Reformation, there was a modus vivendi agreed upon at the Diet of
Augsburg in 1555, according to which the princes could select the type
of faith they preferred and enforce religious conformity to it in their
respective realms. The principle of the religious peace of Augsburg was
cujus regio ejus religio..

38 John Locke and English Deism

agreed in the conviction that the state must take account
of the religious welfare of its members.1 Thousands of
clergymen were turned out of their pulpits because they
refused to recognize the changes ordered by those in
authority.2 There were also the vigorous pamphlet
debates, to which almost all of the great men of the day
contributed.3 However toward the close of the seven
teenth century and during the fore part of the eighteenth
century, the religious life of the nation waned-.4

Third, there were the scientific interests, which
occupied the attention of some of the greatest minds of
the age. In true Baconian spirit men were ceasing to
reason out how things must be and were beginning to
observe how they are. Perhaps no fact has more sig
nificance in this connection than the founding of the
Royal Society for Improving Natural Knowledge. It
was the century of Harvey, Boyle, Sydenham, and
Newton. The number of real scientists was growing,
but there were still comparatively few.

Fourth, there were the philosophical interests, which
were represented by a still smaller number of learned
men. Bacon was perhaps rather a maker of programs
than a philosopher; Hobbes conceived a great mechan
ical system, but he stood alone and had practically no
followers; Locke founded the empirical school of
philosophy; and the Cambridge Platonists were an

1 Bourne, Life of John Locke, I, 1-66.
3 Ibid., p. 96.

3 Hobbes, Milton, Boyle, Newton, Locke, and many other scholarly
laymen, and almost all of the prominent clergymen.

4 Abbey and Overton, The English Church in the Eighteenth Century
(London, 1878), I, i, 2.

The Method 39

influential group. There are never many philosophers
in any period, and there were not many here; but some
of them were pathfinders.

There were these four great fields of human interest.
Within each one of these four fields, there were two
divergent tendencies, the conservative and the liberal.
And though all shades of opinions were represented,
broadly there were but two parties, the conservative
and the liberal.

The conservative party represented -the hold that
tradition always has on the minds of many men. It
sought to avoid change, to maintain things just as they
had been; it was prone to appeal to authority, to deter
mine issues of today by yesterday. In politics it
generally stood for the divine,j:4gfet-0f-tings ; in religious
matters, for revived scholasticism- in : theology and for
intolerance;1 in_science it opposed the Baconian reform;
and in "philosophy it was still quoting Aristotle and the
Schoolmen.2

Over against this conservative, tradition-loving
group was the critical or rationalistic or liberal party.
As we shall see later, it protested against tradition and
authority in the name of reason and nature.3 It used

'Bishop Sprat in 1667 felt that it was necessary "to defend the
Fellows from the attacks and criticisms of Aristotelian philosophers.
.... He tells us, indeed, that the objects and cavils of the detractors of
so noble an Institution, did make it necessary for him to write of it, not
in the way of a plain history, but as an apology." — Weld, History of the
Royal Society, I, Preface.

3 Bourne, op. cit., I, 47.

3 These two focal concepts of progressive speculation were inherited
from a former period; an account of their origin and use would be inter
esting, but it would not be relevant to our problem.

4Q John Locke and English Deism

these two concepts for correcting or criticizing or ground
ing institutions and for constructing systems. It
represented a constructive and progressive motive as
well as critical; it was by no means merely the expression
of a negative spirit.

Though these two tendencies of thought are present
in each of the four fields of interest described above, for
the purposes of this investigation we can limit our atten
tion almost wholly to the rationalistic-critical move
ment, for it is here that we find Locke and the Deists.
The conservative motive in the thought of England of
this period concerns us only as a common object of
attack for all the progressive thinkers; hence it has a
negatively determinative value.

We shall now submit a tentative definition of Lockian
,. thought and of Deism. As we shall see later, it will be
inadequate ; in some respects we shall require something
more definite. But it is sufficient for the purpose of
determining more closely our field of investigation and"
for pointing out the lines that must be followed. In
making this preliminary definition for our guidance, we
have no difficulty in getting Locke's views; we know
where to look for them, they are easily accessible. But
when we come to the Deists the task is not so simple.
As is generally the case with a movement or school of
thinkers, it does not have a clear outline. We are, as
it were, feeling our way, looking for the path that will
lead us to our goal. For the present we accept as proper
representatives of the deistic movement only those
thinkers who have been generally recognized as con
stituting the movement when it was at its height —
Blount, Toland, Collins, Tindal, Wollaston, Woolston,

The Method , 41

Morgan, Chubb, and Herbert Jwho was the father of the
movement in England.1

' In politics Locke was Jiberal; the Deists showed
little or no interest.

In theology and religion Locke was rationalistic and
critical in method and conservative in results;2 the
Deists were rationalistic and critical in method, and in
their results were increasingly hostile to positive Chris
tianity.3

In science Locke was liberal and progressive; the
Deists showed no interest.4

In philosophy Locke was progressive, his method
was rationalistic and critical; in so far as individual
Deists had a system of philosophy, it represented the
new movements. I

We could define in like manner any other men or
movements of this time, but it is not necessary. We

1 Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy, I, 379; Falkenberg,
History of Modern Philosophy, p. 179.
3 Essay, IV, xviii, 5, 6.

3 Toland wrote Christianity Not Mysterious to prove that there was
nothing in religion that was above reason. He accepted miracles (pp. 47,
90, 147) and assumes the divine origin of Scripture (Preface, pp. xv,
xxiv, 4, 18, 38, 41, and elsewhere). When we come to Tindal, we find
in Christianity as Old as Creation (London, 1735) a certain hostility to
miracles which is not well denned; they have no evidential value (pp.
200, 370). "There are no miracles recorded in the Bible, but many of
the like nature are to be found in pagan histories" (p. 192). He unhesi
tatingly sets up natural religion as the norm for all religions (pp. 59, 67,
69). Morgan asserts that so-called supernatural revelation cannot be
relied upon, for there is confusion everywhere and man has nothing left
but reason (Physico-Theology). These opinions may be taken as typical
of the deistic movement when it was at its height.

4 Bourne in his Life of John Locke gives several accounts of observa
tions that he made in medicine and of his interest in the scientific dis
coveries of Boyle, Sydenham, and Newton.

42 John Locke and English Deism

shall have occasion to refer to their formative principles
and to their conclusions, but it would not further our
purpose to define them here.

From the definitions of Locke and Deism just given,
it is clear that our field of investigation is limited; it
covers only a part of the whole sphere of interests of
England of the seventeenth century. Toleration has a
political aspect, but it can be considered along with the
religious interests. The deistic philosophy and its
relations are unimportant. Both will be studied with
the direct internal evidences of dependence of the Deists
on Locke. Thus our investigation is limited almost
exclusively to the theological and religious field and to
the liberal thinkers in it.

4. RESULT OF THIS STUDY OF METHOD

In summing up this study of method we find that
we can determine the sort and degree of relation
that exists between Locke and English Deism, first, by
making comparisons — that is, by setting forth likenesses
and differences, and then interpreting them critically;
secondly, by collecting and interpreting other relevant
historical data. Both of these operations involve clear
definition which is the determination of characteristic
features; and this can be done only with reference to
the whole background on which Locke and Deism
appeared. Thus our investigation leads to a more or
less extended study of the whole liberal movement of
this period.

But we are confronted at once by an embarrassing
situation. We are to make a comparison, and a compari
son presupposes that we have already clearly denned the

The Method 43

elements that are being compared; whereas we have
thus far only tentative definitions of Lockian thought
and Deism. There is confusion and contradiction here
that cannot be avoided. It arises from the fact that
in the last analysis definition and comparison are not
separable processes. Perhaps we should say that they
are the same process regarded from the points of view of
different interests. In definition we set forth the char
acteristic features of that which is defined for the pur
pose of identification, and in comparison we do the
same for the purpose of studying it in certain relations.
The two processes advance pari passu. There can be
no clear definition which is not ultimately a comparison,
and there is no comparison which does not at least to
some extent define. In this study we shall gradually
approach our definition of Locke's religious views and
of Deism by the progressive elimination of factors that
by critical comparison are found to be irrelevant. We
shall then see what the likenesses and differences that
exist between Locke and Deism mean in terms of some
other relation.

With this understanding of the scope or our investi
gation, we shall first compare Locke and Deism with
respect to their point of view. Both were rationalistic,
both appealed to nature and reason in their speculations.
We shall study the use that was made by them and by
others of these two focal concepts.

Then we shall compare the conclusions at which they
arrive concerning disputed points in the field of theo
logical and religious interests. But in order to do this
we must take into consideration the teachings of their
contemporaries who discussed the same subjects.

44 John Locke and English Deism

And finally we shall examine the direct evidences of
relation between Locke and Deism.

This is simply the genetic method with more emphasis
than usual placed upon the study of contemporary
thought. It aims to avoid the error that is likely to be
made if the linear character of the development of any
movement is so emphasized that significant factors are
neglected. A number of those whose views have been
quoted in chapter ii seem to have committed this error.
It is as if they found certain elements in Locke, and find
ing them in Deism, perhaps further developed, they
conclude, apparently without any further investigation,
that Locke accounted wholly or in very large measure
for Deism or was a part of the deistic movement.1

This method also differs widely from that which
Crous followed in his special study, as set forth in the
preceding chapter. He also makes comparisons between
Locke and Deism. But in the method that is advocated
here, agreements and differences are studied critically on
the background of what others were thinking at the same
time, and they are interpreted in the light of con
temporary thought. Whereas Crous simply noted like
nesses and differences, and, without determining their
significance by a more extended comparison with what
other men were then thinking, rather naively balances
his list of likenesses and differences and concludes that
in most respects Locke was a Deist.

1 If we may venture a theory as to whence this conviction arose, we
would suggest that it may be due to Voltaire, who considered Locke the
father of all eighteenth-century movements, including the very radical
systems of France. When the writers of histories of philosophy discuss
Voltaire, their style has the vividness that is characteristic of the pres
entation of first-hand information; while their description of the English
Deists often has a hesitant and somewhat uncertain manner which may
indicate that their information is, in part at least, second hand.

CHAPTER IV
THE TWO FOCAL CONCEPTS

At this time everybody, at least every progressive
thinker, appealed to nature and reason in grounding
institutions and principles. In this Locke and the
Deists agree; both were rationalistic and critical in
method, as were also the other representatives of the
progressive movement. The Deists differed from Locke /
and the other liberal thinkers in that they applied the
rationalistic method more radically. "

In setting forth the use that was made of these two
focal concepts of speculative thought in England in the
seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth
century, it will be convenient to study the progressive
thinkers in three groups: the Rational Theologians,
the Philosophers among whom is Locke, and the
Deists.

I. ORIGIN OF THE TWO FOCAL CONCEPTS OF

RATIONALISTIC-CRITICAL

SPECULATION

We have described Locke, Deism, and certain other
men and movements of this age as liberal or progressive,
that is, as rationalistic and critical. This is descriptive
of their intellectual attitude toward the problems they
were considering. They were not prone to appeal to
authority; they rather protested against authority, or
scholasticism and tradition, in the name of freedom of

45

46 John Locke and English Deism

thought. They emphasized free investigation. In the
first chapter we saw that this was the normal result of
the progressive emancipation of man intellectually,
scientifically, religiously, politically. This movement
had its roots far back in the centuries. Man brought to
light again the treasures of the ancient world, and this
stimulated independent thought. He discovered nature,
and himself as a part of it, and also that these ideas did
not fit the authoritatively transmitted systems. Some
seeing saw not, but many followed the new vision of
truth; and their mental horizon grew until it could no
longer be forced to fit mediaeval forms. And each
discovery or invention was not merely so much achieved ;
newly discovered truth became at once a stimulus to
seek more truth. A new spirit was moving, and moving
mightily in the dawning of a new age.

But not only were scientific and philosophical systems
challenged; all institutions, human and divine, were
called upon to give an account of themselves. Once
man had discovered nature, he began to explain things in
terms of nature. In this he was helped by the new
learning, which enabled him to know the prominent part
that the concept of nature had played in the speculations
of Greek and Roman thinkers. Before this, explanation
had been almost entirely in terms of the supernatural;
but now, in the new age, the concept of nature is used
as an ultimate for grounding institutions. Grotius
bases the authority of law, not on theological sanctions,
but on human nature. Society is founded on principles
that are in man — ex principiis homini internist And
Hobbes would account for the state by making it a

1 Hoffding, Brief History of Modern Philosophy, p. n.

The Two Focal Concepts 47

convenient device for escaping conditions that were
intolerable. Yet these conditions, which made neces
sary a society ordered under laws, sprang from the
fundamental principles of human nature. In other
words, the state was negatively grounded in nature.

Rationalism was another motive in the critical
method which" was influential in determining its results.
This, however, was not foreign to the spirit of scholas
ticism when it was at its height. In fact the great
systems of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas had
in them the germs of that which later effected their
overthrow. Albert recognized the natural law of reason
as having authority in matters of religion. However
there are questions for which philosophy has no final
answer "and must remain standing before the antinomy
of different possibilities." Here revelation decides.
"Revelation is above reason, but not contrary to
reason."1 The position taken by Thomas Aquinas is
essentially the same — that knowledge, which man by his
unaided power can acquire, that is, philosophical knowl
edge, is but a lower stage in the realm of nature, which
is completed by revelation in the realm of grace. And
though the Scotists increased the dividing gulf between
reason and revelation, when the new age came we find
the leaders of the progressive tendency more and more
appealing to reason, and in the field of religion they give
it an authority along with revelation, and the most
radical finally place it above revelation. At first "they
conceive the relation between nature and revealed
religion quite in accordance with the example of Albert
and Thomas; revelation is above reason but in harmony

1 WindleJ&and, A History of Philosophy, p. 321.

48 John Locke and English Deism

with reason; it is the necessary supplement to natural
knowledge."1

Accordingly it was to be expected that, once the

rationalistic critical movement had begun in England,

religion would not long remain unchallenged. It was

also to be expected that when it was challenged it would

be in the name of nature and reason. If religion is true

I we should be able to know its truths by a rational

process, and we should find that it has its foundations in

rM the very nature of things. In the period that we are

^studying we find men using these two concepts in the

study of religious problems. They are the elements

which constitute the rationalistic-critical method.2

Nature and reason will be treated separately in this
study. However, in doing so we shall at times do
violence to certain systems. For though they are
generally distinguishable factors or motives in the
speculation of this period, they are by some writers
linked together in a way that is most puzzling. Even
that widely used inherited expression " natural light" is
not at all clear when we come to analyze it. It is made
to stand for that natural mental equipment of man by
which he comes into the possession of knowledge ; hence
it includes reason. Thus reason would appear as a part
of nature; and as a matter of fact it is often treated as
such. And again it seems to include not only the innate

1 Windleband, A History of Philosophy, p. 487.

2 This brief account of the source of the two motives, that we are
here considering as applied in matters of religion, is in no sense an
exhaustive discussion of their genesis; that lies beyond the purpose
of this study. We are undertaking a study of certain problems in which
they are involved and by way of introduction have indicated their
probable origin, which is sufficient for the present purposes.

The Two Focal Concepts 49

capacities of man, but also that truth, more especially
religious and moral truth, which he can know from the
world about him. We shall find that there is no con
sistent usage of the term reason or natural light. Its
meaning varies often in the same writer. It is probable
that some used it without any clear notion as to just
what they meant by it.

There are also different senses of the concept nature.]
It sometimes is just the sensible world, the mechanically
ordered realm about us. As such it stands in contrast
with the spiritual world including God and man, or with
the supernatural. Again it is made to include both of
these. Then it is the whole of reality, the sum total
of all being; and in this sense nothing is supernatural.
Sometimes it seems to be an exaggerated idea of the
immanence of God in His world. Then nature and God
become almost identical; what nature does is the act of
Deity. And often it means the native capacities in man,
his natural endowment by which he is able to know
truth, especially principles of action, God and his duty
toward Him. And there are those who consider nature
an eternal, unchangeable order, apparently independent
of God, to which God and men in willing and acting
must conform. We shall find some men consistently
holding to one or another of these views, while others
seem to use the term in several different senses.

The limitation of such a study as this prevents an
exhaustive presentation of the part that this concept of
nature plays in all of the important systems that were
produced by the liberal thinkers of this period; the
investigation will therefore be limited to those that were
typical or influential.

50 John Locke and English Deism

2. THE USE OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
A. THE RATIONAL THEOLOGIANS

Richard Hooker'^ ^E^desi^ica] Polity was much
quoted by~aTTparties in this period, including the Deists.
Locke refers to him as the "judicious Hooker" in his
Essay and speaks of him as an authority in his Two
Treatises of Government.

He is seeking to derive order, more especially ecclesi
astical order, not only from revelation, but also from
nature. All government is based on this,1 whatever
form the government may take.2 But nature is not
conceived as something entirely separate from God; it
"is nothing else but His instrument."3 Nature as well
as revelation teaches us that order must take the place
of contention. "But of this we are right sure, that
nature, Scripture, and experience itself, have all taught
the world to seek for the ending of contentions." This
results in establishing order.4 Natural law is estab
lished by God; it is from God, by God's command.5
Thus according to Hooker God is the author of nature,
her laws are of His making, her voice is His instrument;
hence he can well say: "obedience of creatures unto the
law of nature is the stay of the whole world."6 Things
revealed in Scripture or in nature have the same divine
authority.7 For nature is of God, her order is from Him,

1 Essay, IV, xvii, 7; Two Treatises of Government, Book II, chap. ii.

2 Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, Works (Oxford, 1888), I, 146;
P- 243-

3 Ibid., pp. 210, 227. s Ibid., pp. 206, 207.
* Ibid., p. 166. 6Ibid., p. 208.

7 John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy (London,
1872), I, 51.

The Two Focal Concepts 51

her message is His word to us for our guidance, natural
law is by His authority.

Even Stillingfleet, who later became Locke's critic,;
at least in his early period did not hesitate to say "the\
law of nature binds indispensably, as it depends not
upon any arbitrary constitution, but is founded on the
intrinsical nature of good and evil in things themselves."
Such a law "if we respect the rise, extent and immuta
bility of it, may be called deservedly the law of nature;
but if we look at the emanation, efflux and origin of it,
it is divine law," for "it depends upon the will of God"
and therefore the obligation must come from Him.1
And yet he tends to regard this law of nature, in its\
unchangeableness, as independent of God, for he also
says: "The law of nature, where it is clearly intelligible,
is paramount and cannot be superseded by any positive
human or divine enactments."2 God "cannot change
the nature of moral obedience. He cannot make good
evil or evil good."3 It seems that we have here two
different motives: the first is the voice of Hooker, the
second is like the view of the Cambridge Platonists.

In Tillotson, whom, according to Collins, "all
English freethinkers own as their head,"4 we find a like

'That which is deduced from the "perceptive law of nature is
of divine right." Quoted by Tulloch from Stillingfleet's Irenicum,
pp. 427, 428.

2 Tulloch, op. cit., I, 430.

3 In establishing and shaping church polity, Stillingfleet appeals
not only to Scripture and tradition but also to that which nature
dictates. He thus deduces the fundamental principles for organizing
the church (Tulloch, I, 437-38). The "light and the law of nature
should guarantee the right of appeal" (ibid., p. 441).

* A. Collins, A Discourse on Freethinking (London, 1713), p. 171.

52 John Locke and English Deism

use of nature as an ultimate term for giving account of
religion. He considered natural knowledge of God the
foundation for the ideas of good and evil and for all
revealed religion,1 the surest ground of religion.2 In
fact, "Christianity hath hardly imposed any other laws
upon us but what are enacted in our natures, or are
agreeable to the prime and fundamental laws of it."3

We may think that something of this kind was to be
expected from Tillotson, whose liberalism was recog
nized, though his orthodoxy was not seriously challenged;
but surely such a positive defender of Christianity
against Deism as Sherlock will sound a more positive
note. In his book, The Trial of the Witnesses, which
appeared in 1729, and in a few years ran through fourteen
editions, we have "the very centre of the orthodox
position."4 He says in a sermon that the law established
proper social relations which, often disregarded, give
occasion for repentance. Hence "repentance had refer
ence to the law of nature against which men had
offended."5 He refers to the "law of reason and nature,"
which had been darkened; yet "the general principles of
religion" were revealed in human nature.6 Tindal
quotes Sherlock on the title-page of Christianity as Old
as Creation as follows: "The religion of the Gospel is the
true original religion of reason and nature." Thus

1 John Tillotson, Works (London, 1720), I, 405, 406.

2 Ibid ., I, 436, 579.

3 Ibid, (gth ed., 1743), I, 128-74.

* Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, I, 243.
s T. Sherlock, Discourses Preached on Several Occasions (Oxford,
1797), V, 137.

6 Ibid., V, 136.

The Two Focal Concepts 53

nature is a datum from which, by a normal use of our
faculties, we can know religious truths without revela
tion. Both Tillotson and Sherlock are less clear than
Hooker as to what they mean by nature, but they go
beyond him in magnifying its importance in problems
of religion.

B. THE PHILOSOPHERS

Turning from the theologians to the philosophers,
including the Christian philosophers of Cambridge (we
shall consider Herbert with the Deists), we find that
Bacon's reforms emphasize nature, and that he recog
nized natural theology, although he assigned it a very
modest role. Hobbes in his world of matter and motion
reasons "back from the world to God," although God is
really incomprehensible to man; yet "if we went back
far enough we should necessarily reach an eternal cause
which did not in its turn have a cause."1 And organized
society is devised as an escape from an intolerable state
of nature; that is, the state is naturally though negatively
grounded. Moral duties "have their elementary basis
in human nature, but they derive all their social or
organic effect from the supreme political power"; and
religion, though it has its truths guaranteed by the
authority of the sovereign, "has a natural foundation in
human fear."2 In both Bacon and Hobbes philosophy
and theology are sharply separated from each other, the
natural stands in a clear contrast with the supernatural.
Their line of thought "takes as its foundation the data
of external or internal nature, and seeks starting from

1 Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy, I, 273.
* Tulloch, op. tit., II, 27, 28.

V « -

54 John Locke and English Deism

these to arrive, by means of induction or deduction, at
further results."

Among the philosophers "there is another tend
ency connected historically with Neo-Platonism, which
believes there is a foundation for the highest ideas,
more especially ethical ideas, which is exalted above all
experience."1 For the Cambridge Platonists, who were
among the chief opponents of Hobbes, there are eternal
truths objectively real and independent of the knowing
human subject. There are ultimate fixed standards of
morals,2 and religion must conform to similar norms.
If it does not refine, temper, and govern practice, it
" falls short of the very principles of nature."3 For
Culverwell, who if not of this school is near to it, nature
is " the origin of existence, it is the very genius of entity";
it "speaks the action of existence," and it is the principle
working in spirituals as well as "the source of motion
and rest in corporeals."4 And the law of nature is from
the eternal law; as Aquinas said, "The law of nature is
nothing but the copying out of the eternal law, and the

1 Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy, I, 287, 288.

2 "It is impossible anything should be by will only, that is, without
a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of anything should be
arbitrary." And concerning the moral law: Suppose such a law to be
established, it must be either right to obey it, and wrong to disobey it, or
indifferent whether we obey it or disobey it. But a law which it is
indifferent whether we obey or not cannot, it is evident, be the source of
moral distinctions; and on the contrary supposition, if it is right to obey
the law, and wrong to disobey it, these distinctions must have had an
existence antecedent to the law (R. Cudworth, Immutable Morality
[London, 1731], Book I, chap. i). And in like spirit, "Moral laws are
laws of themselves, without sanction by will" (Whichcote as quoted by
Tulloch, op. cit., II, 106).

JTulloch, op. tit., II, 106.

4 N. Culverwell, The Light of Nature (London, 1857), pp. 38, 39.

The Two Focal Concepts 55

imprinting of it upon the breast of a rational being."
But in Culverwell a sort of Christian pantheistic view of
nature prevails, which makes it dependent on or even
identical with God, rather than the Platonic motive
which has just been mentioned. This eternal law is not
distinguishable from God.1

Taking the school as a whole, they sought to account
for the highest ideas by assuming eternal and immutable
standards or archetypes, which with some men seem to
constitute a realm of reals separate from God; while in;
others the standards and the eternal law of nature seem
to be an expression of God Himself. It was character
istic of the school to hold that our knowledge of the law
of nature was an immediate certainty innate in the mind
of man.2

When we come to Locke the concept of nature,
although very important in some connections, seems to
play a less conspicuous part. He uses it in several
senses and is not always clear. In the Essay he refers
to the law of nature frequently, and sometimes in
important connections. Because he denies innate laws
he does not wish to be understood as denying that there
is a law of nature, which we can know by proper use of
our senses and faculties, that is, by the light of nature \
without revelation.3 This law of nature seems, at least

1 Ibid., pp. 50, 79, 98.

3 The devout scientist Boyle saw in nature a revelation of God
sufficiently clear to enable man to know Him and to grasp the funda
mental principles of natural religion, which is "the foundation upon
which revealed religion ought to be superstructed." From nature we
get as it were the stock upon which Christianity must be engrafted
(R. Bqyle's Works [London, 1744], V, 46, 685).

3 Jbhn Locke, Works, I, 44; also Essay,, i, iii, 13.

56 John Locke and English Deism

I in one form, to concern our duty toward God, as that
can be inferred by the unaided capacities of man.1 This
appears to be the same as "divine law," for he says that
by this he means "that law which God has set to the
actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the
light of nature, or the voice of revelation."2 There is an
order that arises from the nature of things, which we can
know by a proper application of our faculties. We may
infer that this order is from God, for He is the Creator
and Author of all things.3 Moral law is a part of the law
of nature, and has God as its author.4

In discussing civil government, especially in the
second book, he frequently refers to the "state of
nature/' apparently meaning thereby the condition of
the race when socially unorganized. But man is not
lawless here. "The state of nature has a law of nature
to govern it, which obliges everyone ; and reason, which
is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."
There is such a thing as "equality of men by nature";

1 Boyle's Works, I, 37, tf^Essay, I, iii, (>,• "I grant the existence
of God is so many ways manifest, and the obedience we owe Him so
congruous to the light of reason, that a great part of mankind give
testimony to the law of nature." The true ground of morality "can
only be the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in His
hands rewards and punishments," etc.

2 Essay, II, xxviii, 8, n; Government, II, ii, 6.

3 He seems to have the same thought in mind when he says, "Reason
is natural revelation whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain

\of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of the truth
which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties" (Essay,
IV, xix, 4).

*Ibid., I, iii, 12.

The Two Focal Concepts 57

that is, by virtue of what man really is.1 Here the state
of nature is set over against organized society, and the
law of nature over against positive law.

Yet it must be admitted that Locke, when compared \
with others, makes but little use of the concept of nature
in constructing his system; when he does so it is prin
cipally in the spirit of Hooker. Nature is a divine
order which we can know; and her laws are God's laws
which He there reveals to us. He certainly differs widely
from the Cambridge Platonists.

C. THE DEISTS

When we come to the Deists we find great variety
of opinion. But though they differ as to what nature is,
all agree in assigning it an important place in the study
of all religious problems. It is an ultimate norm for
testing religious truth.

In the system of Herbert of Cherbury, who is
generally recognized as the founder of Deism, there are
four groups of our numerous human faculties: natural
instinct, sensus internus, sensus externus, and discursus.
Of these, natural instinct is the most certain. From it
we have the "common notions" which are innate in all
men. Among these "common notions" we find his
five fundamental principles of all religion. "For
Herbert, natural means much the same as divine. For
him, as for his friend Grotius, the law of nature is the law
of God and of supreme authority." We find him writing
in one place deum sive naturam.2

1 Government, II, ii, 5.

3 W. R. Sorley, Mind (1894), p. 501.

58 John Locke and English Deism

And coming to the less important deistical writers
just before Tqland and Collins, we find Blount speaking
of his five articles, which follow closely those of Herbert,
as "grounded upon the law of nature," which is "God's
universal Magna Charta, enacted by the all-wise and
Supreme Being from the beginning of the world."1 He
also asserts that there is a sanction arising "from the
nature of things" before any human law. This is much
in the spirit of Hooker.2 Gildon before his conversion
from Deism wrote of "nature, or that sacred and supreme
cause of all things, which we term God."3 Thomas
' Burnet used almost the same words.4 God's immanence
j is so magnified that it seems to suggest a sort of
j pantheism.

Though Toland speaks frequenty of "natural law,"
"natural reason," and " natural _religion," it is difficult
to say just what he means by "natural." It is clear that
in many instances he has in mind that which is neither
God-given nor man-made, but it is impossible to define
the content of the term more definitely.5

For Collins the term scarcely exists. He speaks
of "natural light," but this is in a paragraph from
Tillotson.6

Tindal, who with Wollaston represents the best
scholarship and thought among the Deists, makes very

1 C. Blount, Religio Laid (London, 1683), p. 94.

2 Miscellaneous Works (London, 1695), p. 93.

3 Preface to Oracles of Reason (London, 1693).

4 Archiologiae Philosophicae (London, 1729), p. xxii.

s Christianity Not Mysterious, 46; Nazaremis (London, 1718), p. 67;
Letters to Serena (London, 1 704) , p. 1 1 7 ; A Collection of Several Pieces,
etc. (London, 1726), II, 139.

6 A Discourse on Freethinking, p. 173.

The Two Focal Concepts 59

frequent appeals to nature. It is noteworthy that the
concept has greater prominence in the systems of these ~
two men than in that of any other Deist. Tindal
mentions frequently the "law of nature" whicfPljT"
known to all creatures. It is perfect, eternal, unchange
able, and the gospel was not intended to change it;1
all religions acknowledge it and it must be obeyed.2
He even asserts that God's laws are built on the eternal
reason of things, and that there is an unalterable reason
of things according to which God must act when He
acts.3 We know by reason that this is true. You
cannot prove anything to be God's will except that
which His nature and the nature of things point out to
be His will.4 We have the " light of nature" which is
none other than the "voice of God Himself."5 jrhe____ "^
"book of nature" is in characters "legible by the whole
world "";" "^~wh"oruiis~may read. The title of his book is
Christiamty^as-Old-as Creation, or The Gospel, a Republi-
cation of the Religion of Nature. Thus nature appears
as that which stands out in contrast with revelation. It
"is the instrument oitKe~ primitiveTeveTation or it is the
primitive revelation itself. Though he makes frequent
use of the concept, it is not further defined.

Wollaston emphasizes "the great law of nature, or
rather as we shall afterwards find reason to call it, of the
author of nature." It is that no intelligent being should
contradict truth or that he should treat everything as
being what it is.6 The infinite original cause is the

1 Christianity as Old as Creation, p. 8.

2 Ibid., pp. H-I2. 4 Ibid., pp. 246, 247.
*Ibid., p. 124. slbid., p. 273.

6 W. Wollaston, Religion of Nature Delineated (London, 1759), p. 41.

60 John Locke and English Deism

author of nature and what is done in it.1 For Wollaston
nature is God's handiwork, wherein His acts appear,
from which His law, which is the law of nature, can be
known.

In the writings of Woolston nature seems to play no
part.

Morgan placed the ultimate foundation of religion
in nature, not in revelation.2 From nature we can know
"the eternal immutable rules and principles of moral
truth," which are always the same and known to all
. pien, and which constitute natural religion.3 He goes
so far toward the Cambridge school as to teach that God
does not create good and evil, that there is a rule of
action prior to God's willing. Yet nature is not clearly
defined; we cannot be sure what he understood by it.
It may be understood either in the sense of Hooker or in
the sense of the Cambridge Platonists, but its importance
in his system is evident.

Bolingbroke finds our duties set forth so plainly
in "the constitution of our nature" that we cannot fail
to know them.4 More circumspect than some of his
fellow-Deists, he holds that Christianity is founded on
the universal law of nature, and that God teaches the
fundamental principle of this law; although it is not just
a republication of it.5 This universal law of nature is the

1 W. Wollaston, Religion of Nature Delineated (London, 1759),
pp. 129, 287.

* Thomas Morgan, The Moral Philosopher (London, 1740), III, 126;
Physico-Theology (London, 1741), pp. 143 ff.; Tracts (London 1726),
Preface, p. xvii.

3 The Moral Philosopher, I, 94.

<H. Bolingbroke, Works (London, 1809), VI, 281.

5 Ibid., p. 311.

The Two Focal Concepts 61

foundation of everything.1 He gives us no further deter
mination of nature or natural law. Is it God's creature,
God's instrument for grounding things ? Whether it has
the same meaning as in Hooker's system or is something
independent of God as the Platonists taught he does not
tell us.

Chubb wrote An Enquiry into the Ground and Founda
tion of Morality, in which he undertook to show "that
religion is founded in nature," and that this pure religion
of nature "is grounded upon the unalterable nature and
the eternal reason of things."2 He starts out from the
assumption that "there is a natural and essential
difference in things," which is the "ground and founda
tion of moral truth;"3 and divine rectitude is God's
acting in harmony with such difference. His acts are
always in harmony with the essential difference in things.4
This is clearly the doctrine of the philosophers of Cam
bridge. Though he is the only Deist who announces it
in unambiguous terms, it may be in the background of
the teaching of Morgan and Bolingbroke.

D. CONCLUSION

In this study of the place of the concept of nature in
English thought of the period that we are considering
we have found some confusion. Few thinkers hold
consistently to one sense of the term. However we are

1 Ibid., pp. 345 ff. In this passage he vigorously rejects the teach
ing of Hobbes, which bases morality on civil enactment.

a Thomas Chubb, An Enquiry into the Ground and Foundation of
Morality (London, 1745), p. 40.

3 Chubb, An Inquiry Concerning Redemption (London, 1743), p. 35.

*Ibid., p. 37.

62 John Locke and English Deism

justified in drawing several conclusions that are relevant
to our problem. In some form or other the concept of
nature is present in the speculations of almost every
liberal thinker that we have considered. The age was
prone to believe that institutions and principles were
adequately grounded only when it was proved that they
were natural. Nature is the foundation of economies
and institutions ; it determines their character and gives
them authority.

But when it comes to defining just what was meant
by nature, there are radical differences. The views that
were held seem to fall into two groups. On the one
hand, we find God and nature more or less closely linked;
it is His creation, its laws are ordained by Him, it reveals
His will, and sometimes it seems to be identical with Him.
And on the other hand, it is conceived as eternal, immu
table, and at least in some sense independent of God, an
order distinct from God to which His willing must
conform; and sometimes the writings of one man seem
to show both motives. But whatever the conception
of nature, in practically every system "natural law,"
"natural light," "the book of nature," "the religion of
nature," stand out in contrast on the one hand with
man-made institutions, on the other with supernatural
revelation. It is placed over against that which is
positive, whether human or divine. In the considera
tion of the religious problem, which chiefly concerns us
here, nature is an order or a datum that is contrasted
with God's dealing with man in that special revelation
which we find in the Bible.

Generally speaking Locke and the Deists under
stand the term in the same way. With the exception of

The Two Focal Concepts 63

Chubb, and perhaps also of Morgan and Bolingbroke,
they stand in the line that comes down from Hooker.
The Cambridge way of thinking does not seem to have
influenced the Deists until we reach the period of their
decline.

We have here a similarity between Locke and Deism
when it was at its height. Both use the same concept
and they seem to understand it in the same way. But
the likeness is just as marked between the Deists and
certain prominent theologians and philosophers, many
of whom lived before Locke. It was the point of view
or method that prevailed at that time. Just as scholars
today are likely to organize the data of a given science
according to the genetic method because it is so widely
accepted, so the leaders of English thought two or three
hundred years ago sought to ground all institutions and
principles in nature. Locke and the Deists stand in the
main line of the progressive movement. When we study
critically their resemblance in the use of the concept of
nature, we cannot infer any other closer relation from it.
Later, in considering natural religion, we shall see how
Locke and the Deists are related in the importance that
they assigned to the concept of nature in this relation.

3. THE USE OF THE CONCEPT OF REASON

The general movement of the age was toward free
inquiry. Inherited systems and institutions were sub
jected to criticism; it was no longer enough that a con
viction had behind it hoary tradition. If anything was
to survive, it could do so only under the condition that
good reasons were given why intelligent men should hold
it. There is only one way for a man to know truth, and

64 John Locke and English Deism

that is by a proper use of his reason; whatever is
accepted must be rationally grounded. Such was the
spirit of the liberal movement in England at this time.

A. THE RATIONAL THEOLOGIANS

Beginning with "the judicious Hooker " we find that
he appeals to reason with a frequency that is surprising.
Though he argues that it alone is not sufficient to ground
that which is necessary to salvation,1 he also holds that
"there are but two ways whereby the spirit leadeth men
into all truth .... one, that which we call by a special
divine excellency, Revelation; the other, Reason."2
For the earnestness of conviction does not guarantee
the truth of opinions but the "soundness of those
reasons whereupon the same is built." Only thus can
we know that they are from the Holy Spirit and not
from an evil spirit that might deceive us.3 It is by the

1 Ecclesiastical Polity, Works, I, 231, 232, 234, 281. He expressly
taught that the law of reason does not contain all duties that bind
reasonable creatures, but only those duties that men by using their
natural wit may or should discover, which are common to all.

3 Ibid., p. 150.

3 Ibid., p. 151. The conviction that we believe on a basis of ade
quate reason is developed at some length (pp. 321-30). Even in matters
of faith we must grant judgment some place. Belief cannot ignore
evidence, though the authority of human judgment is not as strong as
the testing of God himself (p. 323). "For men to be tied and led by
authority, as it were by a kind of capacity of judgment, and though there
be reason to the contrary not to listen unto it, but to follow like beasts
the first in the herd, they know not nor care not whither, this were
brutish. Again, that authority of man should prevail with men, either
against or above reason, is no part of our belief" (p. 324). "Shall I
add further, that the force of arguments drawn from the authority of
Scripture itself, as Scriptures commonly are alleged, shall (being sifted)
be found to depend upon the strength of this so much despised and
debased authority of man ? Surely it doth and that oftener than we are
aware of" (pp. 299, 328).

The Two Focal Concepts 65

light of reason that we know good from evil; reason
directs the will by recognizing the good.1 This light of
reason is from God. The meaning of Romans 2 : 14 is
"that by force of the light of reason wherewith God
illuminateth everyone which cometh into the world,"
etc.2 In fact the law of reason is a part of God's
eternal law; that part which men may find by reason and
to which they may know themselves to be bound.3
There are lengthy passages in which he refers on almost
every page to the "light of reason," "the law of reason,"
and "right reason."

Thus according to Hooker the role of reason is of
fundamental importance. It can know a part of God's
law for us and, though it cannot reveal to us all that is
necessary for salvation, only on the basis of sound
reason can we know when a belief is wrought by the
Holy Spirit. He is seeking to give an intelligent reason,
a reason other than tradition for the faith that is in him.
The conviction that lies in the background of his thinking
is that we can know the truth of our beliefs only by "the
soundness of those reasons whereupon the same is

1 Ibid., pp. 222, 223, 225 ff. "And the law of reason or human
nature is that which men by discourse of natural reason have rightly
found out themselves to be all forever bound unto in their actions."
Such laws are in harmony with nature and can be investigated by reason
without the aid of revelation; and knowledge of such laws is general —
the world has ever been acquainted with them. " Law rational, therefore,
which men commonly used to call the law of nature, meaning thereby
the law which human nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound
unto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the law of
reason; this law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the
light of their natural understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may
know" (pp. 233-34).

3 Ibid., p. 227. 3 Ibid., p. 205.

66 John Locke and English Deism

built." This involves a principle that is of far-reaching
consequence: religious belief must be rationally
grounded.1

Chillingworth after his reconversion to Protes
tantism demands a ''rational conviction at the root of
his religion." He is certain "that God has given us
reason to discern between truth and falsehood," and he
who does not use his reason does not know why he
jbelieves the truth. Though he asserts his belief in
revelation most vigorously he requires that faith
should be rationally certified.2 Jeremy Taylor held
practically the same view. Man should follow his own
reason, guided only by revelation, not by human author
ity. Revelation is not challenged in the name of reason
but reason provides grounds for accepting beliefs.3

Stillingfleet has very little to say about reason in
matters of religion but his silence becomes eloquent
when we remember that his criticism of Locke was
occasioned by Toland's use of Locke's "new way of
ideas " and that in this controversy Stillingfleet sought
to identify Locke with the Unitarians. He objects to'
Locke's doctrine of ideas but his appeal to reason is

'"The work remains an enduring monument of all the highest
principles of Christian rationalism— of that spirit and tendency of
thought which everywhere ascends from tradition or dogmas to
principles, and which tests all questions, not with reference to external
rules or authorities, but to the indestructible and enlightened instincts
of the Christian consciousness" (Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian
Philosophy, I, 53). This same principle perhaps in a somewhat more
rationalistic form was asserted by Lord Falkland (ibid., pp. 161-64).
And John Hales of Eaton "is the representative — the next after Hooker
— of that catholicity yet rationality of Christian sentiment which has
been the peculiar glory of the Church of England" (ibid., p. 260).

1 Ibid., pp. 331, 332. 3 Ibid., p. 404.

The Two Focal Concepts 67

scarcely touched upon; he did not find it objectionable.
It is significant that he put in a headline "Vindication
of the Doctrine of the Trinity .... from Scripture,
Antiquity and Reason."

The orthodox Sherlock did not hesitate to say that
if "the Gospel represents to us the law of nature, it
need only to appeal to the reason of mankind for its
authority,"1 and that "the Gospel is the true original
religion of reason and nature."2 Warburton goes so far
as to teach that "the image of God in which man was at
first created lay in the faculty of reason only."3

These men were among the most prominent church
men of their times. They were theologians who exerted
a great influence in shaping the theology of the church,
and, so far as the writer has observed, with the exception
of Tillotson, their orthodoxy was never questioned.
Therefore their rationalistic way of looking at things is
all the more significant. Religious conviction that
rests merely on authority has an uncertain foundation. !<
When reasonable beings such as men believe anything,
it should be because of sound reasons. Revelation is
not challenged, but the acceptance of revelation must
have a rational basis.

B. THE PHILOSOPHERS

The teaching of Hobbes concerning the place of
reason in matters of revelation are found in the thirty-
second chapter of the Leviathan. Though he magnifies
the authority of the Bible in a manner inconsistent with

1 Discourses Preached on Several Occasions, V, 143.

3 Ibid., pp. 134, 142.

3 Quoted by Pattison, Essays and Reviews (London, 1861), p. 269.

68 John Locke and English Deism

his theories, he recognizes reason as an instrument given
by God for knowing true religion, and thus it is in a
sense God's word. However, the Bible may well contain
some things that are above reason, although it cannot
give us anything that is contrary to reason.

The Cambridge Platonists represent something new
/jn' Protestantism. As Tulloch expresses it, it was the
first effort among Protestants "to wed Christianity and
philosophy" and "to form the union on the indestruc-
, ; tible basis of reason and the essential elements of our
1 |iigher humanity." They were devoutly Christian, but
thoroughly rationalistic. Writing in the spirit of the
school and in its defense, an author who hides himself
behind the initials of his name is quoted by Tulloch as
follows: It is absurd to accuse them "of harkening too
much to their own reason. For reason is that faculty
whereby a man must judge of everything; nor can a man
believe anything unless he have some reason for it,"
whether it be "the light of nature," "the candle of the
Lord " in the soul of every man, or revelation. The most
ancient should prove to be the most rational and the
most rational the most ancient. "Nothing is true in
divinity which is false in philosophy or on the contrary."1
Turning to these Christian philosophers themselves,
Whichcote formulates the statement of the relation that
obtains between reason and religion which is accepted
by the other members of the school. Reason is not to be
taken lightly, for it is from God. Hence there is no
inconsistency in calling upon men to use it, for "the
spirit in man is the candle of the Lord, lighted by God
and lighting man to God."2 He has given two lights to
1 Tulloch, op. cit., II, 41, 42. * Ibid., pp. 99, no.

The Two Focal Concepts 69

guide us on our way, the light of reason which is ours by
creation, and the light of scripture which is revealed by
Him,1 to which reason is not opposed. "There can be
no faith without reason, nor yet any higher reason with
out faith."2 And John Smith in like spirit preaches that
religion does not extinguish reason, but rather fosters it.
They who "live most in the exercise of religion shall find
the reason most enlarged."3 Tulloch sums up his
position by saying, "that religion cannot be separated
from reason, nor morals from piety, was of the nature of
an axiomatic truth to him."4 Cudworth held the same
views as to the harmony between philosophy and
religion, between reason and faith.5 Man, God's
creature, bears his image, "is endowed with the divine
reason," the intuitions of which are eternal.6 Moore
also was a preacher of the rights of reason. To take
reason away from the priest, under whatsoever pretext,
is "to disrobe the priest" and "to rob Christianity of
that special prerogative it has above all other religions
in the world— namely that it dares appeal unto reason.
.... For take away reason and all religions are alike
true; as the light being removed all things are of one
color."7 In CulverwelPs Discourse on the Light of Nature
we probably have the most eloquent discussion of the
relation of reason and faith that this school of pietistic
rationalists produced. His avowed purpose is "to
give unto reason the things that are reason's, and unto
faith the things that are faith's"; to give faith her "full

1 Ibid., pp. 113, 114. sfbid., pp. 233, 234.

1 Ibid., p. 116. 6 Ibid., p. 300.

J Ibid., pp. 184, 185. ' Ibid., pp. 353, 354-

« Ibid., p. 188.

70 John Locke and English Deism

scope and latitude, and to give reason also her just
bounds and limits"; and he significantly adds "this is
the first-born, but the other has the blessing."1 Reason
is a royal gift of the Creator;2 it discovers the moral light
founded in natural light that is, in the light of reason, and
that "there is nothing in the mysteries of the Gospel
contrary to the light of reason."3 By reason man can
know the restraining laws that God has set, but it does
not make the law.4 It has its authority from heaven.
"To obey right reason is to be persuaded by God him
self."5 But as the soul is the shadow of the Deity, "so
reason also is a weak and faint resemblance of God
himself," planted in us by God.6 Even the movings
and revelation of the Holy Ghost "are a rational light,
as rational as a demonstration."7 Before there can be
faith in any soul "there must be a knowledge of the
proposition to be believed." Before you understand
the terms of a proposition "you can no more believe it
than if it came to you in an unknown tongue."8 How
ever there are certain matters of faith which shall forever
be above reason, though not contrary to it.9

The school taught that faith rests on rational
grounds, that we believe on the basis of adequate reasons.
Our ability to apprehend truth rationally is a gift of God,

1 Culverwell, Discourse on the Light of Nature, p. 17.
3 Ibid., p. 18.

3 Ibid., p. 25. 6 Ibid., p. 153.

4 Ibid., pp. 79, 90, 98. 1 1bid., pp. 161-62.
s Ibid., pp. 99-101. 8 Ibid., p. 216.

9 Ibid., pp. 229-32. Tulloch in English Puritanism and Its Leaders,
speaking of Milton, said that a " liberal rationalising spirit " distinguished
certain parts of Christian Doctrine (p. 271). He also makes a like
observation concerning Baxter (p. 381).

The Two Focal Concepts 71

by which we know His will and what is worthy of belief.
By it we distinguish the true from the false. The office
and importance of reason is magnified, it is of God, it is
divine ; and yet they are careful to assert that it has its
limits. There are truths that faith apprehends which
are above reason, though not contrary to it.

When we come to Locke we find the same rationalistic
way of viewing things^lhat we find among the more
liberal theologians and the Cambridge Platonists.
Probably he is somewhat less enthusiastic than Cudworth
and Culverwell, but he is as outspoken as any of his
predecessors; he gives to the problem concerning the
relation of reason and faith the most systematic expres
sion that it has thus far received. It was a topic to
wrhich he devoted much thought. He returns to it again
and again, often when least expected. Though a genetic
study of the development of his opinions from year to
year might show that during the last decade of his life
he emphasized more than formerly the importance of a
positive revelation, there is no evidence that he changed
his views in any essential respect.

We find his full discxission--of, the problem in the
seventeenth, eighteentfT, and nineteenth chaplefT'Df'fhe
f ourth-bookofjhe Essay. The eighteenth ciiapterjacarc
the title "Of FaTthfand Reason and Their Distinct
Province." We shall let Locke speak for himself.

He defines reason as "natural revelation, whereby
the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge,
communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he
has laid within reach of their natural faculties; revela
tion is natural reason enlarged by a new set of dis
coveries, communicated by God immediately, which

72 John Locke and English Deism

reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs
it gives, that they come from God. So that he that
takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out
the light of both, and does much what the same, as if he
would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to
receive the remote light of an invisible star by a
telescope."1

Speaking of " enthusiasm" he says that if God
expects us to assent to the truth of any proposition, "He
either evidences that truth by the usual methods of
natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which
He would have us assent to by His authority; and con
vinces us that it is from Him, by some marks which
. reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last
^ judge and guide in everything. I do not mean that we
must consult reason and examine whether a proposition
revealed from God can be made out by our natural
principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it;
but consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be
a revelation from God or no." And if reason finds "it to
be revealed from God, reason then declares for it ....
and makes it one of her dictates." Without reason we
could not know truth from vain conceits.2 If a man
believes without reason for believing, he does not seek
the truth, nor does he obey his Maker who gave him
those faculties to keep him from error.3 But unaided
reason cannot discover everything. There are some
truths that are above reason, and here revelation should
have the greater weight.4 "But no proposition can be
received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due

, ~~~\

, IV, xix, 4. J Ibid., IV, xvh, 24.

., IV, xix, 14. « Ibid., IV, xviii, 6, 7, 8.

The Two Focal Concepts 73

to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive
knowledge ..... For faith can never convince us of
anything that contradicts our knowledge."1

Perhaps of all the quotations from Locke concerning
reason that have been or might be given, the most
characteristic one is: "Reason must be our last judge
and guide in everything." God gave it to us to use; by
it alone we can know truth from error. We believe on
the basis of sufficient reason. Faith is rationally
grounded, reason certifies revelation, and the content of
faith is rational. He repeatedly emphasizes the widely
accepted doctrine that nothing in revelation can be
contrary to reason, though it may enable us to know
some things that are above reason.2

Thus far in our study of the use that is made of reason
in speculation concerning religious problems, we have
found little difference of opinion among the men that
we have met. Some go a little farther than others in
magnifying the office of reason in matters of religion, but
there is no essential difference. Though Locke is much
more elaborate in his statement rJ?

faith and reason, he simply systematizes the teacKihg
from Hooker .down. When the great bishop asserted
that earnestness of conviction did not guarantee the
truth of opinions "but the soundness of those reasons
whereupon the same is built," he struck the keynote of
progressive theology in England during the next century.

1 Ibid., IV, xvifi, 5. "~

2 In like spirit Boyle held that God had given man reason by which
he could know the principles of natural religion, but that this was not
enough (Works, V, 46). By reason we know that there are things above
reason (Works, IV, 39 ff.), which are not contradictory to it (Works, V,
65, 682). It needs the help of revelation (Works, III, 414).

74 John Locke and English Deism

C. THE DEISTS

When we come to the Deists we move in a different
atmosphere. Some of them in their teaching differed
only a little from the more liberal theologians. Yet
the divergence is significant and can be easily detected.
iN, Reason becomes something more and revelation some-
Beginning again with Herbert of Cherbury, we find
"~-that "natural instinct" gives man the greatest certainty
and that it accounts for his "common notions," and that
from these he gets his five articles of "the true Catholic
Church, that is to say, of the religion of reason," which
was the primitive, pure religion of man. Whatever is
contrary to them is contrary to reason and therefore
false; but that which conforms to reason, though above
it, may be revealed.1

Blount felt obliged to stand by "common reason"
rather than debase his "understanding in divine mys
teries."2 Reason is supreme; it gives us the fundamental
articles of religion, and all those who live according
to the rule of reason are Christians.3 "What proceeds
from common reason, we know to be true, but what
£ proceeds from faith we only believe."4 The test to
\\ which all extraordinary biblical accounts are subjected
is that of reason.5 Blount writes carelessly, but reason
means more and positive religion means less than for
anyone considered thus far. This is the first statement

1 W. R. Sorley, Mind (1894), p. 501.

2 Religio Laid, pp. 26-30.
» Ibid., pp. 16, 95.

4 Blount, Philostratus (London, 1680), Book I, chap, v, illustration 6.
s Oracles of Reason, p. 33.

The Two Focal Concepts 75

that we have found of the doctrine that unaided reason
can grasp enough religious truth to mark a man as a
Christian.

Toland's contribution to the movement as well as his
general position is summed up in the unabbreviated
title of his book, Christianity Not Mysterious; or a Treatise
Showing That There Is Nothing in the Gospel Contrary to
Reason, nor above It, and That No Christian Doctrine Can
Be Properly Called a Mystery. Scripture and reason
agree very well.1 Christianity was divinely revealed
from heaven.2 Yet the proof of the divinity of Scripture
rests upon reason 3 and there is nothing in it above
reason;4 yet that which reason reveals to us is not the
full gospel.5 Tpland is almost as enthusiastic as Culver-
well in magnifying the importance of reason. His denial
that there can be anything above reason is an important
change; it marks a stage in the growth of deistic
rationalism.

Collins is still more radical. "Christ, the first
begotten of God, is nothing else but reason, of which all
mankind are partakers, and that whosoever live by
reason .... are Christians; and that such were
Socrates and the like."6

For Tindal reason is the great mark of dignity of
man, "since our reason for kind, though not for degree
is of the same nature with that of God; nay, it is our

1 Christianity Not Mysterious, Preface, pp. xv, 25, 26.

2 Ibid., p. xxv. * Ibid., p. 46. 4 Ibid., pp. 97, 120.
5.4 Collection of Several Pieces, etc., pp. 138-41.

6 A Discourse on Freethinking, pp. 123, 124. Sebastian Franck and
Croonhert had held the same views (Hoffding, History of Modern
Philosophy, I, 60).

76 John Locke and English Deism

reason which makes us the image of God." It is the
inspiration of the Almighty.1 By it we distinguish false
religion from the true.2 In fact the religion of the Gospel
is but the religion of reason.3 Both are in complete
agreement.4 By magnifying revelation we weaken the
force of natural religion and strike at the foundation of
all religion.5 For nothing can be accepted by intelligent
beings which is above the use of reason.6 Tindal
conceives reason practically in the sense of Toland.
However, when he considers the question of revelation
he applies it much more radically. The religion of
reason as a norm for all religions is vigorously asserted.

For Wollaston the religion of nature is but a system of
theistic ethics, virtue is but the product of reason and
truth, which every man has. He finds no necessity for
revelation. To be governed by reason is imposed
by God on rational beings.7

Bolingbroke, almost in the very words of Tindal,
teaches that we cannot assume that religious truths are
above reason,8 which reveals to us the entire content of
natural religion.9 Reason was never subdued by

1 Christianity as Old as Creation, pp. 22-24, J94-

2 Ibid., p. 66.

3 Ibid., p. 79.

4 Ibid., pp. 191, 179.
sibid., p. 178.

6 " If the Scripture was designed to be understood, it must be
within the reach of human understanding; and consequently it can't
contain propositions that are either above or below human understand
ing" (ibid., p. 222).

' The Religion of N attire Delineated, pp. 35, 76 ff., 86, 87, 402.

8 Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 282 ff.

» Ibid., p. 281.

The Two Focal Concepts 77

revelation, "but revelation was subjected to reason."1
In fact, he goes so far as to say that he who claims a
revelation added to reason is mad.2

In Morgan there is a strange contradiction. He
seems to have been influenced by different motives at
different times. In the volume of collected tracts he!
speaks the language of Hooker, the Platonists, and Locke,
and claims that by revelation we get knowledge of things
which unaided reason could not grasp. In this sense we *
can believe things above reason.3 And yet this revela
tion is elsewhere not highly esteemed. He speaks of the
"so-called supernatural revelation," which is confusion
on all sides, so that there is nothing left but to judge of
it all by reason.4 For nothing miraculous or super
stitious can have any authority superior to reason.5
Revelation can give us nothing above reason.6 Reason
is the ultimate, sure, and certain court to which revelation
must eventually appeal.7 Morgan accepts revelation
as a fact, but denies that it can give us anything above
reason.8

1 Ibid., pp. 288, 290.

1 Ibid., pp. 170, 171. 5 The Moral Philosopher, III, 134.

* Tracts, p. 18. 6 Ibid., pp. 84 ff .

4 Physico-Theology, pp. 144 ff. ' Physico-Theology, pp. 328 ff.

8 Thus The Moral Philosopher and Physico-Theology flatly contradict
the position taken in the volume of Tracts. The latter appeared in 1726
and bears the marks of immaturity. It is distinctly on a lower level than
The Moral Philosopher and Physico-Theology which appeared about a
dozen years later. In it he also stands closer to the orthodox view and
seeks to emphasize revelation; when he refers to it he speaks with a
certain reverence. It is probable that this represents an earlier stage
in his development and that his views changed between 1726 and 1737,
when the first volume of The Moral Philosopher appeared. We can
safely take the more radical views of his later period as representative.

78 John Locke and English Deism

Chubb has nothing to add to that which the other
Deists have said. He admits the fact of revelation,
sometimes with hesitation;1 generally it is assumed as a
matter of course.2 But if men are to come into the right
relation with Christ, they must submit themselves "to
the law of reason or the rule of righteousness, which
Christ requires."3 For reason is the proper judge of
all parts of revelation and must reject certain things
in it as being contrary to it.4

D. CONCLUSION

Looking back over what these men have said con
cerning the use of reason, from the great Hooker to the
candlemaker Chubb, one cannot help being impressed
by the marked likenesses and also by the radical dif
ferences that appear. There was an ever-increasing
conviction that mere authority was an inadequate
foundation for the faith of rational beings. It is true
traditionalism yet lingered as a potent factor in the
more conservative thought of the times. Many leaders
in the church and in academic circles still lived in the
atmosphere of an age that was dying : they were wont to
appeal to that which was rather than to encourage free
inquiry. But against this conservative tradition-loving

( t ' )

tendency, there stood the party of progress. We have
considered a number of the leaders and have studied

1 A Discourse Concerning Reason (London, 1746), p. u.

3 The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted (London, 1741), pp. 14,
IS, iQ-

3 Ibid., p. 5.

* A Discourse Concerning Reason, pp. 12, 13, 19.

The Two Focal Concepts 79

their way of looking at things. We find that in a
genuinely rationalistic spirit they protest against the
reactionary narrowness of the conservative party and
attempt to demonstrate the claims of religion.

The demonstrations that were given were of course
rationalistic. We must not be confused here; we are
likely to think of rationalism as meaning that which
appeared later on the Continent, more especially in
Germany. But a characteristic feature of this conti
nental rationalism is its hostile attitude toward_positive
religion. Here in Englan^6T^e~seventeenth century,
and also later though in less degree, rationalism is a way
of thinking rather than a type of doctrinal system. It is
a tendency or point of view, a way of approach to
problems, it is a persistent demand that all things
believed shall be rational. The most

about this period is.. that all parties agree in this con
viction, the Churchmen and the D^s^eTrEeTsTtHe^ngrrs-
sive orthodox clergy as well as the Arminians, Socinians,
and Deists. All creeds and religion itself must stand
or fall according as they meet the test of the prevailing
rationalism. If we are to accept revelation and hold
to positive religion, it must be for adequate reasons. At
the opening of the century Hooker laid down, and by his
own course illustrated, the principle that "the truth of
opinions" is guaranteed by "the soundness of those
reasons wtver eriprm tfry same is built. ' ' This rationalistic-
critical motive dominated the speculations of the pro
gressive thinkers of the succeeding period. At the end
of the century Locke stated the same principle in a
more elaborate and systematic form, and we find it;
applied by such champions of orthodoxy as Stillingfleet

8o John Locke and English Deism

and Sherlock, as well as by the whole race of Deists.
There was no essential difference as to the demand that
religion must be rationally grounded.

But though there was this complete agreement
concerning the fundamental attitude or principle, there
was great divergence of results when it was applied.
The favorite statement of the relation ietween the —
content of revelation and reason is the scholastic formula,
that revelation may contain truths that are above
reason, but cannot give anything that is contrary to it.
This is clearly involved in Hooker's teaching and was
expressly accepted by practically everybody except the
Deists. We saw that even some of the earlier Deists
held to it without question. Locke asserted and
defended this principle and thus stood in the line of the
rational theologians, the Cambridge Platonists, and a
number of other progressive leaders of a more conserva
tive type. But when we come to the period of the
greatest influence of the deistic movement, we find a
very different response to the demand for rationality
in matters of religion. Toland flatly asserted that not
only must religious truth not contradict reason^ but also
that it cannot be above reason, and that anything tnaT~
is above reason must be rejected as not being a part of
true Christianity. This is _ .the__ke.yrxo.te. of- 4he deistic
conception of the relation J)et.ween_reaSQn_aiid positive
religion. It is repeated by later representatives of the
movement, sometimes in the spirit of Toland, but
frequently it is more radically applied. In some
instances revealed religion is declared to be superfluous
and its documents hopelessly confused. The English
rationalistic-critical movement of this period becomes, in

The Two Focal Concepts 81

its later deistic development, aggressively hostile to all
positive Christianity.

In a word, the period that we are studying was
thoroughly rationalistic. Practically everybody, cer
tainly every progressive thinker, held that religious belief
was based on adequate reasons. Locke and such men
of his generation as Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and Sherlock,
and before him the Cambridge Platonists and the rational
theologians, accepted revelation as a fact and believed
that it could give us that which was above reason,
though not contrary to reason.

Deism, except in the very beginning, held that if
there was such a thing as revelation, it could not give us
anything above reason, and became more and more
hostile to positive Christianity.

Therefore it is evident that rationalism, although
common both to Locke and Deism, is not peculiar to
either. It is, however, characteristic of the age in which
they flourished; and in so far as Locke or the Deists
show this rationalistic tendency, they exemplify the
working of the common spirit of their times.

And when we consider the distinguishing features,
those elements that marked and characterized the deistic
movement as a distinct tendency in religious thought, we
find that it differs from all others in its radical application
of this rationalistic principle. Here Locke and the
Deists are far apart. Both were rationalistic and critical ,
in their method, but they differ widely in the manner
in which they applied this method. Locke was con- \
servative; the Deists were radical. To say that the An
radical rationalism of Deism is only the conservative \
rationalism of Locke further developed, is to state a i

82 John Locke and English Deism

dangerous half-truth that misrepresents the situation.
: It would be true under one condition — that Locke was

I the only rationalist of this period, or the only rationalist
that exerted any influence. But we know that there
were many others, that the whole atmosphere of pro
gressive thought was rationalistic. Deism took this
rationalistic tendency, that characterized at least the
entire progressive movement of this age, and gave it that
radical application which marks the deistic movement.

CHAPTER V

THE MAIN POINTS IN THE RELIGIOUS
DISCUSSIONS OF THIS PERIOD

A thorough study of the views held in England in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would be a
great undertaking. It was an age of individualism in
religious opinion. Sects were multiplying rapidly and
the rationalistic movement resulted in a great variety
of beliefs. A survey of these with a view to producing a
doctrinal history of the period would be an almost
endless task. But the purpose of this investigation is
the determination of the kind and degree of relation that
exists between Locke and English Deism. For this it is
not necessary to reconstruct the systems of divinity of
each man, and then trace linkages. We can limit our
attention to the main points of the religious debate that
was then in progress. For it is among these that we
shall find the marks that distinguish and relate Locke
and Deism. Peripheral religious factors also vary, but
they are seldom significant, and when they are they are
generally closely joined to some cardinal point of
debate. Therefore we will not miss matters of impor
tance by limiting the scope of this investigation to the
chief topics that Were discussed.

I. CONCERNING GOD
A. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

If we were to judge of the religious faith of this age
by the language of the controversies, we might conclude

83

84 John Locke and English Deism

that it was a time of great apostasy, when unbelievers
* and misbelievers were numerous and aggressive. Per
haps the favorite epithet for an opponent was "atheist,"
which seldom meant a denial of the existence of God, but
only rejection of the system of doctrine which was held
by the ecclesiastic who was doing the scolding. Many
men who had elements of greatness lived in the dwarfing
atmosphere of intolerance and suffered and unfortu
nately caused others to suffer from rabies theologicum.
It was probably an age of belief rather than of unbelief,
although it is true that religious faith was conceived
largely as dead assent to doctrines rather than as a
living motive force in life. But men were seriously
interested in religion, and, at least among those whose
influence was sufficient to cause their opinions to survive
in books, there is practically no trace of atheism, although
men were talking about it all the time.

We may say that everybody believed that there was
a God. Men did not occupy themselves very much in
trying to prove His existence. They were busy testing
and proving religion. Generally it was assumed without
much comment that man knew God and his duties
toward Him either by common notions that were innate
or by the use of reason which formulated proofs. Con
trary to a common belief the Deists paid little attention
to this part of natural theology; several of them do not
even mention it. But-Locke-laid greaLemphasis upon
what he calls his demonstration of the existence of God.1

1 The fact that the existence of God was not challenged by any party
probably accounts for the small amount of attention that was given to
proving it. For our purposes the views held by others are not significant;
they cast little or no light on the relation of Locke and Deism. It is not

Main Points in Religious Discussions 85

He is not only full and explicit, but he returns to it
again and again. It appears in a number of places in
his works, often very unexpectedly. Instead of assum
ing that there is a God, or of barely touching upon the
way in which we know it, as do the Deists, he system
atically develops his own proof, perhaps recognizes the
cosmological proof and explicitly rejects that of Anselm.

He regards our knowledge of God as very certain.
In fact he speaks of it as a " demonstration." He. I
believes that he can show that man by the "use of his
natural abilities" can attain to knowledge of God1 which
cannot be doubted, for "it is as certain that there is a
God as that the opposite angles made by the inter
section of two straight lines are equal." In the opening
paragraphs of the tenth chapter of the fourth book of t
the Essay, where he presents his so-called "demonstra
tion," he says that the evidence of God's existence is
"equal to mathematical certainty." He then proceeds"

/ ti

to give his proof, which is as follows:

I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his
own being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something
.... that actually exists. In the next place, man knows by |
an intuitive certainty,2 that bare nothing can no more produce »
any real being than it can be equal to two right angles If /

necessary that we should consider them here. Though the proof of the
existence of God was not a point in the deistic controversy, it is presented
here because it tends to show that the Deists are independent of the
infhieneet>fXocTce.

"x Essay, IV, x, 2, 3, 4.1

2 The significance- of Locke's psychological and genetic account of
the idea of God has been much debated in Germany. Crous gives a
good resum6 of the views held by those who have discussed the subject
(pp. 20-21).

86 John Locke and English Deism

therefore we know there is some real being and that nonentity
cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration that
from eternity, there has been something; since what was not from
eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be
produced by something else. Next, it is evident, that what had
its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which
is in and belongs to its being, from another.

The eternal source of being must also be the source
< of all power. Hence it is all powerful; and of all
knowledge, hence most knowing; and this is what we
call God. "From what has been said it is plain to-jne
we have a more certain knowledge of the existence e£~a
God than of anything our senses have not immediately
discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say that we
more certainly know that there is a God than that there
is anything else without us."1

In several places he seems to infer God from the
observed purpose and order of the world. "For the
visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear
so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational
creature, who will but seriously reflect upon them,
cannot miss the discovery of a Deity."2 And again,
speaking of the eye, he says "the structure of that one
part is sufficient to convince of an all-wise Contriver.
And he has so visible a claim to us as his workmanship
that one of the ordinary appellations of God in Scripture

1 Essay, IV, iii, i ff.; x, 6; xi, i, 13; xvii, 2; iii, 27.

2 Ibid., I, iii, 9. This may be understood Ideologically; it may also
be read cosmologically. Crous well observes that this is essentially
cosmological, and is distinguished from his ordinary or cosmological
proof in the stricter sense of the word by the fact that the latter takes
as its starting-point the intuitive knowledge of our own ego (Crous,
p. 27).

Main Points in Religious Discussions 87

is God, our Maker."1 That Locke here is making use
of the argument from design is very doubtful. If he is,
it is neither clearly nor adequately stated, and it is so
far from being emphasized that it appears only
incidentally.

His attitude toward the ontological proof is moder
ately skeptical in the Essay and aggressively critical in
an unpublished paper that Lord King included in his
work on Locke. In the former he is content to observe
that there are temperamental differences, and that for
this reason some arguments have more force with some
men than with others. Yet he thinks that he may say
that to prove the existence of Tjo^hfnnn"TrieT4€a^pj;. a
most perfect being "is' an 'HI way 6T~establishing this

truth. "z^ln his commonplace boolTfor-r6go7 unoler the
heading Deus, he discussed "Descartes' proof of God
from the idea of necessary existence." He rejects it,
because you can just as easily prove eternal matter as
eternal spirit; and, furthermore, although we can prove
real being from real being we cannot prove real being
from the mere idea of it.3

Locke's demonstration is but a special application
of the well-known cosmological proof. It is very

1 Government, pp. 1-53. Locke is arguing concerning the authority
of parents over their children; they have such authority because they
gave them being. He contrasts this with the complete authorship of
our being which is in God. It is not so much the order of the parts of
the eye as such that proves the existence of an all-wise Contriver as it
is God's authorship of our being, that gives Him authority over us, that
concerns Locke.

'^Essay, IV, x, 7.

s The relatiatToTHocke to the Cartesian proof of the existence of
God was frequently discussed in Germany during the last century.
Crous has made a good digest of the discussion (pp. 25-26).

88 John Locke and English Deism

doubtful whether he uses the teleological proof, and we
have just seen that he expressly rejected the ontological,
mentioning it as from Descartes.

Turning to the Deists we find that Herbert was sure
of God's existence because he found the idea of God, as
well as the other articles of natural religion, among the
common notions that are given by natural instinct, and
are innate and of all knowledge most certain. Blount
seems to accept Herbert's views here, just as he did in
case of the other articles of natural religion.1 Toland
is not clear. He says that reason is our ground for
certainty that God exists, and in the same passage he
appeals to common notions, apparently in the same
sense as Herbert. He also speaks of common notions
elsewhere.2 Collins seems to know nothing about
innate principles in this connection. However in one
place, quoting from the opening of Hobbes's De Homine,
he recognizes the importance of teleology as a proof of
God's existence. We must conclude from the adapta
tion of organs that they were made for their respective
needs by an understanding being. He who would not
reason thus "ought to be esteemed destitute of under
standing."3 Tindal knows of only one thing that is
innate in man; that is desire for happiness.4 But we
can know that there is a God "from the marks we dis
cern in the laws of the universe and its government."
From those "we can demonstrate it to be governed by a
God of infinite wisdom and goodness," and he who

1 Blount. Miscellaneous Works, p. 136.

2 Christianity Not Mysterious, p. 31.

3 A Discourse on Freethinking, p. 104.

4 Christianity as Old as Creation, p. 22.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 89

cannot grasp this by his reason cannot know that there
is a good and wise God.1 Wollaston expressly rejects
innate knowledge of God,2 but appeals to the cosmo-
logical proof at least twice,3 and refers to the argument
from purpose, although he does not work this out
clearly. Morgan is impressed with the unity, order,
wisdom, and design of the world. "All nature shines
with Deity, and divine truth and perfection irresistibly
makes its way to every rational attentive mind."4 The
other Deists do not seem to have any interest in prov
ing the existence of God. They assume it as an
unquestioned fact, and devote most of their attention
to the relation of natural and revealed religion.

Accordingly it appears that the Deists as a class
seldom touch the proble.no. Although at first they
emphasize innate principles as a ground for our belief
in God's existence, as the movement approached its
most active and influential stage this gave way to the
teleological proof and also, in case of Wollaston, to the
cosmological proof. However they do not seem to have
made a clear distinction between the last two argu
ments. For instance, we cannot be certain that Tindal
did not reason cosmologically. But the proof of Anselm
does not seem to have appealed to them. It is not
certain that any Deist mentions it.

Summing up our results and comparing them with
Locke's views, we find that early Deism taught that we
have innate ideas of God, which Locke and Wollaston

1 Ibid., p. 191.

2 The Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 36.

3 Ibid., pp. ii4ff., 156.

* Physico-Theology, pp. 140 ff.

90 John Locke and English Deism

^/expressly rejected. It seems that Tindal also rejected
it and it was not mentioned by the other Deists. In
v this respect, later Deism agreed with Locke.

Locke's proof of the existence of God was the cos-
mological one. He thought it had the certainty of
mathematical demonstration. Perhaps this was referred
to by Tindal, but we find no trace of it in any other Deist.
Thus in his main proof Locke seems to have exerted no
influence on the Deists.

It is uncertain whether Locke recognized the teleo-
logical proof.1 This was more widely held among the
Deists than any other. Here the difference between
them is very marked.

Locke expressly rejected the ontological proof. The
Deists appear to have been silent about it.

B. THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD

a) Providence. — There is a widespread conviction
that the Deists denied divine Providence; that they so
reduced the supernatural that the doctrine of the
immanence of God in the world of our impressions
disappears. The God of the Deists is often made to
appear as the apex of an abstract world-system, a creative
being that started the world-process and then withdrew
and is now separated and isolated from it; this is the

1 Locke's practical neglect of the teleological proof becomes all the
more striking when we remember that both Newton and Boyle, who were
his friends, with whom he often discussed religious problems, emphasize
the argument from design. Was Locke's failure to use this proof due
to his keener critical sense which enabled him to see its weaknesses that
were brought out later? We have found nothing that casts light on
this.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 91

"absentee God" of literature.1 It is a tradition that is
not well founded; the Deists who have survived in
history did not hold such views.

Nowhere does Locke give us a specific statement of
his conception of Providence. In fact he seldom men
tions it. He conceives God as very clearly related to \
our well-being here,2 as the supreme Preserver of man
kind,3 and through the bounty of His Providence has
made the useful needs cheap and within the reach of
all.4 "He is constantly bringing about his purposes by
ordinary means." He makes use of miracles "only in
cases that require them" for the evidencing of some
revelation or mission to be sent from him. In fact, as
will appear later, Locke's whole conception of God's
dealings with man, in revealing to him the plan of salva
tion and certifying it by miracles and fulfilled prophecies,
and in making it effective, assumes an active immanence
of God.

Locke repeated the prevailing views of Providence
and had no particular reason to discuss it. It is to be
regretted that Fraser, in the notes of his critical edition
of the Essay, does not give his reason for saying that the

'Deism "has come into use as a technical term for one specific
metaphysical doctrine as to the relation of God to the universe, assumed
to have been characteristic of the Deists, and to have distinguished them
from atheists, pantheists, and theists — the belief, namely, that the first
cause of the universe is a personal God, who is, however, not only distinct
from the world but apart from it and its concerns" (Encyclopaedia
Britannica, art. "Deism").

1 Bourne, Life of John Locke, I, 180, 396.

3 Locke, Works, VII, 85 ff.

* Reasonableness of Christianity, Works, VII, 85.

92 John Locke and English Deism

idea of God "is found in very various stages of develop
ment, and with Locke himself is external and mechanical,
excluding immanence in the actuality of the world of
experience. It is the deistical idea, in short." The
writer finds no justification for this assertion concerning
Locke, nor for this imputation concerning the Deists,
as will appear later. Both accepted the providential
dealings of God with His world as a fact, as did almost
everybody else.1

Turning to the Deists,2 Blount is as outspoken in his
belief that God does "lead and guide all our thoughts,
words, and actions" as any orthodox believer,3 that
God leads men,4 that a great political event was the act
of God.s Toland and Collins are silent on the subject.
But Tindal quotes approvingly from Clarke's Boylean
lecture and holds that "God preserves the world by his
continual all- wise Providence."6 He believes that the
Jews, as God's chosen people, were cared for provi
dentially.7 Wollaston taught that "God who gives
existence to the world, does also govern it by his Provi-

1 Fraser, Locke's Essay Concerning the Human Understanding
(Oxford, 1894), I, 99; Essay, IV, xvi, 13.

2 Richard Willis in Occasional Papers (London, 1697), p. 13, entered
into the deistic controversy and finds no objection whatever to the
deistic doctrine of Providence; he quotes the particular Deist against
whom his attack is directed; from this we learn that he held that God
superintends the actions of men.

3 Religio Laid, pp. 59, 60. 4 Ibid., pp. 63, 64.

s Ibid., pp. 66, 81, 83, 85. This is mentioned in a number of places.
His implicit belief in Providence and the frequency with which he
expresses it would impress any reader with this or any other work of
Blount.

6 Christianity as Old as Creation, p. 364.

' Ibid., p. 197.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 93

dence," and this even concerns "particular cases relating
to rational beings."1 Morgan, in the Preface to Physico-
Theology, expresses the conviction that he demonstrates
"the being, providence, continual presence, and incessant
agency and concurrence of the Deity in all the works and
ways of nature." He also criticizes those who would see
the world running as a perfect clock without the Maker.
He adds that such teaching may be good philosophy, but
it is poor divinity.2 But in a significant passage he
vigorously criticizes those who do not see God acting
through the laws of His world. He can "discover no
difference .... between such sort of Deism and
atheism itself."3 The context indicates that he is
defending the doctrine of Providence against those who
would reduce to a minimum the supernatural factor in
the ongoing of the world. If there were Deists who held
such views, they were not among the leaders of the
movement and leave no mark upon it.4 Strange as it
may seem, Chubb, the least educated of the Deists, is the
only one who has given a systematic statement of the
doctrine of Providence. There is a general Providence,
by which God at the creation put the world under such
laws as result in making proper provisions for the needs
of the animal part of creation.5 Then there is special

1 The Religion of Nature Delineated, pp. 170, 171, 176, 279.

2 Physico-Theology, pp. 25 ff. The seventh chapter is under the
heading, "Of Divine Providence, or God's Preserving and Governing
the World." He expressly accepts both general and special Providence.

3 Ibid., p. 61.

4 Boyle also makes a very vigorous defense of Providence; it seems
to have been called forth by some definite attack. But there is no clue
as to who made the attack (Works, V, 46).

5 A Short Dissertation on Providence, Tracts, I, 142 ff.

94 John Locke and English Deism

Providence, which is a special interposition of God
outside of the normal order, hence miraculous. For
instance, a man passes a loose wall and it falls after he
has reached a point of safety; such a conception of
Providence "is controverted among Christians." It is
inconceivable that God should be almost perpetually
interfering, that there should be a sort of "perpetual
patchwork." But he asserts without hesitation his
conviction that God, for certain great ends, does interfere
in the ongoing of the world.1

Accordingly we find no essential difference between
the doctrine of Providence as set forth by Locke and
as held by all the leading Deists. Both accept the
prevailing view of God's relation to the world. Since
it is a point on which there is no difference of opinion, it
cannot in any way contribute to the solution of our
special problem. This presentation is called forth by
the more or less widespread belief that the Deists as a
class denied Providence as commonly understood, that
this was a distinguishing characteristic of the deistic
movement, and that it was a point of dispute in the
deistic controversy.

b} Miracles. — It does not seem to have occurred to

/Locke that the fact of miracles could ever be seriously

j, challenged. He accepted them as events that actually

\ took place, which reason convinces us are sufficiently

attested in history. "Miracles, which are well attested,

do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to

other truths, which need such confirmation."2 He

appeals to them frequently as testimonies wrought of

1 A Short Dissertation on Providence, Tracts, I, pp. 149 ff.
'Essay, IV, xvi, 13; xix, 15.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 95

God to convince men of the truth of His revelation. In
his Essay on Miracles he says that they are the "bases
on which divine mission is always established, and con
sequently that foundation on which the believers of any \
divine revelation must ultimately bottom their faith."1
They certified the Messiahship of Jesus to the Jews,
they are the credentials which God has given the bearers
of His message to the world.2 Locke frequently empha
sizes the evidential value of miracles. His form of
statement may vary; sometimes he is less extreme
than at others; but whenever he touches revelation his
discussion is permeated by the conviction that it is
miraculously attested.

This tendency in Locke to magnify the importance
of the evidential value of miracles was not peculiar to
him. Even the liberal Tillotson held that miracles
were reasonable and may become, as in the case of
biblical miracles, a convincing proof of revelation.
This was also the opinion of Clarke.3 Even the chemist
Boyle not only held that miracles are a proof of the
Christian religion, but went so far as to assert that they
were necessary to support Christianity.4 As we shall
see later, miracles were considered such an important
part of the economy of revelation that to challenge them
was considered the same as to challenge supernatural
revelation itself and also all positive religion.

Between this view and the general deistic attitude
toward miracles there is a great contrast. Their
evidential value is at first questioned, then denied, and

1 Locke, Works, X, 264; also pp. 259 ff. a Ibid., VII, 32.

3 McGiffert, Protestant Thought before Kant, pp. 200, 210.
« Boyle, Works, V, 48, 52.

g6 John Locke and English Deism

the fact of the miracles is made to appear less and less
probable, and eventually impossible. For Herbert
alleged miracles and so-called revelation 'seemed to go
together. Although he does not deny them, they could
have meaning only for those who witnessed them. For
us they are uncertain tradition.1 It is difficult to gather
from Blount's writings just what opinion he held con
cerning miracles. He accepts the account of the pente-
costal gift of tongues,2 believes that some accounts, such
as that of Lazarus and Dives, are founded on truth, but
enlarged and therefore need interpretation,3 defends
Burnet's critically skeptical attitude toward Old Testa
ment miracles,4 and says, when expressing uncertainty
concerning certain miracles connected with the birth of
Christ, that "to believe in any stories that are not
approved by the public authority of our Church is
superstition; whereas to believe them that are, is
religion."5 He also questions the evidential value of
miracles. He would not depend upon them lest Simon
Magus be his rival; and, furthermore, both miracles and
doctrine come to us by tradition. It is the spirit of
Herbert.6 Though Blount did not reject miracles, his
attitude was often skeptical and hostile. This was the
beginning of the deistic criticism of miracles.

Coming to the leading Deists we find great difference
of opinion concerning miracles. Some surprise us by

1 Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, pp. 48 ff.

2 Miscellaneous Works, pp. 165, 166.

3 Ibid., p. 32.

* Ibid., pp. 2 ff.

s Philostratus, Book I, chap, iv, illustration i.

6 Ibid., chap, v, illustrations 6 and 7.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 97

their conservative views, while others are radical in their
criticism. Tpland, when he is arguing that Christianity
is not mysterious, says plainly that " Christ proves his
authority and Gospel by such works and miracles as the
stiffnecked Jews themselves could not deny to be
divine."1 However a miracle cannot be contrary to
reason.2 He also accepts their evidential value.3 But
a quarter of a century after the publication of Christianity
Not Mysterious, he expressed himself very skeptically on
the Old Testament miracles. He thought that not more
than one-third of them were real miracles. The pillar
of cloud was smoke and the fire "a human contrivance."4
It is probable that Toland became more liberal and
perhaps less cautious in his later years. But even in his
early publications the evidential value of miracles is not
so great as with Locke and Boyle and other progressive
leaders.

Collins seems to accept miracles as a fact,5 although
he is inclined to explain away some of them.6 However
a miracle is not sufficient to give authority to a prophet
attempting to prove anything contrary to natural
religion.7 In fact even "the miracles wrought by Jesus

1 Christianity Not Mysterious, p. 47. He defines a miracle in much
the same sense as Locke and Clarke: "A miracle then is some action
exceeding all human power and which the laws of nature cannot perform
by their ordinary operations" (p. 144).

* Ibid., p. 145. 3 Ibid., p. 147.

4 Hodegus (London, 1720), pp. 5 ff.

3 A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion
(London, 1737), p. 33.

6 A Discourse on Freethinking, p. 160.
•> Ibid., pp. 174, 175.

98 John Locke and English Deism

are, according to the Gospel scheme, no absolute proof
of his being the Messias, or of the truth of Christianity."1

Tindal, though hostile to miracles, does not expressly
deny them, nor does he say that the Deists deny them,2
but he believes there are many miracles found elsewhere
that are of like nature to those of the Bible. In fact
"there are no miracles recorded in the Bible, but many of
the like nature are to be found in pagan histories";3
they have no evidential value if evil as well as good
beings can perform them.4 He calls attention to Clarke's
Boylean lecture, in which Clarke claims that there are
indifferent or possible doctrines, in addition to positive
or ethical, which can be believed on the witness of
miracles.5 Then Tindal adds: "Here these Deists beg
leave to differ with him," both as to whether there are
indifferent doctrines and as to whether they can be
proved by miracles.

Wollaston is silent concerning miracles. Apparently
they have no place in the religion of nature, which he
delineated.

Woolston, in the sixth discourse on the miracles of
our Savior, denies that there was such an event as the
carnal resurrection of Jesus, and asserts that the accounts
of it are absurd, impossible, and inaccurate. One might
almost conclude from his discussion of it that Jesus was
an impostor. At least this much is clear to him, many
of the miracles recorded by the evangelists were never
wrought, and those of Jesus "as they are nowadays

1 A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,
P- 33-

3 Christianity as Old as Creation, pp. 373 ff.

* Ibid., p. 192. « Ibid., p. 200. * Ibid., p. 370.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 99

understood, make nothing for his authority and Messiah-
ship."1 Woolston undertakes to explain these accounts
allegorically. His attitude toward them is often that of
coarse jesting.

Although Bolingbroke at times refers to miracles in a
somewhat uncertain way,2 he accepts them as con
firmations of revelation wrought by God for the estab
lishing of the Christian religion. Christ "proved his
assertion at the same time by his miracles."3 Boling-
broke's doctrine of miracles is that of the orthodox men
of his times — that is, he accepted miracles as historical
facts, out of the ordinary, wrought by God to attest the
truth of His revelation to man.

Morgan, in the second volume of The Moral Phi
losopher, seems to hold almost the same opinion con
cerning miracles that we found in Tindal;4 but in the
first volume he simply assumes miracles as matters of
fact5 and believes that the power of working miracles has
no connection with truth. False prophets also per
formed them.6 The historical fact is not challenged;
the evidential value is denied.

Chubb agrees with Morgan; at times he seems to
assume a somewhat skeptical attitude toward miracles;7

1 A Discourse on the Miracles of Our Saviour (London, 1728), pp. 3-5.

2 Works, VI, 240, 258, 259.

3 Ibid., p. 351. "The faith, which God himself came to earth to
publish, which was confirmed by miracles, and recorded by divine
inspiration," etc. Stupendous miracles accompany God's revelation of
His Son (pp. 283, 285). St. Paul "worked indeed now and then a mir
acle, as it was given him to work them" (p. 288).

« The Moral Philosopher, II, 50 ff.

5 Ibid., I, 79. 6 Ibid., pp. 89, 98, 99.

7 The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted, pp. 43 ff.

ioo John Locke and English Deism

but he believes that they actually occurred, though they
cannot afford certain, but only probable, proof that a
revelation is divine.1

Generally speaking the deistic attitude toward
miracles was hostile. However, few doubted that they
actually occurred. Some of the biblical accounts might
be questioned or even denied, but special divine inter
vention in the course of the world was not challenged.
Some of the Deists held that miracles might be performed
by other powers — by evil spirits or even by the devil.
The miraculous as such was not considered impossible;
but, with the exception of Toland and Bolingbroke, the
Deists rejected the evidential value of miracles. They
cannot prove the truth of revelation. This was a radical
departure from the prevailing opinion of the times.

This attitude toward miracles stands in marked
contrast with that of Locke. Nowhere in his writings
do we find anything that suggests the hostile criticism of
miracles that characterizes the Deists. The lion of
rationalism is made to lie down in peace with the lamb
of traditionalism and not devour it. For him miracles
are facts in history, so well authenticated that we must
believe them. They were special acts of God, wrought
by Him to certify to the truth of His messengers, so that
the man of sound reason had adequate ground for
accepting His revelation. Locke's rationalism did not
venture beyond the beaten paths, while the deistic
rationalism opened up new lines of criticism. It

1 The True Gospel of Christ Asserted, pp. 8 ff.; An Enquiry Con
cerning Redemption, pp. 105, 106; Remarks on Britanni ens Letters (London,
1734)> P- i- In the latter part of The True Gospel of Christ Asserted,
he assumes a very critical and somewhat skeptical attitude toward
miracles, but he nowhere denies them as historical events.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 101

questioned certain biblical records of miraculous events
and attacked the long-cherished Christian conviction
that miracles were an argument, perhaps an unanswer
able argument, for the divine origin of the Scriptures
of the Old and New Testaments. The contrast between
these two views is marked. Locke accepts the scriptural
accounts just as he finds them, and gives what he
considers adequate reasons for doing so, and concludes
that we have in the miracles of the Bible historical facts
and divine witnesses to its truth. The Deists challenged
at least some accounts of miracles and almost unani
mously denied their evidential value. Theirs was
another and a very different spirit.

2. REVELATION AND SCRIPTURE

We have learned that neither Locke nor the Deists
conceived God as dwelling in isolation, unconcerned for
the welfare of his world. We would therefore naturally
expect that they would think of the Creator and Ruler
and Upholder of the universe as having some special
designs for man's well-being, some plans or principles for
directing his life which He would make known to man.
This is what we find both Locke and the Deists teaching.
Everybody believed that God reveals His will, that man
can know what God would have him do, and that rewards
or punishments are ours according as we obey or disobey
God's will. The fact of revelation is never challenged.
But when we go beyond this opinions differ widely.
Assuming that there is a revelation, some further ques
tions arise. How is it given, how does God make known
His will to man, how does the Infinite communicate to the
finite ? And, again, assuming that there is a revelation,

io2 John Locke and English Deism

what is God's message to man, what does He com
municate to us, what is the content of revelation ? Can
we take the Bible just as it is to be His revelation ?
These questions lead us to one of the chief battle grounds
of the deistic controversy. Perhaps in no other field can
we see so clearly the lines that divide the Deists from the
more orthodox men of the period that we are studying.
If you know a man's attitude toward revelation, you can
classify him quite accurately. Here, as in the case of
miracles, there is a radical difference between Locke and
Deism. We shall see that this difference pertains to the
relative importance that is assigned to reason and
nature, as over against the supernatural factor, in
mediating revelation, and to the consequent conception
of the contents of revelation. In the preceding chapter
we considered the place of reason and nature in religious
matters. It will therefore not be necessary for us to
make an extensive survey of the opinions of other writers
of the liberal movement.

Though Locke does not give us a full and systematic
discussion of revelation, he has indicated plainly what
he holds concerning it, so that we can reconstruct his
views with confidence. Worcester is right in asserting
that Locke assumes the possibility of revelation without
.remark.1 We may go farther and say that Locke
assumes the fact of revelation, which he undertakes to
define, limit, and rationalize as far as possible. In the
Essay, Book IV, chapters xviii and xix, he discusses
Faith and Reason and Enthusiasm, and makes many
references to revelation. He defines faith as assent to

1 E. E. Worcester, The Religious Opinions of John Locke (Geneva,
N.Y., 1889), p. 23.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 103

a proposition "not thus made out by the deductions of
reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming 1 1
from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. |
This way of discovering truth to men we call revelation."1
Perhaps his best definition of revelation is given in the
passage already quoted in the study of reason in the
preceding chapter, in which reason and revelation are
contrasted. "Reason is natural revelation, whereby
the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge
communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he
has laid within the reach of their natural faculties;
revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of
discoveries communicated by God immediately; which
reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proof
it gives that they come from God." So that to deny
reason in the interest of revelation "puts out the light
of both."2

Reason and revelation in the narrower sense are set
over against each other. Both are from God. Each
brings to us some portion of God's truth; revelation
enlarges natural reason by giving man something from
God immediately, by some extraordinary means of
communication, which is vouched for by reason.

Locke clearly teaches that revelation is no ordinary
communication; its supernatural character never seems
to have been questioned by him. We have just seen,
in the preceding section, that he is convinced that its
bearers come with the special stamp of divine approval
in the miracles that God enabled them to perform.
Being no ordinary communication from God, it was

1 Essay, IV, xviii, 2.
4-

io4 John Locke and English Deism

natural that it should be accompanied by extraordinary
events.

He also holds that revelation brings us some things
; that unaided reason could never discover; it thus
• becomes supplemental to natural light. There are
things that are above the reach of reason, of which we
can have no knowledge; yet these "when revealed are
\ the proper naatter of faith," such as the rebellion of
I angels, the resurrection of the dead and the like;1 and
in certain things where reason ,can give us but probabil
ity, revelation "must carry it against the probable con
jecture of reason. ' ' In the Reasonableness of Christianity,
he was disposed to enlarge the scope of that which we
have from revelation, that reason could not discover.
; He emphasized the contrast between the ethics of natural
and revealed religion.

He also teaches that we accept revelation because
reason certifies to its being revelation. Though revela
tion is supernatural and can give man that which is
above reason, it cannot be accepted on its own authority.2
We saw in the preceding chapter that it had its creden
tials from reason: and when we receive anything as
revealed by God our assurance can be "no greater than
our knowledge is that it is a revelation from God."3

1 Essay, TV, xviii, 7. 3 Ibid., 6.

3 Ibid., IV, xviii, 5. "Whatever God hath revealed is certainly
» true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith; but
\ whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge; which can
j I never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is
i (less evident, not allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowl
edge and certainty. There can be no evidence that any traditional
irevelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the
isense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as that of the principles

Main Points in Religious Discussions ic(

Hence faith is a persuasion short of knowledge.1 But
once we are persuaded by sound reason that a revelation
is from God, "we may as well doubt of our own being, as
we can whether any revelation from God is true."2

The closing paragraph of Locke's first letter to
Stillingfleet gives his attitude toward the Holy Scripture. '
It is his constant guide; it contains infallible truth, and 1 '/
he is ready to condemn and quit any opinion once it (
is shown to be contrary to any revelation in Holy I
Scripture.3

Though Locke's attitude toward revelation is
thoroughly rationalistic, the conclusion at which he I
finally arrives is very conservative. He is convinced
that he has sufficient reason for believing that the
Scriptures are God's revelation to man with full divine /
authority, supernaturally given and certified by miracles/
and prophecy.

Locke accepted prophecy and its fulfilment as fact.
For him it was not just a special part of God's super
natural revelation to man. It was given, as the rest
of the Bible, in a manner that is out of the ordinary.

of reason; and therefore nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent
with, the clear and self-evident dictates of reason has a right to be urged
or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do.
Whatsoever is divine revelation ought to overrule all our opinions,
prejudices, and interests, and hath a right to be received with full assent"
(Essay, IV, xviii, 10).

1 Locke, Works, VI, 144. This term played an important part in his
controversy with Stillingfleet.

2 Essay, IV, xvi, 14. "Not to believe what he has revealed ....

calls his veracity into question For the holy inspired writings

being all of the same divine authority, must all equally in every article
be fundamental, and necessary to be believed" (Works, VII, 234).

' Locke, Works, IV, 96.

io6 John Locke and English Deism

But much of it has been fulfilled in the later stages of the

revealing of the plan of salvation ; and this becomes the

s proof of the divine character of all revelation. This is

ian additional witness to the truth of Scripture, which, as

we have just seen, Locke considered synonymous with

revelation. Miracles and prophecies fulfilled are

evidences for revelation that no man with sound reason

can reject. Paul confirmed the gospel by two sorts of

arguments: the one was the revelations made concerning

our Savior, by types and figures and prophecies of Him ;

the other by miracles.1 ''Christ, now He is come, so

! exactly answers the types, prefigurations and predictions

I of Him, in the Old Testament, that presently, upon

'( turning our eyes upon Him, he visibly appears to be the

I person designed"; and the obscurity of many passages

becomes clear.2 Thus the New Testament has, in

addition to the miracles that were wrought by Christ

and the apostles, the proof from the fulfilment of the

Old Testament prophecy.

When we study the teachings of the Deists con
cerning revelation, we find ourselves in a different
atmosphere. Herbert did not deny revelation, but he
conceived it as mediated to us under such conditions
as make it very uncertain. It was real revelation only
to him that first received it. To us of a later time it is
but tradition; and the reliability of a tradition depends
upon the reliability of the narrator and can never be
more than probable. There was great opportunity for
fraud, and as a matter of fact deception had been prac
ticed.3 Blount, apparently under the influence of

' Locke, Works, VIII, 86.

1 Ibid., p. 200. 3 Sorley, Mind (1894), p. 507.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 107

Herbert, asks, "Whether I am obliged to accept of
another's revelation for the ground of my faith?"1 He
generally answers this question in a conservative way.
"For my own part, I who believe the Scriptures to be
the word of God, do in this point, as in all others, resign
up my poor judgment to that sacred oracle."2 However
at times he assumes a critical attitude toward certain
portions of the Bible.3

1 Religio Laid, p. 94.

3 Anima Mundi (London, 1679), pp. 25, 31, 95. The only account
of the Jews that we can rely on "is the Old Testament Scriptures, which
as everybody knows, was dictated by the Holy Spirit." — Miscellaneous
Works, p. 136.

3 Miscellaneous Works, p. 147; Philostratus, Book I, chap, vi,
illustration 5; Book I, chap, xvii, illustration 2.

In the Oracles of Reason there is printed a letter to Blount from one
whose identity remains hidden behind the initials of his name. He
holds that revelation cannot be a necessary supplement to natural
religion, because the latter is the only general means to happiness that
has been proposed and must therefore be adequate and known to all men.
This letter was published as a part of the Oracles of Reason, which was
recognized as representative of the deistic movement at that time.

Stillingfleet's Letter to a Deist, which is said to be the first formal
reply to Deism that is known, sheds much light on the sort of views that
he was opposing. Works (London, 1709), II, 120 ff. The Deist whom
he is answering found all manner of confusion in the Bible and sought out
and magnified the difficulties. He set forth the points agreed upon which
are but an enlargement of those which Herbert had held. His seven
objections to the authority of Scripture are extremely radical: (i)
There is no certainty of an event so long ago; we have many fictitious
histories. (2) Probably these were written when no one lived who could
contradict what was said. (3) They could more easily do this before
printing 'was known. (4) Perhaps there were more impostors engaged in
giving false revelation and miracles than we can now discover. (5) We
should not take the testimony of Scripture or Christian writers, for they
may be prejudiced. (6) Contradictions and inconsistencies in the Bible,
unfulfilled prophecies, obscurity, imperfections of persons mentioned,
justify suspicion of the truth of it. (7) We have cause to doubt the

io8 John Locke and English Deism

Toland, in the Preface to Christianity Not Mysterious,
frankly says: "In the following discourse the divinity of
the New Testament is taken for granted."1 For him
the authority of God is the same as divine revelation;
however this revelation "is not a necessitating motive of
assent, but a means of information."2 Yet the ultimate
proof of the divinity of Scripture rests upon reason, and
all doctrines and principles of the New Testament must
agree with natural reason.3

Though Collins said that the Bible was "given us
at diverse times by God himself,"4 he also believes that
a natural duty was "of more indispensable obligation
than any positive precept of revealed religion."5

In Tindal we come to the more radical development
of the deistic view of revelation. He starts out from the
thesis that external and internal revelation must agree,
must in fact be the same; the standard of the latter must
be the basis for judging the former.6 Hence revelation

apostles' sincerity — they "might have indirect ends in divulging the
miracles recorded in Scripture."

It is evident that Stillingfleet had in mind some writer who held
almost all of the characteristically radical opinions of later Deism.

1 Christianity Not Mysterious, pp. xxiv and 4.

1 Ibid., pp. 18, 38, 65; Vindicius Liberius (London, 1702), p. 104;
Letters to Serena, pp. 19, 56.

3 Christianity Not Mysterious, pp. 32 ff., 46.
* A Discourse on Freethinking, p. 10.

s Ibid., p. 174. In the Preface to A Discourse on the Grounds and
Reasons of the Christian Religion, he assumes a somewhat unfriendly
attitude toward the Old Testament and sees difficulties in its divergence
from the New Testament.

6 Christianity as Old as Creation, pp. 8, 59, 188.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 109

cannot supplement reason.1 Therefore external revela
tion, in addition to the light of nature, is not necessary.2
He even claims that had our documents of revelation
asserted authority without relying upon reason, they
would have had no authority.3 Here reason is not only
the authority that certifies that an alleged revelation is
revelation; it becomes also the judge of that which
revelation brings. Revelation is made to depend on
reason to a greater extent than in any previous writer.
Bolingbroke would test the Old Testament, as every
other historical work, by seeing whether its contents
squared with experience.4 By this test we find that
" there are gross defects and palpable falsehoods in almost
every page of Scripture." Their whole tenor is such
that one who would believe in an all-wise Being cannot
believe them to be His word.5 He even says: "Can
he be less than mad who boasts a revelation superadded
to reason?" and then adds reason to revelation. And
into such madness St. Paul, Augustine, Malebranche,
and the Bishop of Cloyne fell.6 And concerning the
reliability of the records, we have only opinion to attest
supernatural revelation handed down by tradition;
hence there is a decreasing probability of its being true;
while natural religion suffers no diminution. The
original pure gospel of Christ was supplemented from

1 Ibid., p. 69. "Whatever is true by reason, can never be false by
revelation" (p. 178).

2 Ibid-, p. 195. "The Scripture can be only a secondary rule, as far
as it is found agreeable to the nature of things." The ultimate criterion
of revelation is subjective (pp. 188, 190). Revelation so far as it is
reasonable is not set aside by reason (p. 213).

s Ibid., pp. 210 ff. s Ibid., p. 148.

« Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 238. 6 Ibid., pp. 170, 171.

no John Locke and English Deism

heathen sources; hence not all of the New Testament is
gospel. Even in the very beginning it was changed by
Paul, for his gospel is different from that of Christ.1
Turning to the purpose of revelation, which, in spite
of his racial hostility, he seems to accept as a fact,
Bolingbroke finds that "it was not given to convince
men of the reasonableness of morality, but to enforce the
practice of it by a superior authority."2

Morgan assumes revelation as a fact.3 Yet it is no
guaranty of the truth of that which was revealed save
to the first person who received it; for all who came
later have the account transmitted through tradition.4
In the Tracts, his first publication, he held that revela
tion may be able to give man that which unaided reason
could not reach;5 but in The Moral Philosopher he
teaches that revelation cannot give us anything above
reason, to which it must always appeal.6 In fact the
only thing left for us to do is to appeal to reason, for in
so-called revelation there is confusion everywhere.7
Morgan believes that he has proved that revelation is

1 Bolingbroke, Works, pp. 303, 350 ff., 354-56; VII, 39 ff.

1 Ibid., VI, 329, 330. In the Sermon on the Mount, "revelation
commands what it is impossible to obey, without an assistance unknown
to reason" (p. 331).

3 The Moral Philosopher, I, 15, 20.
''Ibid., pp. 8 1, 82.

s Tracts, X, 18. In the preceding chapter he discusses the use of the
concept of reason.

6 The Moral Philosopher, III, 84 ff . Nothing miraculous or supernat
ural can have any authority over reason (p. 134). Physico-Theology,
pp. 328 ff. The authority of any doctrine is grounded in nature or
reason, not in the manner of its communication (p. 126).

i Physico-Theology, pp. 144 ff.

Main Points in Religious Discussions in

not infallible, and that those ancient Jewish historians
were not under any unerring guidance of the Holy
Ghost.1

Chubb recognizes some sort of revelation, and Christ
as a mediator of a divine revelation to the world, and
our accounts of these revelations of God as "in the main
strictly true," though we must make allowance for
error.2 But our certainty of revelation rests not barely
on the fact of "divine declaration," but "on the ground
of reason."3

It will be instructive here to note what some of the
critics of Deism indicated as the objectionable element
in the movement. It is significant that their attitude
toward revelation forms one of the main points of
attack, and sometimes almost the only point of attack.
Stillingfleet selects this as their most objectionable
teaching.4 Boyle discusses the objections of Deists to
Scripture and revelation, and concludes that "Deists
must, to maintain their negative creed, swallow greater
improbabilities than Christians, to maintain the positive
creed of the Apostles."5 Richard Willis argues against
those who say that revelation is impossible.6 These
were the early critics of the deistic movement; they
knew it as it was a generation before Tindal uttered his

1 The Moral Philosopher, III, Preface.

2 The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted, pp. xi, 12; An Enquiry
Concerning the Books of the New Testament, whether They Were Written
by Inspiration (London, 1734), pp. 5, 6.

3 The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted, pp. 137, 139.

4 A Letter to a Deist in Origines Sacrae (Oxford, 1797), Vol. II.
s Boyle, Works, V, 660, 66 1.

6 Occasional Papers, I; A Letter to a Deist.

ii2 John Locke and English Deism

radical views. Stillingfleet and probably Boyle directed
their criticisms against unknown writers of a deistic
literature before Toland and perhaps before Blount.
It is evident that even in its early stages the deistic
movement was characterized by a hostile attitude toward
revelation; and it is also plain that the defenders of the
more orthodox position considered this one of the most
objectionable features.

In their attitude toward the prophetic portions of
revelation we find a like difference between the Deists
and Locke, who agrees with the more conservative
writers of the progressive movement. Though Blount
seldom refers to prophecy, he is very critical in what he
says. Moses, Elijah, Isaiah, and many other prophets
failed, for prophecies were suspended. Sometimes they
deceived each other.1 Toland scarcely mentions proph
ecy. He seems however to accept it as a fact.2 Collins
is critical and hostile in his attitude toward it, though
he does not make an open denial of it.3 However, he
challenges it as a proof of revelation, assuming that in
many instances an allegorical interpretation is neces
sary.4 Tindal; contrary to what we would naturally
expect, seeks to avoid the discussion of prophecy. Yet
he shows that he is as critical here as elsewhere. He
asserts that the apostles were deceived by prophecy;
then how can we be certain?5 Woolston accepted

1 Religio Laid, pp. 37-47; Philoslratus, Book I, chap, xvii, illustra
tion 2; Miscellaneous Works, pp. 162-65.
3 Christianity Not Mysterious, p. 90.

3 A Discourse on Freethinking, pp. 153 ff.

4 A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,
pp. 35 ff., 41, 94.

5 Christianity as Old as Creation, pp. 258-62.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 113

prophecy as a fact, and even went so far as to say that he
believed that the controversy concerning Christ's
mission "will end in the absolute demonstration of
Jesus' Messiahship from prophecy," and not from
miracles. He would apply the allegorical method of
interpretation to all prophecy.1 Bolingbroke seems to
accept prophecy as a fact, but does not discuss it.2
Morgan holds that prophecy is no proof for us of the
truth of anything that others report. He seems to
accept prophecy as fact, but denies to it as well as to
miracles any evidential value; Christ was not the
fulfiller of Jewish prophecy.3 Chubb did not mention
prophecy in anything that he published; however in a
posthumous pamphlet he asserted that it would not
prove the truth of Scripture.4

Looking backward over the survey of the opinions of
Locke and the Deists concerning revelation and Scrip
tures, we see that the difference in point of view or
method, that was set forth in the preceding chapter, has
brought its fitting results in their widely divergent
attitudes toward supernatural revelation and its record.
Both were rationalistic; both appealed to nature and
reason as over against authority. But in making this
appeal Locke was conservative and emphasized the
limits of unaided reason in the field of religion, whereas
the Deists were radical and magnified those factors
which tended to weaken the authority of an externally

1 A Discourse on the Miracles of Our Saviour, pp. i, 2.

2 Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 351.

3 The Moral Philosopher, I, 343 ff.; II, xxviii.

4 Chubb, Posthumous Works (London, 1748), II, 139 ff.

r

ii4 John Locke and English Deism

given revelation. Accordingly, when they come to the
discussion of revelation, they consider it from different
and ever more widely diverging points of view. One
cannot pass from Locke to Tindal without being sensible
of the great chasm that exists between them. The
former, a reverent, pietistic rationalist, saw in every
part of Scripture God's supernaturally given message
for guiding man to salvation, which message he accepted
as from God on grounds which his reason convinced him
were sufficient; though this conviction fell short of
certain knowledge. And once he was led on the basis
of sufficient reason to accept a book as from God, he was
ready to give up any opinion that was not in harmony
with it. Though he believed that revelation could not
and did not bring to man anything that was contrary to
reason, its message might be above it. Tindal, whose
chief book became one of the most influential and
representative deistic writings, challenged revelation
and the Bible in the spirit of a more radical rationalism;
Scripture becomes only a secondary rule; revelation
can give us nothing above reason and nothing that
reason cannot attain; hence it is not necessary. The
contrast could scarcely be greater. Locke is reverential
in his attitude toward the old beliefs, and uses his
rationalistic method to establish the supernatural
sanctions; Tindal and the typical Deists are hostilely
critical toward the old beliefs, and apply their
rationalistic method to the destruction of the tradi
tional supernatural sanctions in the interest of estab
lishing the sole normative authority of that which
is naturally mediated. The former is a "super-

Main Points in Religious Discussions 115

natural rationalist"; the latter are anti-supernatural
rationalists.1

Comparing the views of these very divergent systems
concerning revelation, we find that Locke accepts super
natural revelation as a fact, and that the Deists also
accepted it, but with considerable reservation. For him
it was synonymous with the Bible; for the Deists it was
not, though opinions differed somewhat in this, becoming
more hostile as the movement advanced. Locke was
convinced that we as rational beings could not accept
anything, not even revelation, without sufficient reason;
so were the Deists. But he also held that revelation
can and does give us that which unassisted reason could
not attain, though it is in harmony with reason; the
Deists denied this, though here again there was some
difference of opinion. Locke taught that revelation \/
supplements reason; with few exceptions the Deists said
that this was impossible. For Locke reason is insuffi
cient to give us all that is necessary for salvation,
revelation is necessary; again the Deists dissent.
Locke accepted prophecy as a fact, and recognized in
fulfilled prophecy evidence of the divine origin of
Scripture; the Deists as a group, perhaps all of the
more important Deists, also accept prophecy as a fact,
but, with the surprising exception of Woolston, they deny
to it any evidential value, and are generally skeptical
and critical in their treatment of it.

'The term "supernatural rationalism" was used by McGiffert in
Protestant Thought before Kant, pp. 199 ff., for describing the views of
such men as Tillotson, Locke, Clarke, and others. It is accurately
descriptive. Though they held firmly to the supernatural, they were
thoroughly rationalistic.

n6 John Locke and English Deism

With the help of naturalistic principles Locke
attempted to free from blind authority-belief and to
ground rationally the essential elements of the tradi
tional view of revelation as supernatural; while the
Deists became ever more hostile and skeptical toward it,
challenging now this, now that, and, though they did not
deny it outright, they reduced the supernatural in
revelation almost to the vanishing-point.

3. RELIGION

At no time did the deistic controversy challenge the
fact of religion. Just as everybody believed that there
was a God, so they believed that man stood in some
relation to Him which involved certain obligations on
the human side. Attention has been called to the free
and easy use of epithets at this time; the controversial
literature was full of scolding names. But even if there
were atheists, they were not Deists. Both the Deists
and their critics accepted religion as an unchallenged
fact. But since so many of the industrious orthodox
pamphleteers identified religious faith with the accept
ance of a set of authoritatively formulated dogmas,
dissent from such man-made standards was considered
irreligion. Even among the Protestants "human
glosses," as Locke called such dogmas, were treated as

• rules of faith that believers must accept. This, along
with "popery," was the religion of authority, against
which the rational theologians, the Cambridge "Lati
tude Men," Locke, and the Deists were continually pro-

; testing. But religion itself was not denied at any time.

In the preceding chapter we noted the use that was

made of the concepts of nature and reason in discussing

Main Points in Religious Discussions 117

religious topics. We saw that they were extensively
used throughout the period that we are considering;1
they were important motives in the speculative thought
of England at this time. At least the more progressive
minds sought to account for and to justify the existence
of principles and institutions by deriving them from
nature or from nature and reason. Nothing should be
accepted as true by an intelligent being, such as man,
unless it is grounded in the nature of things and is in
harmony with right reason.

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL RELIGION

It was inevitable that religion should be subjected
to this test. If the lesser things of life are rational,
certainly that which is man's "supreme concernment" \
cannot be irrational; and if human institutions have
an anchorage in the nature of things, religion, which is
a divine institution, cannot have less, and it may have
more. And, above all, the heathen apparently without
any revelation learned to know God and their relations
to Him merely by the use of their natural powers.
Natural religion was a fact that could be verified. This
conviction was an inheritance from former centuries.
The question at once arises as to its value, and as to
what sort of relation exists between it and revealed •.
religion. Which is supreme ? Is it to be judged by
positive religion, or is positive religion to be judged by
it ? These questions were much debated in England of '
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and opinions

1 They were a heritage from former periods, but whence they came
need not concern us here. Their origin and the history of their use are
not relevant to our problems.

1 1 8 John Locke and English Deism

differed widely. They constituted one of the significant
problems of the age. We can classify men according to
their answers. Though certain phases of this problem
were touched upon in the study of the use of the concepts
of nature and reason, its most important phase, which
concerns the relation of natural and revealed religion,
has not been adequately considered. We shall therefore
make a critical survey of the views that were held
concerning natural religion by the more influential
progressive thinkers, from Hooker until the decline of
the deistic movement.

a) The rational theologians. — The first two books of
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity are concerning natural
law and divine law. In the preceding chapter we saw
that in his discussion of these subjects he has much to
say concerning nature and reason, the source of their
authority and what they can and what they cannot give
us. This law of reason or nature is from God, and comes
with His authority.1 It can show us that there is a God,
and certain of our duties toward Him;2 but it is limited,
it cannot teach us what we "should do that we might
attain unto life everlasting"; the way of salvation is
supernaturally given, revelation is necessary, it supplies
the insufficiency of the light of nature.3 According to
Hooker man by unaided reason can know something of
God and his relations to Him; the light of nature is
sufficient to enable him to know certain duties, but the
way of salvation must be supernaturally revealed. He
clearly recognizes natural religion, though he scarcely
uses the term, but he also emphasizes its limitations.

1 Hooker, Works, I, 205, 227, 232, 233. 2 Ibid., pp. 230, 231.
s Ibid., pp. 331, 333, also 234, 259, 269, and elsewhere.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 119

This, with individual modifications, was the position
taken by the rational theologians. It did not occur to
anyone to deny that man by his natural powers could
know God, and could have some sense of religion. Even
Stillingfleet in his Irenicum taught that by reason we can
discover the "law of nature" which comes from God, and
therefore "cannot be superseded by any positive human
or divine enactments"; and "things clearly deducible
from the law of nature .... may be practised in the
Church."1 It is significant that Stillingfleet in his
controversy with Locke did not find fault with Locke's
attitude toward natural religion. Tillotson, another
contemporary of Locke, would test revelation by our
"natural notions about religion." Sherlock said in a
sermon that "the Gospel is the true original religion of
reason and nature," and that if it "represents the
religion of nature, it need but appeal to a man's reason
for acceptance." However he added: "The religion
of the Gospel is the true original religion of reason and
nature. It is so in part; it is all that, and more."2
And a little later Prideaux in his Letter to the Deists went
so far as to say: "Let what is written in all the books of
the New Testament be tried by that which is the touch
stone of all religion, I mean that religion of nature and
reason which God has written in the hearts of every one
of us from the first creation; and if it varies from it in
any one particular" it is an argument strong enough to
overthrow it. Even Bishop Butler, the great champion
of orthodoxy against the Deists, writes in the first chapter
of the second part of the Analogy: "For though natural

1 Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, I, 427-30.
* Sermons Preached on Several Occasions, V, 134-43, 148.

i2o John Locke and English Deism

religion is the foundation and principal part of Chris
tianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it." In fact
he is ready to go almost as far as Prideaux, who published
his book a few years later. "If in revelation there be
found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is
contrary to natural religion, we may most certainly
conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one."1
Yet however much they magnified natural religion, and
however plainly they recognized its normative character,
they were all careful to say that it was inadequate to
meet the religious needs of man. Some of these church
leaders were considered liberal, but most of them were
recognized as the great apologists of their time. We
can safely take their views as representative of the
orthodox progressive leaders in the church.

b) The philosophers. — The philosophers of the period
recognized natural religion, but there was not full agree
ment as to the importance it should have. In our study
of the use that was made of nature and reason as ground
ing principles for laws and institutions, we saw that
though Bacon recognized natural religion he assigned a
modest place to natural theology, and that Hobbes also
recognized it, though he accounted for it in another way.
In the union of philosophy and Christianity, which the
Cambridge Platonists sought to effect, the place of
natural religion was at least as clearly recognized as it
was by the theologians. Whichcote's striking expression
may be taken as characteristic of the whole school:
"The spirit in man is the candle of the Lord, lighted by
God, and lighting man to God."2 With nothing but our

1 Essays and Reviews, pp. 267, 268.
3 Tulloch, op. cit., II, 99.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 121

natural faculties, we can "ascend the world's great altar-
stairs that slope through darkness up to God." Unaided
reason can attain to a knowledge of certain of the funda
mental elements of religion; but, however much man
knows in this way, it still falls short of revelation; nature
is not sufficient to attain all that God bestows.1 The
Cambridge Platonists are as careful to emphasize the
limitations of that which nature through our reason
reveals to us of God and our duties toward Him as they
are to magnify the dignity and importance" of the natural
light, which is also divine, that shines in the soul of
every man.

In full agreement with the rational theologians and
the Cambridge Platonists, Boyle, who was really a
theologian and a philosopher as well as a scientist,
recognizes natural religion, which "as it is the first that
is embraced by the mind, so it is the foundation upon
which revealed religion ought to be superstructed, and is
as it were the stock upon which Christianity must be
grafted. For, though I readily acknowledge natural
religion to be insufficient, yet I think it very necessary."2
Boyle's estimate of natural religion might well be taken
as representative of all the progressive thinkers of the
more conservative tendency, whether from the camp
of the philosophers or from the theologians.

It is evident that at the time when Locke was doing
most of his writing natural religion was one of the chief
centers of interest in religious speculation. Apparently
almost everybody had an opinion concerning it; the
more conservative men were engaged in setting its

1 Ibid., p. 70; also Culverwell, The LigJtt of Nature, pp. 267, 272.

2 Boyle, Works, V, 46, 685.

122 John Locke and English Deism

limits and the more liberal, as we shall see later, in
magnifying its importance. In the preceding chapter we

{' saw that Locke exalted reason and also recognized the
importance of nature in accounting for things. He also
was intensely interested in all matters pertaining to

, religion; it is really in the background of all his specula
tions and often appears when least expected. We
would naturally think that since he treated so many
problems in philosophy and religion systematically he
would give us a thorough discussion of natural religion.

( But though isolated passages in his works show clearly

j that he recognized it as a fact, he nowhere makes an
ordered presentation of his views concerning it. His

: interests in religious problems were focused rather on
revealed religion and the rationalization of it than on
that religion which man with his unaided capacity can
attain.1

In discussing the imperfection of words he says:
"Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when
clothed in words," should be liable to that uncertainty
which " attends that sort of conveyance." We should be
thankful that God by His works and Providence and the
light of reason has enabled men, who know not His
special revelations, to know Him and their relation to

1 Worcester discusses "the comparative practical importance Locke
assigns to 'revealed' and to what he sometimes calls 'natural' religion.
One difficulty in the way of such an inquiry lies in the fact that Locke
nowhere clearly states exactly what he understands by the latter expres
sion and as all his specifically religious writings lie in the field of Revela
tion, his conception of a 'natural religion' is preserved in only a few brief
hints," The Religious Opinions of John Locke (p. 30). Crous also calls
attention to Locke's failure to discuss natural religion. He makes the
very important observation that Locke does not enter into a thorough
presentation of it, "but emphasizes the necessity of the sending of
Jesus" (p. 106).

Main Points in Religious Discussions 123

Him, so that they need not "doubt of the being of God,
or of the obedience due Him. Since the precepts of
natural religion are plain and very intelligible to all
mankind, and seldom come to be controverted"; and
revealed truths, expressed in language, are liable to the
"natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words;
methinks it would become us to be more careful and
diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial,
positive, and imperious, in imposing our sense and inter
pretations of the latter."1 Here Locke is emphasizing
the "imperfections of words"; he is not magnifying the
importance of natural religion. Owing to this imper
fection, which necessarily attends this way of convey
ance, it happens that natural religion is not hampered
by the uncertainty that necessarily attends the use of
words, because it is mediated through the light of
reason, while revelation is thus hampered because it is
conveyed in words. Therefore natural religion has this
one advantage over revealed religion, its principles are
not hampered by the uncertainties of words. We are
not justified, on the basis of this passage, in assuming
that it has any other advantage; it may have many
disadvantages.

A passage in A Discourse of Miracles, which was
published posthumously, seems to give great prominence
to natural religion. He says: " That no mission can be
looked on to be divine, that delivers anything derogating
from the honor of the one, only, true, invisible God, or
inconsistent with natural religion or the rules of morality :
because God having discovered to men the unity and
majesty of His eternal Godhead, and the truths of

1 Essay, III, ix, 23.

124 John Locke and English Deism

natural religion and morality by the light of reason, He
cannot be supposed to back the contrary by revelation;
for that would be to destroy the evidence and the use of
reason, without which men cannot be able to distinguish
divine revelation from diabolical imposture." Locke
is certain that God gave reason to man, through which

I he discovers Himself to men as the one true God, and
certain of man's duties toward Him. We must
remember that much of this that we know by reason
concerning God is of the nature of demonstrative
certainty; and it is really a revelation of God, though

i through natural means. To set up anything in con
tradiction to this is to deny reason, and if we do this we
are helpless; we have no way of distinguishing true
revelation from that which is false. We should also
recall in this connection that according to Locke faith
is a persuasion short of knowledge. We may conclude
from this passage that reason and the religion of reason
or natural religion, so far as it goes, cannot be contra
dicted by other revelation. But we cannot conclude
anything concerning the adequacy of natural religion.

If there is such a thing as natural religion, if man by
the exercise of his reason can know the one true God and
his duty toward Him, the question arises as to what
place there is left for a supernatural revelation. We
find Locke's answer to this in the Reasonableness of
«/* Christianity in his discussion of the faith of those who,

„ because they lived before Christ or in a place where
knowledge of Him had not come, did not have an
opportunity to accept Jesus as the Messiah.1 "Nobody

1 The closing portion of the Reasonableness of Christianity, Works,
VII, 128 to end.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 125

was, or can be, required to believe what was never
proposed to him to believe." God requires from every
man according to what he hath, and he who makes use
of the candle of the Lord will be sure to find the way to
forgiveness.

But though the works of nature and man's reason
show the way to God, man failed to know Him as he
should. Several Greeks grasped the truth, but it was
not communicated to the mass of mankind. Only the
few have knowledge of the one true God. Christ came,
and threw down the wall of partition, and showed that
the knowledge of God was for all mankind. Further
more, man lacked a clear knowledge of duty. "He
that shall collect all the moral rules of the philosophers,
and compare them with those contained in the New
Testament, will find them to come short of the morality
delivered by our Savior, and taught by His Apostles."
And even if such a collection from ancient thinkers were
made, and even if it equalled that taught by Christ, it
would be entirely without authority. In Christ, who
was sent by God, morality has a pure standard which \
revelation vouches.

Though Locke does not wish to minimize in any way
the importance of reason, he finds himself compelled, by
the religious and moral conditions that prevail and have
prevailed, to admit that reason has not sufficed in matters
of religion and morality. It seems that theoretically
reason is capable of much more than it actually accom
plishes, owing to the darkening influence of vice and the
passions of men. We have seen already that he holds t
that revelation can and does give us that which is above
reason, though not contrary to it.

126 John Locke and English Deism

Taking this lengthy discussion of the value to man
of God's revelation in Christ, which Locke published in
1695 when he was still in the period of his greatest
intellectual activity, as the standard for interrupting
the short passage from A Discourse on Miracles, which
he wrote the year before his death, and which was not
published by him, we conclude that Locke recognized
natural religion as a fact, that he magnified the impor
tance of reason as that which certifies to revelation and
which revelation cannot contradict, and that he empha
sizes the limitations of the religion and morals which
unaided reason can give. Natural religion for Locke
is a norm for testing revelation only so far as concerns
that which contradicts reason; revealed religion may
and does contain elements that are above reason. He
emphasizes the imperfections and limitations of all
religions, save that which has God's special revelation
as contained in the Bible. To interpret these passages
in such a way as to represent Locke as making natural
religion the sole standard for judging of all religion would
be contrary to his entire spirit, and could not be harmon
ized with the limitations that he has set to reason nor the
importance that he assigns to revelation.

c) The Deists. — But when we come to the Deists, we
find a very different attitude toward natural religion.
Herbert of Cherbury, their earliest representative, shows
the spirit that dominated the movement when it was at
its height. Scripture is very uncertain; for if there was
a supernatural revelation it had authority only for him
who first received it; for all others it is but tradition and
can never be more than probable. But we find a sure
foundation for religion in our common notions, which

Main Points in Religious Discussions 127

we have from our natural instinct; and that which we
have through natural instinct cannot be doubted.
Among these common notions are the five articles of his
universal religion. They are sure; they give us some
thing definite by which we can judge all dogmas of
religion. He does not deny revelation, but since any
knowledge that we may have of it is so uncertain, and
since these five catholic articles cannot be doubted, they
should be supreme. Natural religion, which unaided
reason can discover, is sufficient. Of course we must
remember that with Herbert natural is almost synony
mous with divine.1

Though Blount at times emphasizes the importance
of revelation, as we have seen in treating that subject,
he believes his five articles of natural religion, which
are essentially the same as those of Herbert, are suffi
cient, and that what goes beyond them is likely to bring
bad results because it is so uncertain. Common reason
is our sure foundation in matters of religion; all faiths
have been shaken save those which are founded on it.2

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, art. "Herbert"; W. R. Sorley, Mind
(1894), p. 492; Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, pp. 42 ff.

3 Religio Laid, pp. 81-91. In the Oracles of Reason, the letter to
Blount from A. W. on pp. 197 ff. discusses "natural religion as opposed
to divine religion" and concludes that revelation cannot be a necessary
supplement to natural religion, because the latter is the only general
means of happiness that is proposed; it must therefore provide man with
everything that is necessary for his spiritual well-being. The entire
letter is aggressively hostile to the supernatural elements in religion.
See note under section on "Revelation" in this chapter. There were
evidently a number of less prominent deistic authors, whose writings
have not survived, or at least have not drawn the attention of the
students of this period. From the limited information concerning them
that we have, we are justified in concluding that they were more hostile
to Christianity than Toland, or Collins, or even Blount. Their criticisms

128 John Locke and English Deism

Toland has little to say about natural religion, but
he recognizes it. And his denial that revelation can
give us anything above reason increases its normative
authority as over against positive religion. He quotes
Whichcote as saying that "natural religion is eleven
parts in twelve of all religions"; but he adds that one
main design of Christianity was to improve and perfect
the knowledge of the law of nature.1 Toland in Chris
tianity Not Mysterious evidently wants to hold to
Christianity in its orthodox form, or at least he wishes
to appear to do so; he also wants to be distinguished
from the Deists. But in Nazarenus, which appeared
twenty-two years later, he is much more radical in his
attitude toward revelation; the spirit of the book is
more hostile toward traditional Christianity than any
thing that he had written.

Collins, strictly speaking, does not discuss natural
religion, but he emphasizes "natural light" and sets
natural duty over against revealed religion in such a way
as to show plainly the great importance that he attaches
to it.2

As we would naturally expect, Tindal gives a radical
interpretation of the relation of natural and revealed

seem to have anticipated almost all of the characteristic opinions of the
later and more radical Deism. However, it may be that Toland was
more radical in his views than he gave himself out to be; in reading his
books one is likely to suspect insincerity.

1 Nazarenus, pp. 67 ff .

3 A Discourse of Freethinking, p. 173. He quotes Tillotson, whom he
appeals to frequently (p. 1 74) . Collins uses the central thesis of his book
very loosely. Bentley is justified in criticizing severely his "perpetual
juggle" about his term of art, freethinking, Remarks upon a Late Dis
course of Free-thinking (London, 1713), p. 65.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 129

religion. His great deistical work, Christianity as Old
as Creation, may be considered a discussion of the thesis,
"natural and revealed religion differ in nothing." From
the beginning God must have given men such rules of
conduct as would guide them in doing that which is
acceptable to Him, and "external revelation" can do no
more. And if God gave man a religion from the begin
ning, was that religion perfect or imperfect ? Certainly
it was absolutely perfect, which means that it could
admit of no change either by addition or diminution.
Natural and revealed religion differ only as to the means
whereby they are communicated.1 The thesis of the
sixth chapter is, "that the religion of nature is an abso
lutely perfect religion; and that external revelation can
neither add to, nor take from its perfection; and that
true religion whether internally or externally revealed
must be the same." Assuming that the agreement of
natural and revealed religion is an accepted fact, a
further question arises: Which one is normativej when
there is a difference between natural^ and_ revealed
religion, which one should be followed ? Consistent
with his radical rationalism, Tindal holds that the *n
religion of reason is always supreme. The law of jiature ./w*-
is the standard of perfection, and by it we must*, ^f***
judge antecedent to all traditional religion what is or i
not proper and worthy of God.2 "Could we suppose
any difference between natural and traditional religion,
to prefer the latter would be acting irrationally,"3 for

1 Christianity as Old as Creation, pp. 3-6. The gospel was not to add
to natural religion which man had from the beginning, but to free man
from the load of superstition (p. 8, also p. 79).

2 Ibid., p. 59, also pp. 164, 178. 3 Ibid., p. 328.

130 John Locke and English Deism

religion is blemished by that which is added to it beyond
what natural religion offers; thus superstitions came in.1
According to Tindal, Deism really consists in judging
revelation by natural religion; its very essence is hos
tility, in some form, to revelation.2

For Wollaston religion is but an ethical system on a
theistic background. He has nothing to say concern
ing the relative importance of natural and revealed
religion. Natural religion exists in the sense of a moral
duty. There is a law of nature that must be followed,
and doing so is religion. He speculates in the spirit of
Tindal and has nothing to add to the discussion of this
point.3

Bolingbroke, though probably attaching more impor
tance to revelation, occupies practically the same posi
tion as Tindal. He holds that to think that man is
unable "to attain a full knowledge of natural theology
and religion without revelation" dishonors man; revela
tion can add nothing to reason.4

Morgan, though more conservative than Tindal and
Wollaston in some respects, is probably the most radical
deistic writer in discussing the relative importance of
natural and revealed religion. Natural religion is the
sure and certain religion; if you exclude it you have no

1 Christianity as Old as Creation, pp. 85 ff. and 141 ff.

' Ibid., pp. 368, 369.

3 The Religion of Nature Delineated, pp. 2, 4, 41.

* Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 41, 171, 172, 282, 288 ff. Yet he admits,
apparently inconsistently, that "there are many doctrines which reason
would never have taught, nor is able to comprehend, now they are
taught." This "cannot be denied" (p. 356). But the whole tenor of
his writings runs in the other direction.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 131

religion left.1 "Revealed religion" is built upon tradi
tion and human authority, and this "clerical or
sacerdotal Christianity or revealed religion consists in
the belief of doctrines which cannot be understood."2
Natural religion is clear and sure and is the standard
for all religions. Neither Chubb nor Woolston added
anything to this discussion.

For the Deists natural religion has an increasingly
honorable and important position. It is not only a
genuine religion, but for most of the leaders from
Herbert on it is the only sure religion that is free from
the mysteries, uncertainties, and confusion that weaken
the claims of positive Christianity. Hence the religious
truths and principles that unaided reason can discover,
or that God reveals to man through reason, are made the
standard for testing all revelation. If supernatural
revelation is acknowledged at all, it is of less value than
the principles of natural religion, either because that
which was revealed could have authority only for him
who first received it, for to all others it was but tradi
tion, or because revelation could not give man anything
that was above his reason or beyond its reach. Or,
expressing it differently, the Deists emphasized the
importance and normative authority of natural religion
and the limitations of revealed religion.3

Locke and others that we have studied also recog
nized the importance of natural religion, but they
emphasized its limitation, its insufficiency. They sought

1 The Moral Philosopher, I, 346, 434.

2 Ibid., Preface, also pp. 94, 117.

3 "Accordingly Deism is essentially an elevation of natural religion,
supported by free examination, to the norm and rule of all positive
religion" (Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, p. 460).

132 John Locke and English Deism

to show that it must be supplemented and that it
actually is supplemented by revelation, which brings to
man that which unaided reason could not attain. "The
religion of the Gospel is the true original religion of
reason and nature." To this the Deists would readily
assent. But Sherlock and others, including Locke,
would add: "It is so in part; it is all that and more."1
That which is postulated over and above natural
religion distinguishes the liberal non-deistical writers
from the Deists. Revelation was not only a historical
fact, as most of the Deists taught, but it actually brought
to man something that unaided reason could never have
attained. And that which it conveyed to man was of
importance for his religious life.2

1 Sherlock, Discourses Preached on Several Occasions, V, 134,* 142.
Preaching before the king in June of 1700, he denned Deism. It is "to
believe a God and to deny all revealed religion" (I, 256).

2 After setting forth the rationalistic motive in the theological
speculations of all the parties of this period, Mark Pattison says:
"According to this assumption, a man's religious belief is a result which
issues at the end of an intellectual process. In arranging the steps of
this process, they conceive natural religion to form the first stage of the
journey. That stage theologians of all parties and shades travel in
company. It was only when they had reached the end of it that the
Deists and Christian apologists parted. The former found that the
light of reason which had guided them so far indicated no road beyond.
The Christian writers declared that the same natural powers enabled
them to recognize the truth of revealed religion. The sufficiency of
natural religion thus became the turning point of the dispute. The
natural law of right and duty, argues the Deists, is so absolutely perfect
that God could not add anything to it." The "Christian defenders
.... never demur to making the natural the basis on which the

Christian rests Christianity is a resume of the knowledge of God

already attained by reason, and a disclosure of further truths. These
further truths could not have been thought out by reason; but when
divinely communicated, they approve themselves to the same reason"
(Essays and Reviews, pp. 269 ff .) .

Main Points in Religious Discussions 133

B. RELIGION DEFINED AS MORALITY

Another significant point of dispute in the deistic
controversy concerning religion is the definition of it
largely or exclusively in terms of morality. Is religion
mere morality, or is it something more ? This is closely ]
associated with and in a sense grows out of the problem *
of the relation of natural and revealed religion; in fact
it might almost be considered a part of it. Men were
convinced that unaided reason could know that there
is a God, and that man has certain duties toward Him
and toward his fellow-men, and that the performance of
these duties brought divine approval and the neglect of
them divine displeasure. Man's welfare here and here
after depended upon knowing and doing his duty. It
was a legalistic age; religion consisted in obeying the*
divine laws, and these were revealed to unaided reason.!
If there were "mysteries" in religion they were of less
importance, for God had given them to only a few.
From these premises it was easy to conclude that
religion should be defined wholly or almost wholly in
terms of morality. And as a rule speculation in the
philosophy of religion was likely to do this just in the
degree in which natural religion was given a normative
authority over positive religion. The more radically
men asserted the supremacy of reason in all matters of
religion, the more they challenged the "mysteries" in^
revelation and magnified the ethical at the expense of the
supernatural. As the supernatural waned in radical
Deism, the ethical grew in importance, until religion was
but a moral system on a theistic background.

Among the rational theologians we have no trace
of this tendency to minimize the supernatural. Though

134 John Locke and English Deism

they emphasized nature and reason in their speculations
concerning religion, they were always careful to show the
limitations of the natural and the necessity of the super
natural. It is true that they conceived religion legal-
istically, after the manner of the times.1 For Hooker
revelation was primarily for directing action, the notion
of law and duty was very prominent. And his suc
cessors held the same view : they emphasized the ethical
factor in religion, and, with others, they probably
helped to prepare the way for the more radical deistic
writers who conceived religion in terms of an ethical
system.

Among the Cambridge Platonists the moral element
in religion is emphasized still more. Whichcote saw but
two things in religion— morals and institutions — and
morals are nineteen parts out of twenty of all religion.2
Cudworth agreed with him. "The Cambridge Divines
.... gave their chief interest and study to the moral
side of Christianity and the divine power which it
reveals in the life and sacrifice of divine love."3 They
emphasize the ethical element in religion more than any
other writers outside of the rank of the Deists, but they
never resolve religion wholely into terms of morality.
In their systems revelation was always considered a
necessary supplement to that which is mediated through
nature.

1 That in this period religion was conceived legalistically in England
is seen in much of the theological literature, but it is not so clear just
whence this tendency came. It may be due to the Calvinistic type of
theology and perhaps also in part to the influence of Socinianism, both
of which emphasized legalism.

2 Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, II, 107.

3 Ibid., p. 235.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 135

Locke, like his predecessors and contemporaries,
conceived religion largely from the legalistic point of
view. In the opening pages of the Reasonableness of
Christianity, Christ's redemption is made to consist in
restoring what Adam lost by setting up the new law of
faith, "which is allowed to supply the defect of full
obedience," in lieu of the law of works which had been
delivered to the Jews, which was, "Do this and live,
transgress and die." Man could not yield perfect
obedience, but faith can take its place; thus the immor
tality lost in Adam's fall is regained. But the moral
elements of the law still hold. This faith was believing
that Jesus was the promised Messiah; but in order to
avail for salvation it must be accompanied by repentance.
"Faith .... and a new life are the conditions of the
new covenant." The law of works was too hard for
man — perfect obedience, which it required, was all but
impossible; hence Christ came with a new law, which is
the law of faith; in this sense Christ is represented as a
new lawgiver.1 But the faith element, accepting as
true what God wishes us to believe, is a necessary part
of our obedience toward God. The great emphasis that
Locke lays on faith and repentance makes the legalism in
his conception of Christianity perhaps more apparent
than real.2

Certain students of Locke's writings are disposed
to interpret some of his statements concerning the place

1 The whole doctrinal background in which this appears is well
worked out by Worcester in the third chapter of The Religious Opinions of
John Locke. Though interesting and instructive, it does not bear directly
on this problem except in so far as it has been presented in very brief
outline.

2 Reasonableness of Christianity, Works, VII, the opening pages
and pp. 128 ff.

136 John Locke and English Deism

morality should have in worship as proving that he is of
the school of Herbert of Cherbury. In speaking of
toleration Locke says: "A good life, in which consists
not the least part of religion and true piety concerns also
the civil government."1 And in the opening pages of
his first Letter on Toleration, he states that "the business
of true religion .... is the regulating of men's lives
according to the rule of virtue and true piety." This he
sets over against ecclesiastical pomp and authority.
But in this same portion of his discussion of toleration,
he asserts that "faith only, and inward sincerity are the
things that procure acceptance with God." Morality
is the outward expression of the inward state.2 The
place of morality in religion is also emphasized in
Sacerdos, which Bourne says was written before 1667
and was published posthumously.3 Locke opposed, as
vigorously as any man, that type of Christianity which
magnifies the forms of righteousness and the pomp of
outward worship; in doing this he emphasized the
virtuous and pious life; the Christianity that does not
regulate action and result in holiness of life is not
genuine. But he is never in danger of making religion
and morality synonymous.4 On all essential points in

1 Locke, Works, VI, 41.

* Ibid., VI, 28.

3 L. King, Life of John Locke (London, 1830), II, 84 ff.

* In the closing pages of The Reasonableness of Christianity, he gives
reasons why Christ came to bring God's revelation to man. Among
other advantages that we have through His coming is a clear and
authoritative moral standard, for "a clear knowledge of their duty was
wanting to mankind."

It was too hard a task for reason to establish morality in all its parts.
The best that the philosophers discovered fell far short of the rules of

Main Points in Religious Discussions 137

the definition of religion he probably agreed with the
more progressive leaders of his day in the Church of
England. He was legalistic in his conception of religion,
after the fashion of that period, and he emphasized, to a
limited extent, the ethical factors in religion; but in this
he does not go as far as Whichcote and Cud worth.

In the deistic movement, especially when it was at
its height, a different spirit prevailed. In the very
beginning Herbert laid the foundation in his philosophy
of religion for resolving all religions into morality. His
universal principles were so sure, and a revelation that
was mediated through tradition was so uncertain, that,
as has been stated, his five articles were made normative
for all religion.1 The central element in religious life,
according to Herbert, is worshiping by moral and pious
living. Man also knows that he ought to repent for
sins; this is one of the "common notions." But he
would not know sin were it not for the moral law, in
obeying which he worships God. Thus for Herbert the
ethical factor in the religious life was all-important.

the New Testament. And even if they could have found out their full
duty, it would have lacked authority. But this is just one of the advan
tages that men have through Christ. He brought the new covenant and
now man can have salvation through the law of faith instead of through
the law of works, and faith believes what God would have us believe and
that is that Jesus is the Messiah.

The statements by Crous on pp. 85 and 109 are misleading. On a
small foundation, and by emphasizing what Locke mentioned only
incidentally, he succeeds in putting him within the deistic movement.
By a like process of reasoning he could make many others Deists.

1 These five catholic articles are: There is a God; He ought to be
worshipped; Virtue and piety are the chief parts of worship; Sin
must be atoned for by repentance; Punishment and rewards follow this
life.

138 John Locke and English Deism

Religion became little more than an ethical system in
which the theological background was emphasized.

It is probable that Blount's position resembled closely
that of Herbert, whose five articles greatly influenced
him. He nowhere says outright that religion is morality,
but the general tenor of Religio Laid is to magnify the
ethical at the expense of the supernatural.1 Though
Toland seldom mentions the ethical factor in religion, it
has considerable importance for him. But there is no
effort to reduce religion to a system of morals.2

Tindal is the first one of the more prominent Deists
to give us a complete statement of the relation of morals
and religion. He is as radical here as elsewhere.
According to Tindal religion consists "in the practice of
morality in obedience to the will of God." The differ
ence between morality and religion is this: morality is
"acting according to the reason of things considered in
themselves," while religion is "acting according to the
same reason of things considered as the will of God."3
Natural religion, which is about the only kind of religion
that Tindal recognizes, is but an ethical system on a
theistic background; it consists in observing the rules

1 The letter from A. W. to Blount that was published in Oracles of
Reason is much more radical than Blount. The writer identifies the
rules of natural religion, which is about the only religion that he recog
nizes, with morality. He says the practice of obedience "to the rules
of right reason " is " moral virtue " .... is "natural religion."

3 The next year after the appearance of Christianity Not Mysterious
(i.e., in 1697) Willis in Occasional Papers, p. 17, objected to the deistic
foundation of ethics and expressed the conviction that we had better
ground our morals on revelation than on the deistic principle laid down
by reason. Collins is silent on the subject. See also Nazarenus, p. 67,
and A Collection of Several Pieces, II, 121, 130, 138 ff.

3 Christianity as Old as Creation, p. 192.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 139

that reason discovers. And anything added to this is
a blemish.1 The whole of religion, according to the
Deists, consists in performing all the duties of morality.2

For Wollaston religion is "nothing else but an
obligation to do what ought not to be omitted, and to
forbear what ought not to be done." If there is moral
obligation, there is natural religion. The foundation of
religion lies in the difference between the good and evil
acts of men.3 The whole of The Religion of Nature
Delineated is but a theistic moral system, in which the
naturalistic factor is emphasized, but the theistic founda
tion is never lost sight of.

Morgan agrees with Tindal and Wollaston; he says
the same thing in different words. "By Christianity,
I mean that complete system of moral truth and right
eousness, justice and charity, which, as the best tran
script of the religion of nature, was preached to the
world by Christ and the Apostles." Morgan holds that
natural religion consists of eternal and immutable
principles of moral truth.4

Deism, in its beginning and at the time of its greatest
influence, so emphasized the ethical factor in religion
that it almost eclipsed the supernatural. After the
manner of the times the Deists conceived religion
legalistically. It consisted largely, perhaps almost
entirely, in obeying certain laws. The legalistic way

1 Ibid., pp. 13 ff., 141.

2 Ibid., p. 366. Just at this time (1731) John Balguy in A Second
Letter to a Deist (London, 1731) said that Deism is more than merely
being governed by the obligations of moral fitness (p. 64).

3 The Religion of Nature Delineated, pp. 4, 41. .

4 The Moral Philosopher, I, 94, 439.

140 John Locke and English Deism

of viewing religion, which prevailed everywhere, when
united with the more radical rationalism and naturalism
of the deistic movement, resulted in conceiving religion
almost entirely in terms of ethics. Practically every
serious thinker on religious problems would say that the
religious life is a moral life ; but few, if any, beyond the
camp of the Deists would say that the moral life is
always a religious life; or, as several of the Deists put it,
that Socrates was a Christian. The essential element in
natural religion is obeying rules that reason can discover;
and natural religion is the standard for judging all
religion. It may be that this tendency in Deism is but
the doctrine of Cud worth further developed. Some of
them speak of ethics in the language of Cambridge.
But they do not accept the objectivity of the distinction
between right and wrong as a point of departure from
which to begin their discussions of religion or morals,
as do the Cambridge Platonists. It is rather the spirit
of Herbert that speaks in the more radical later Deism.
Virtue and piety are the chief parts of worship, according
to his fundamental principles of universal religion; and
man knows this religion of nature by his unaided reason.
Tindal and Wollaston and Morgan emphasized natural
religion, which they practically or actually identified
with morality, and made it the norm for testing all
religion. Though their systems remained theistic, the
supernatural was reduced to a minimum.

Locke clearly stands outside of this line of develop
ment. It is true that he emphasized the moral side of
Christianity.- But in doing so he contrasted it with the
empty ecclesiastical forms and pomp that were notori
ously barren of holiness of life. When the Deists

Main Points in Religious Discussions 141

emphasized the ethical elements in Christianity or in
natural religion, they contrasted them with the super
natural. Though they sometimes use the same language,
they do not say the same thing. The supernatural
relations and sanctions of the religious life occupy a
much more important place in Locke's system than in
Deism.

4. TOLERATION

A full discussion of toleration in England of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would be a
history of Nonconformity. For our purpose it will be
sufficient to make only a general survey of the period.

We must remember that not all preachers of tolera
tion were tolerant. One need but read Bourne's account
of events at Oxford, just before and during the time of
Locke's student days, to realize how often the advocates
of toleration forgot their exalted principles when they
had the power to coerce others.1 With some individual
exceptions toleration was never the creed of the party in
power; it was generally the cry for justice of a party
that was oppressed. However there were some leaders,
we may say there were certain groups of leaders, who
advocated it.

The spirit of the whole rationalistic movement in
theology and related interests tended toward toleration.
As we have seen, it fostered free inquiry; a corollary of
this is toleration of resulting divergent opinions. If a
man is to think for himself in religious matters, he must
be free to think, he must have the privilege of holding his
opinions unmolested by others.2 This was the teaching

1 Bourne, Life of John Locke, I, chaps, ii, iii.

2 Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, I, isSff., 1642.

142 John Locke and English Deism

of Faulkland and Hales. Chillingworth held that the
Apostles' Creed contained all the great principles of
religion, and on these all men were agreed; hence the
Protestants were divided not on matters of faith, but
on minor matters of speculation.1 He grasped the
meaning of Protestantism and saw the real sense of
"agreeing to differ." In this same class stands Jeremy
Taylor's defense of The Liberty of Prophesying. It was
probably the greatest plea of that century for the
"liberty of Christian teaching within the Church."
And in like spirit Stillingfleet wrote The Irenicum of a
Comprehensive Church, though he modified his opinions
later. Both Taylor and Stillingfleet set up broad and
comprehensive principles as the ideal.2 The Christian
religion is a religion of peace and tolerance. The church
has no right to require more than Christ Himself asked.
There is no reason that can be given why the things that
are necessary for salvation, as laid down by our Savior
in His words, are not enough for membership in any
church body. Unfortunately the Restoration was
dominated by another and a very different spirit.

Contemporary with this movement, or perhaps a
little later, the group of leaders at Cambridge exerted
an influence for toleration. In some respects they
strongly resembled the rational theologians, and yet
they differed from them. Hales, Chillingworth, and
Taylor, as we have seen, distinguished fundamental and
nonfundamental, and advocated comprehension of sects
by the Church of England on the basis of the funda-

1 Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, I, pp. 325,
33 5 > 341-43-

* Ibid., pp. 344 ff., 411 ff.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 143

mental articles of faith. Their interests centered in
church polity; they would so modify the conditions of
membership in the state church that it would "compre
hend" all sects; their problem concerned the practical
administration of the affairs of the church. The
Cambridge divines, on the other hand, turned their
attention to interests that were more profound; they
discussed the nature of religion and raised critical ques
tions in the spirit of the new speculation — questions
which touched "the very essence of religious and moral
principles." They attempted on philosophical grounds
to say to just what extent men had a right to be dogmatic
and to insist on a certain standard of orthodoxy.
Though they came to practically the same views as
Chillingworth and others concerning toleration, they
reached their conclusions by a different way. It was
religious philosophy rather than ecclesiastical polity that
concerned them.1

Among these Cambridge divines, Whichcote con
ceived the essence and character of true religion in such
a way that he could not understand how regenerate men,
who agree on the great articles of faith and principles
of a good life, could not overlook subordinate differences.2
And Smith, Cudworth, and More were of the same
opinion. In the midst of the warring sects they sought
to grasp a nobler religious ideal which was common to all
Christians. Freedom of conscience in all religious
matters was sacred. Hence all true religion must be
tolerant. The reason enlightened by revelation is a
sufficient guide. The fundamentals were sufficient as a
basis for church unity; it was unreasonable and against

1 Ibid., II, i ff. " Ibid., pp. ioi ff.

144 John Locke and English Deism

the real spirit of Christianity to demand uniformity of
belief in that which is not central in religion. Man
has no right to demand acceptance of more than Christ
and the Apostles required. Because of their broad
views they were soon known as "the latitude men."
Cambridge Platonism became the center around which
developed the latitudinarian movement. But this was a
new message that the rational theologians and the Cam
bridge Platonists brought. It did not fit the prevailing
conception; men were still too prone to define religious
faith in terms of the acceptance of sectarian dogmas.
Their counsel was rejected by both Anglican and Puritan.
Somewhat separate from these liberal theologians of
the established church, and also apart from the Platon
ists at Cambridge, stood Milton, "the great interpreter
of the Commonwealth." Though he was close to the
Cambridge divines in many things— for they were of the
Puritans1 — he did not share their philosophical specula
tions. He approached toleration rather from the
political or practical side. He wrote a Treatise of Chris
tian Liberty in Ecclesiastical Causes, Showing That It
Is Not Lawful for Any Person on Earth to Compel in
Matters of Religion, and also a book on True Religion,
Heresie, Schism, and Toleration. In the latter, which
appeared at a time when it was dangerous to utter such
views, he taught toleration for every religious opinion
except idolatry, which is impiety, and popery, which is
rather a political than a religious party.2 Many of the
greatest advocates of toleration, including Locke,
excepted atheists and Romanists for these reasons. In

1 Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy, I, p. 7.

2 Ibid., English Puritanism and Its Leaders, pp. 239 ff.

Main Points in Religious Discussions 145

the period of the Restoration Milton was probably the
greatest critic of the intolerance that then prevailed.

Locke saw very early in life the evil results of the
prevailing intolerance. During his student days at
Christ Church College men were driven from academic
chairs for no other reason than that they were of another
party than that which was in power. Clergymen were
taken from congregations, some leaders of ecclesiastical
parties were imprisoned, and in a few instances men suf
fered harm in person and estate. It is not surprising
that as a young man, probably less than thirty years
old, he saw the impossibility of church uniformity in
doctrine and cultus. It was forced home upon him that
honest men of religious conviction did not think the same
on all matters, and that the points on which they differed
were almost always not of cardinal importance for
religious faith; they generally concerned doctrinal
statements that were formulated by man — human
glosses as he expressed it — and not the plain truths of
revelation. In an essay entitled Reflections on the Roman
Commonwealth, which was written, according to Bourne,
about 1660, when Locke was twenty-eight years old, he
presents Numa's principle of toleration in all religious
matters most sympathetically, and traces schisms and
heresies to "multiplying articles of faith, and narrowing
the bottom of religion by clogging it with creeds and
catechisms and endless niceties." He also sets limits to
authority in enforcing uniformity. The Roman state \ /
is held up as an ideal of religious toleration.1 About the
same time, or very soon after, in an unpublished essay, he
discusses the problem from a somewhat different angle,

1 Bourne, Life of John Locke, I, 149.

146 John Locke and English Deism

with results that seem to suggest an extension of the
power of the civil magistrates over indifferent things.1
During the next seven years his experience in offices of
state was extensive. He was secretary to the first Earl
of Shaftesbury. Before 1667 he returned to the problem
in Sacerdos, in which he shows that coercion in matters
of religion is unreasonable.2 And very soon after this he
wrote his Essay Concerning Toleration, which is a fuller
and more systematic treatment of the subject. Here,
in the name of freedom of conscience, he advocates
toleration for all religious beliefs, save such as contain
tenets that are hostile to the state or society; hence
Atheists and Catholics should not be tolerated.3 In
1669 he incorporated religious toleration in The Funda
mental Constitution for the Government of Carolina* He
touched upon the discussion of tolerance in several other
writings before he wrote his great work on toleration,
Epistola de Tolerantia, in the winter of 1685 and 1686.
It was publiahfidjn 1689, and was the first discussion of
toleration by Locke that reached the public. This was
vigorously attacked, and Locke wrote a second letter in
its defense.5

It is very doubtful whether any other topic occupied
Locke's attention as often as toleration. He returns
to it again and again, now from one point of view,

1 Bourne, Life of John Locke, I, p. 154.
3 Ibid., p. 156.

3 Ibid., p. 174.

4 Ibid., pp. 239 ff.

s Crous gives an excellent digest of Bourne's account of the develop
ment of Locke's views on toleration with considerable additional matter;
he also gives a faithful presentation of Locke's arguments and con
clusions; it is thorough and correct (pp. 51 ff.).

Main Points in Religious Discussions 147

now from another. It probably is the determining
motive of his most important theological treatise, The
Reasonableness of Christianity. But whether writing a
pretentious work for publication or a short note or essay
just to formulate his views, his fundamental principle
was always the same. Every law-abiding citizen has a
right to freedom of conscience in religious belief and
worship, so long as this does not interfere with the rights
of others.

A genetic study of the development of Locke's
teaching concerning toleration would indicate that the
determining motive is to be found in practical interests.
An intolerable situation of intersectarian jealousy and
oppression existed. In the interests of the well-being
of all parties concerned, both as citizens of the state
and as members of organized religious bodies, the situa
tion demanded relief. Very early in life Locke set
himself to devising a means of escape. He was thus led,
primarily by the very practical question of church polity
and the interests of state, in working out his views on
toleration. In this respect he probably stands in closer
relation to the rationalistic theologians than to the more
abstractly philosophical Cambridge Platonists. For
Locke toleration rose out of a very practical demand;
it is a way of meeting a given situation, rather than the
corollary of a theory of religion. His philosophy of
religion is never wholly lost sight of, but it is not the
determining and molding factor in his advocacy of
toleration.

In the debate concerning toleration Locke's great
service is that he gave a complete systematic presenta
tion of his views; it may be said that he summed up the

148 John Locke and English Deism

best that had been written on the subject. Further
more, he uttered his plea in the language of the more
intelligent middle class, and he supported his position
with the simple but convincing arguments of common
sense. Milton reasoned more profoundly, and so did
the Cambridge Platonists, but Locke, who was not
burdened by the heavy Miltonic diction or by Platonic
speculation, reasoned more convincingly for the reading
public. As a result of this and the more fortunate
conditions that obtained after 1688 his writings on tolera
tion exerted a great influence. But he is not strictly a
pathfinder here. A number of great men had spoken
of it before him; practically all of the more progressive
thinkers of the period urged toleration; Locke is just one
of the most important men of this group.

The Deists, of course, were among those who wanted
complete toleration. But, strange as it may seem, they
had very little to say about it when their movement
was at its height. From Blount to Chubb it is mentioned
probably not more than two or three dozen times, and
nowhere is there a formal discussion of it. These men
came upon the stage after the great leaders, among whom
was Locke, had practically won the battle. Hence they
generally assumed toleration as an acknowledged fact;
some of them never even mention it.

For Herbert religious toleration is the corollary of his
five fundamental principles of all religion; these consti
tute the core of all true religion; whatever more there
is in a religious system is uncertain and cannot be con
sidered essential and binding. Therefore all who
embrace these principles should be tolerated. Toland
devotes a few pages to asserting and defending tolera-

Main Points in Religious Discussions 149

tion.1 Collins, Tindal, and Wollaston are silent on the
subject. Woolston expressly assumes it.2 Bolingbroke,
in his vigorous protest against authority, several times
condemns all forms of coercion in religion, and says that
persecution is caused, not by the gospel, but by the
systems that have been raised on it. This is the nearest
approach to a discussion of toleration among the Deists.3
Morgan refers to toleration in a very energetic way
though briefly. Fundamentals in Christianity have been
multiplied, with the result that the right of private
judgment has been ignored.4 For Chubb the only thing
necessary for recognition as a Christian were the essential
facts of the gospel and not men's opinions. Christ is
man's sole lawgiver; no man has a right to force faith
or subjection.5

Deism, at least in its period of greatest influence, paid
but little attention to toleration. Conditions had
changed since the days of the rational theologians and the
Cambridge Platonists. Toleration was all but an
accomplished fact, so far as concerned active coercion.
Certain political disabilities continued for a century or
more, but there was freedom of conscience to the extent
that men could believe almost what they pleased in
religious matters and yet live in peace. Toleration was
no longer a living issue.

1 Vindicius Liberius, pp. 107-15. He claims toleration for all save
the Papists— they condemn all others and are under a foreign ruler. He
believes that without religion civil liberty is impossible.

2 A Discourse on the Miracles of Our Saviour, pp. 68 ff.

3 Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 286, 290, 350, 483 ff ., and in Vol. VII the
orepart of his discussion of "Tolerance."

4 Tracts, pp. xvi ff., also Physico-Theology, pp. 270 ff.

s The Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted, Preface, and pp. 3 ff.

150 John Locke and English Deism

The occasional references that the Deists make to it
are not sufficiently extensive to enable us to know which
principle determined their thinking on the subject,
whether they were in the line that came down from the
rational theologians, or in that which we have from the
Cambridge Platonists. It is impossible, on the basis of
their few incidental references to toleration, to determine
whether they were close to the practical discussion of
Locke or to the more speculative reasoning of Cambridge.
But it is clear that toleration is not peculiar to Locke
or the Deists; it is, however, a distinguishing character
istic of the more progressive thinkers of the whole period.
We find it advocated by the Rational Theologians, the
Cambridge Platonists, Locke, and the Deists; it was a
doctrine common to many minds. The fact that both
Locke and the Deists advocated toleration marks them
as part of one movement, but not necessarily as consti
tuting the whole of that movement; as we have seen,
there were many others who held the same opinions.
When the new order came after 1688, Locke, by his
vigorous and plain appeal for toleration, became the
leader of all those who advocated it, of whom a minority
were Deists. He did not become the leader of the
Deists, as Crous asserts.1

1 Since toleration was not a point of dispute with Deism, it should
not be discussed here if we were to adhere strictly to the principle that
has guided in the selection of the topics that have been developed in this
chapter. But Crous used it to prove Locke's identity with the deistic
movement; hence this cursory account has been given of such portions
of the debate on Nonconformity as were relevant.

CHAPTER VI

DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE RELATION OF THE
ENGLISH DEISTS TO LOCKE

Locke's influence dominated the period when Deism
was most productive. The extent of this influence, as
seen in quotations from Locke and direct references to
him in the deistic writings, should therefore be investi
gated. It will appear that some of the Deists seemed
to be wholly independent of Locke, while others were
influenced by him, but in a way that is not significant,
and that at least Bolingbroke appreciated the difference
between the religious opinions of Locke and those of
the Deists.

I. LOCKE'S INFLUENCE IN ENGLAND AFTER 1 688

Spinoza and Locke were born in the same year, 1632.
Spinoza died in 1677 while Locke was traveling in France.
Had Locke died at that time his name might have been
preserved as the friend of Sydenham, or as the secretary
of the first Earl of Shaftesbury and tutor to his son. He
was recognized as a genial "student" at Christ Church,
Oxford, of scholarly tastes and more than average
ability; he had many friends, among whom were some of
the most prominent men of the time; but he was com
paratively unknown, he had done nothing to attract
the attention of the public. Locke at fifty was a scho
larly English gentleman, who, as he said when speaking
of his unjust expulsion from Oxford in 1684, "had lived

152 John Locke and English Deism

inoffensively in the College for many years."1 He suf
fered this expulsion, not so much from anything that he
had done that called forth royal disfavor, as because
of his association with Shaftesbury, whose political sun
had set.

But just as England after 1688 was another England,
so Locke after his return from Holland in 1689 was
another Locke. It is probable that 1686 marks the
literary turning-point in his life.2 Before that he was
the modest, retiring student; after that he was the author
of books that marked epochs. Almost contemporary
with his arrival in England appeared A Letter Concerning
Toleration; it was both a plea and a challenge. In the
letter "to the Reader" he says, "absolute liberty, just
and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty, is the thing
we stand in need of. Now, though this has been much
talked of, I doubt it has not been much understood —
I am sure not at all practiced." We are not surprised
that he at once drew the fire of the apologists of the old
idea of uniformity. His book was vigorously attacked
and stoutly defended. And while the debate was still
on, his Essay Concerning the Human Understanding came
from the press, and English Empiricism started on its
course. That same year he published two Treatises of
Government and a second Letter Concerning Toleration,
After this England knew John Locke. He at once
became influential in political affairs; he was a counselor
of ministers and statesmen. His political philosophy
more and more shaped the political ideas of the new
England of William and Mary.
1 Bourne, Life of John Locke, I, 484.
1 Ibid., II, 45-

Direct Evidence 153

When the Essay Concerning the Human Understand
ing appeared, England was without a philosopher.
Hobbes had died in ill repute. Rightly or wrongly
many held his materialistic philosophy responsible for
the low morals of the Restoration.1 Furthermore, the
Baconian program had been gaining rapidly, especially
since the founding of the Royal Society. The new
science, which relied on experiment rather than on
deductive speculation,"was now well established and had
vindicated itself by its results. England was ready for
an empirical system of philosophy; and there were
probably other factors in the general situation that
helped to account for the influence that the Essay soon
exerted. Within eleven years after its first appearance
it had passed through four English editions and had
appeared in a Latin version and also in French. As
most epoch-marking books, it was much criticized. It
had also its great defenders. For various reasons, many
of which were not philosophical, it had probably more
foes than friends; but among its friends were many of
the greatest men of the time. But whether praised or
blamed, it was the philosophy that was most discussed,
and its author was generally recognized as the greatest
living philosopher.

2. THE TEMPORAL RELATION OF LOCKE AND THE DEISTS

Attention has already been called to the fact that
Locke and the Deists were close to each other in time.
He was a boy of sixteen at Westminster when Herbert
died; he was an unobtrusive "student" of Christ Church
when Stillingfleet wrote his Letter to a Deist; he was in

1 T. B. Macaulay, History of England (London, 1849), I, chap. ii.

154 John Locke and English Deism

his fifties when Blount was publishing his deistic writings,
and in his sixties when Toland's Christianity Not Mys
terious appeared. When he died in 1704, Collins was a
young man of twenty-eight, Tindal was forty-seven,
Wollaston, forty-five, Woolston, thirty-five, Boling-
broke, twenty-six, Chubb, twenty-five, and Morgan was
about the same age. Locke's period of greatest activity
began with his return to England early in 1689. And
Lockian thought influenced many, perhaps most, of the
progressive thinkers for some time after his death. With
the exception of Herbert and Blount, all the more
prominent Deists wrote during the period of Locke's
greatest influence. At least Toland and Collins were
personallyjmown to him. Thus the deistic movement,
which had its beginnings early in the century, but did not
develop much strength until the last decade of the
century, and did not reach its period of greatest influence
until after Locke's death, covered the entire span of his
life and extended nearly half a century beyond. How
ever, the most important deistic writings and the most
vigorous part of the deistic controversy came after his
death; generally speaking, almost all the later deistic
literature was produced in the period when Locke was the
leading influence in English philosophy. He was
progressive, rationalistic, and critical; so were they.
You would expect to find the shadow of the Essay
over the literature of Deism.

3. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON
THE DEISTS

It is not easy to determine when and to what extent
one writer influences another. There are several sorts
of evidence, but no one kind of evidence can be taken

Direct Evidence 155

alone; it must be taken with others; and, as we saw in
the study of method for this problem, its value must be
estimated with the whole background before us. But
the most important factors, from which the influence of
Locke upon Deism can be determined, have been studied
in the two preceding chapters, in which we considered the
use that was made of the concepts of nature and reason,
which played such an important role in the more progres
sive thinking of the age, and the conclusions that were
reached on certain points that were under discussion.
We studied critically the resemblances between Locke
and the Deists; these afford the most important evidence
of dependence. We found that though there were
fundamental agreements there were also clearly marked
differences. The significance of these agreements and
differences will appear more fully in the concluding
chapter. There is another important sort of proof of the
relation of the Deists to Locke. Most of them wrote
their books and tracts when Locke was the dominant
figure in English thought, and almost of necessity their
writings contain evidence of their relation to him and of
their attitude toward him. We shall examine the books
of the leading Deists to see what use they made of
Lockian thought.

Of course the relation in time makes it impossible
for Herbert to have been influenced by Locke in any
way; and Blount, who committed suicide in 1693,
published practically nothing after the appearance of the
Essay. His two most significant works, Philostratus
and Religio Laid, appeared in 1680 and 1683,
respectively. There is no evidence that Locke was
influenced by them. He expressly rejects Herbert's
doctrine of innate ideas.

156 John Locke and English Deism

A. TOLAND

Much has been made of Toland's dependence upon
Locke. In 1695 Locke published the Reasonableness of
'Christianity, and the next year appeared Toland's
Christianity Not Mysterious, in which he made use of
Locke's definition of knowledge and other epistemological
elements of his philosophy. Stephen is probably right
in saying that "Toland attempted to gain a place in
social and literary esteem by boasting of his intimacy
with Locke, and by engrafting his speculations upon
Locke's doctrines."1 Though Locke repudiated Toland,
Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, grouped them together
in his contribution to the Unitarian discussion, to which
Locke replied. This resulted in the well-known con
troversy between Stillingfleet and Locke. The Essay
had been before the public six years, and was unusually
popular for a philosophical treatise, the third edition
having appeared in 1695. It had been criticized already,
especially by Norris, and by Sherlock who objected to
Locke's criticism of innate ideas. Stillingfleet under
took to review the whole philosophical system of Locke
and to show that it tended to foster just that atti
tude toward the traditional views of Christianity
which is found in Toland's book. This, no doubt, has
served to emphasize Toland's alleged dependence upon
Locke.2

1 Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, I, 90-93.

a "Toland, an Irish Pantheist, in his Christianity Not Mysterious, has
exaggerated some doctrines in the Essay and then adopted them thus
exaggerated as premises of his own" (Fraser, Locke's Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, Preface, p. xli). At this period in Toland's life
we find no evidence in his writings of a pantheistic bent; that seems to
have been a later development.

Direct Evidence 157

Generally speaking the Lockian epistemology is
adopted by Toland. In attempting to give his dis
cussion a philosophical foundation in the opening pages
of Christianity Not Mysterious, he accepts Locke's
definition of knowledge, emphasizes the inadequacy of
our knowledge of the essence of things, and distinguishes
our knowledge of nominal essence, which we can attain,
from knowledge of real essence, of which we have no
manner of notion, and concludes that we know only the
observable qualities of things (pp. 81 ff.). Toland also
emphasized the necessity of clear and definite ideas,
which is thoroughly in the spirit of Locke. But he
went much farther than Locke in the application of these
principles. Locke, as we saw, in spite of his rationalism
always held firmly to the supernatural, largely in the
orthodox sense. But in Toland's book Lockian doctrines
were applied very differently from the way Locke
intended they should be, as even Stillingfleet acknowl
edged, and it is probable that they underwent some
change in Toland's hands. Locke in the debate with
Stillingfleet frequently repudiated Toland, claiming that
he " went upon another ground ' ' ; and Toland repudiated
Locke twenty years later,1 when he said, "I proceed
upon different principles from Mr. Locke and principles
that are better."2

1 Tetradymus, pp. 190 ff.

3 Though it would be unfair to quote Locke's critics in proof of his
responsibility for Toland's views, or of his identity with the deistic
movement, we can properly use them to prove the opposite. If Stilling
fleet and Edwards do not make him out a Deist, it is very probable that
he was not identified with the movement by others.

The controversy with Stillingfleet was started by the latter's
attempt to join Locke with the Unitarians, which Locke resented. In

158 John Locke and English Deism

It is clear that so far as concerns the establishing of
his m,ore radical conclusions, and it is these that give
Toland's book its character, the Lockian elements play
an unimportant part. Toland seems to forget his
philosophical foundation when he develops his philosophy
of religion. He made no use of Locke in his later
writings; but he called attention to the difference that
exists between himself and Locke.

Zscharnack, in the introduction to his German trans
lation of Christianity Not Mysterious, shows clearly
that Toland's views as therein expressed could not have
been influenced by the Reasonableness of Christianity.

his reply Stillingfleet said that he was satisfied with Locke's attitude
toward Scripture and was convinced that Toland used Locke's principles
in a way in which Locke had not intended them to be used. Yet he
insists that the grounds of certainty as set forth in the Essay lay him
open to just such wrong use. He says in addressing Locke: "Your
notions were turned to other purposes than you intended them." He is
anxious to make this clear and repeats it a number of times. He wishes
his reader to know that he recognizes clearly the difference that exists
between Locke and Toland. He nowhere intimates that Locke is a
Deist; he is satisfied with his attitude toward Scripture, though not
with his views of the Trinity, which Locke persistently refuses to discuss.
He also finds fault with certain of Locke's philosophical speculations,
which he thinks may be used against supernatural revelation, but this
he says is not as Locke intended (Stillingfleet, Works [London, 1710],

III, S3 ff.)-

Even the bitter Edwards, in his attack on The Reasonableness of
Christianity, is satisfied to call Locke a Socinian and Racovian and to say
that his book tended to atheism, that it had a "tang" of atheism; but
he nowhere says that Locke is a Deist. Edwards was not the man who
would refrain from using a scolding name for good manners' sake. It
is very probable that if he could have fastened the reproachful name
Deist on Locke, he would have done it; his failure to do so is significant.
We may conclude that Locke's opinions were distinguished from those
of Toland and that he was not considered a Deist by Stillingfleet or
Edwards.

Direct Evidence 159

Toland's letters indicate that already in May of 1694
he was at work on his book, and that at that time
the central idea was well developed. Zscharnack makes
a very clear case for Toland's independence of the
influence of the Reasonableness of Christianity. In
this book Locke is thoroughly rationalistic, but he
holds firmly to the supernatural; while Toland is also
thoroughly rationalistic, but he shows a very marked
anti-supernatural tendency. Both proceed from the
same motive, both magnify reason, which is in harmony
with the spirit of the age; the difference lies in the way
the principle is applied. Toland is radical; Locke is
conservative.1

B. COLLINS

Collins does not show the influence of Locke any
where in his Discourse on Freethinking. He mentions
his name in a list of great men whom he calls freethinkers,
Erasmus, Descartes, Grotius, Hooker, Chillingworth,
Faulkland, Herbert, Hales, Milton, Whichcote, Cud worth,
More, Temple, and Locke. Just a few pages before he
had referred to Tillotson, "whom all English free
thinkers own as their head." He also informs us that
Carrol had called Locke and Clarke atheists.2 In
another work he quotes Locke and also refers to him in a

1 In Vindidus Liberius, p. 37, Toland claims that Christianity Not
Mysterious was read by the Bishop of Worcester, Mr. Norris, Dr. Paine,
Dr. Browne, Dr. Beverly, and others. Some of these said it used unusual
language, others that it favored Socinianism, "and a very few charged it
with principles tending to Deism."

Toland seems to be anxious to be considered orthodox in his religious
views. He objects very vigorously to being called a Socinian or a Deist
(Vindidus Liberius, p. 150; Nazarenus, p. xxiii).

2 A Discourse of Freethinking, pp. 85, 171, 177.

160 John Locke and English Deism

marginal note; but neither passage is important.1
There is no evidence that Locke influenced Collins to any
appreciable extent.

That Locke was called a freethinker by Collins is not
significant for the determination of Locke's relation to
Deism. Though the name "freethinker" was often
used at this time, more especially after Collins wrote his
book, as synonymous with Deist, it also had a broader
meaning and was claimed by some of the orthodox
theologians. In 1715 certain anti-deistic clergymen
began the publication of the Freethinker.2

C. TINDAL

Tindal's Christianity as Old as Creation appeared in
1730, and in three years passed through four editions;
it was translated into German in 1741. It was at once
recognized as a standard work of Deism and was known
as the "Deists' Bible." Probably no other work is
more representative of the movement.3

Tindal makes frequent use of the books of other
writers on religious subjects, not only of those whom we
associate closely with the Deists, such as Tillotson, whom
he quotes at least a dozen times, and Burnet, to whom
he frequently refers, but also of the more orthodox
theologians, such as Scot, whom he quotes thirteen times,
Prideaux, Nye, Taylor, Chillingworth, Sherlock, and
Clarke. If we could determine affinity and dependence
by a statistical survey of men quoted, we would conclude
that Scot, Tillotson, Burnet, and Clarke were more

lAn Enquiry Concerning Human Liberty (London, 1735), pp. 32 ff., 77.

2 Encyclopaedia Britannica, art. "Deism."

J Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, p. 327.

Direct Evidence 161

responsible for shaping Tindal's radical views than
Blount or Toland or Collins. He was probably making
out the best case possible for his radical views from
the writers who were considered good churchmen.

It is very significant that, in establishing the legis
lative authority of natural religion, he makes no use of
Locke's philosophy. However there are several pas
sages which might be used to show some dependence of
Tindal on Locke. He quoted Locke just five times in
his entire book ; three of these passages are unimportant.
On page 301 there is a marginal reference to Locke which
has no significance. And there is a long quotation on
page 235 from the Essay which emphasizes reason as the
means that men have for distinguishing between true
religion and superstition. In this same argument he
uses passages from Chillingworth, Taylor, Chandler,
and others. Certainly all the progressive thinkers and
probably many of the very orthodox clergy would find
nothing objectionable in the position here set forth.

On page 294 Tindal has a long quotation from the
Essay (IV, xvi, 10) on the rules governing the value of
testimony when it has been repeated. This supports the
deistic contention, which began in Herbert, that, since
our knowledge of revelation comes to us through tradi
tion, it is of necessity not authoritative; revelation is
authoritative as revelation only to the one who first
receives it. Locke is discussing the degrees of assent
and cites a well-known "rule observed in the law of
England." Tindal takes this statement of the principle
of law as made by Locke and makes a special application
of it to the advantage of the religion of reason — an
application which Locke did not make, which is contrary

162 John Locke and English Deism

to Locke's views concerning revelation, and which could
have been made just as well by simply citing the recog
nized practice of the courts without mentioning Locke.
Assuming that there is no contradictory evidence, and
we have seen that there is such evidence, this passage
would have no value as proof of the dependence of
Tindal on Locke.

Coming to the two important passages from Locke,
we find that Tindal, in arguing against certain positions
of Clarke, dissents from Clarke's doctrine that natural
light cannot reveal to man that the sinner has forgiveness,
and against this he quotes, on page 391, the teaching of
Nye and Locke,1 who are convinced that by the light of
reason man can know God as good and merciful and
forgiving. The point at issue is not whether we can
know God by reason, but whether we can know enough
about Him to be sure that He is merciful. Clarke said
we could not; Nye, Locke, and Tindal said we could.2
The teaching is not characteristic of Deism. All those
who held that the gospel is a republication of the pure,
original religion, which was as old as creation, would not
hesitate to assert it.3 Though it was a liberal view, it
was held by some rationalistic clergymen, who were
generally considered orthodox. There is no proof here
of the responsibility of Locke for Tindal's doctrine.

But the quotation from Locke's Discourse on Miracles,
which was published posthumously, seems to be clearly

1 Locke, Works, VII, 133.

2 Whatever Nye was, he was not a Deist. Wallace in Antitrinitarian
Biography (London, 1850), I, 331, exonerates Nye from the author
ship of a Unitarian tract that had been credited to him.

s Sherlock, Discourses Preached on Several Occasions, V, 138.

Direct Evidence 163

deistic. It has been considered already in the study of
Locke's attitude toward natural religion in the fifth
chapter. Tindal is arguing that to magnify revelation
is to weaken the force of the religion of reason, and to
strike at all religion. In doing this he claims that even
the Scriptures assume that man is an intelligent being,
capable of knowing good from evil, and religion from
superstition. And in support of this he quotes from
Locke's Discourse on Miracles:

That no mission can be looked upon to be divine, that delivers
anything derogating from the honour of the one, only, true,
invisible God, or inconsistent with natural religion and the rules
of morality; because God having discovered to men that unity
and majesty of his eternal godhead, and the truths of natural
religion and morality by the light of reason, he cannot be supposed
to back the contrary by revelation; for that would be to destroy
the evidence and the use of reason, without which men cannot be
able to distinguish divine revelation from diabolical imposture.1

Tindal believed that this passage teaches, (i) that
no mission or revelation is true that admits of more than
one God; (2) that men by reason know wherein honor of
God consists; (3) that they must know by the light of
reason what are the truths of natural religion and rules
of morality.

This passage from Locke may be understood as
teaching that natural religion is the supreme legislator
for all religions, which is a characteristic deistic doctrine.
This does not fit in with what Locke has said elsewhere,
as was shown in the study of his views of natural religion
But Tindal does not give it this radical interpretation,
and it can be read, as we saw, in a way that is consistent

1 Locke, Works, IX, 261.

164 John Locke and English Deism

with Locke's general position. He insisted that the
natural light of reason is supplemented by revelation.
Perhaps theoretically reason can know God and all
morality, but actually it fell short and revelation was
necessary. As was observed above, we may conclude
from this passage that reason and the religion of reason
or natural religion, so far as it goes, cannot be con
tradicted by other revelation. To this extent it may be
considered to have a legislative authority over revela
tion; but one cannot conclude anything concerning the
adequacy of natural religion, which Tindal and the
typical Deists assert and Locke denies. Without
twisting the sense, this passage, which Locke himself
never published, can be understood in a way that is in
harmony with the explicit statements that Locke
published concerning natural religion. It is not an
argument for the deistic position of Locke, and Tindal
did not use it as such. There is also no reason for assum
ing that it influenced his general view.

There is no other evidence, so far as the writer knows,
that would suggest the dependence of Tindal on Locke.
These passages show that Tindal in proving certain of
his theses used passages from the writings of Locke.
Even if there were no evidence to the contrary, and in
the preceding chapters we have seen that there is much,
to conclude on the bases of these passages that there was
dependence would be to rest an important hypothesis
on a very small and uncertain foundation. If Tindal's
views were borrowed, the number and the character of
the quotations from Tillotson, Sherlock, Scot, and others
would suggest them as the sources of his system. We
can co-ordinate a larger number of facts, and can bring

Direct Evidence 165

them together with a smaller remainder, if we assume
that the author of the Deists' Bible simply accepted the
rationalistic and critical way of approaching religious
problems, which was used by all progressive thinkers,
including Locke, and applied it more radically than some
others.

D. WOLLASTON

In the Religion of Nature Delineated, Wollaston makes
no use of Locke's philosophy, nor of any writing of his.
Perhaps Locke's insistence upon the supernatural and
the inadequacy of that which is purely ethical was so
far out of harmony with the central thesis of Wollaston
that he recognized in Locke another spirit, so different
that he did not care to use any part of his system.

E. BOLINGBROKE

Bacon is the philosopher whom Bolingbroke praises
most, and Locke is the one whom he criticizes most. It
is "our Verulam," "My Lord Bacon," "the herald of a
new period," "astounding genius," before whose time
the foundations were ill laid, but he laid them on the rock
of nature and truth.1

He appreciates Locke as an empirical philosopher,
who uses the psychological method. It is evident that
he considered him one of the greatest thinkers of the age,
greater than Descartes or Gassendi; the only person to
be compared with him is Bacon.2

1 Bolingbroke, Works, VI, 155, 156, 404; VII, 243, 406.

2 "The first steps toward a right conduct of the understanding
.... are an accurate analysis of the mind, a careful review of the
intellectual faculties .... and an attentive observation of the whole

intellectual procedure When this is well and truly done by any

writer, the reader will feel consciously that it is so; for he will perceive

i66 John Locke and English Deism

But when we come to religious problems, which are
the issues that concern Deism, he dissents from Locke
practically every time that he mentions him, and his
criticism is often severe. Locke is glaringly incon
sistent when he argues in the Reasonableness of Christian
ity and in his commentaries on Paul's Epistle that there
are degrees of historical probability. It does not fit in
with what he said concerning error that attends the use
of words. Locke is also inconsistent in asserting that
the heathen did not know the one true God, though the
works of nature were sufficient proof of Him.1 He
dissents from Locke's view concerning the origin of
monotheism, that the Israelites were the only mono-
theists among the ancients, and rejects his teaching
that mankind before Christ lacked a clear knowledge
of duty.2

He criticizes Locke's doctrine that saving faith is
to believe that Jesus is the Messiah. This may be the
primary but it is not the sole object of our faith.
"There are other things, doubtless, contained in the
revelation he made of himself, dependent on and relative
to this article, without the belief of which, I suppose, that
our Christianity would be very defective."

Bolingbroke saw clearly that there was a funda
mental difference between his view and that of Locke

the phenomena of his own mind to be such as they are represented, and
he will recollect that the same things have passed there, though he has
not always, or at all observed them. This happens to me when I read
the Essay on the Human Understanding. I am led as it were, through
a course of experimental philosophy" (Works, VII, 603; see also VI,
162, 163).

1 Works, VI, 188. 2 Ibid., pp. 187, 192, 218.

Direct Evidence 167

concerning man's native capacity. Locke "asserts the
insufficiency of human reason, unassisted by revelation,
in its great and proper business of morality. Human
reason never made out an entire body of the laws of
nature from unquestionable principles, or by clear
deduction. Scattered sayings — incoherent apothegms
of philosophers and wise men — could never rise to the
force of a law." When Locke contrasts the supposed
imperfect knowledge of the religion of nature, which
the heathen had, with "the supposed perfect knowledge,
which is communicated in the Gospel, what he advances
stands in direct contradiction to truth."1 Perhaps
Bolingbroke understood Locke's attitude toward natural
religion better than some of Locke's modern readers.
He saw that Locke emphasized the limitations of reason
in a way that he could not approve. Locke pointed out
the imperfections of natural religion and the necessity
of revelation, while Bolingbroke laid stress upon the
sufficiency and perfection of natural religion, and its
normative authority for all religion. They represented
two different tendencies in the religious thought of the
age, and Bolingbroke knew it.

F. MORGAN

Morgan professes himself to be a disciple of Locke,
though he seldom mentions him, and disagreed with
him on important points; but Morgan, like Wollaston
and unlike Tindal, makes little use of what others have
said. After investigating and rejecting Locke's teaching
concerning innate ideas, he praises his greatness and
adds: "in almost everything else, I must own Mr. Locke

1 Ibid., pp. 327 ff., 351 ff.

1 68 John Locke and English Deism

as my master, and the first guide and director of my
understanding."1 Yet, with the exception of one
passage, this is the only evidence of Locke's influence
upon him. He refers to complex ideas in almost the
words of Locke; it is clear that he had the discussion of
the Essay in mind. But he at once passes on without
making any special use of Locke's teachings.2

He dissents from the main thesis of the Reasonable
ness of Christianity:

Mr. Locke in his Reasonableness of Christianity has proved that
the one single point as a matter of faith which the apostles preached
in and about Judea, after the resurrection, was this, that Jesus
was the Messiah, according to the prophets; and, I think, I have
proved that our Jesus, or the true Christian Messiah, and Saviour
of the world, never claimed that grand essential character, of being
the temporal restorer and deliverer of the nation, and that he
never promised any such thing to bring it about, either then, or
at any other time.

Morgan and Locke understood the Jewish Messianic
expectation in different ways; Locke interpretes it
after the traditional manner — the anticipated deliverer
is Christ the Redeemer, the spiritual leader of the whole
race, who was sent by God; Morgan understood the
expectation of Israel to point to a temporal restorer and
deliverer and not to the "true Christian Messiah and
Saviour of the world." Probably this difference between
Locke and Morgan is accounted for by the difference
between the Lockian and deistic views of prophecy.3

1 Physico-Theology, pp. 73, 74.

3 Ibid., 174 ff.

3 A. Morgan, Letter to Eusebius, in The Moral Philosopher, II, 57.
Locke is also mentioned on p. 141 to illustrate a point, but it is without
significance; he could have used any other name just as well.

Direct Evidence 169

The references that Morgan makes to Locke show
that he knew him and esteemed him highly, but they
do not prove that he is dependent on Locke in any
matters of importance. In spite of his owning Locke as
his master and guide and director of his understanding,
he does not use his writings. A study of Morgan's book
would never suggest that he sat at the feet of Locke.
Any theory that might be offered to account for this
difference between Morgan's professed dependence on
Locke and the practical ignoring of Locke that we find
in his works would be very uncertain; Morgan's books
give us no clue. It may be due to the fact that he
recognized that there was an essential difference between
them, as did Bolingbroke.

Woolston and Chubb give no evidence that they were
even acquainted with Locke's writings.

4. CONCLUSION

The above is a complete survey of the direct internal
evidence of the dependence of the Deists on Locke.
With the exception of Toland and Tindal, the references
to Locke in deistic literature are without significance.
Wollaston, Woolston, and Chubb do not use his writings
and do not refer to him. In Toland we have more
evidence of Locke's responsibility for the deistic opinions
than in any other deistic writer. But here it concerns
only the philosophical background of his religious
speculation, which plays a very unimportant part in the
development of the thesis that he is seeking to establish. ,
There is no evidence that the theological writings of /
Locke influenced Toland in any way, and later in life he
seems to emphasize his departure from Locke. Collins,

i yo John Locke and English Deism

though as a young man he stood in closer personal
relation to Locke than any other Deist, gives no evidence
of having been influenced by him. Tindal quoted Locke
several times in support of certain theses that he sought
to establish, but none of these passages are important
in his philosophy of religion. If we were to establish
Tindal's dependence on others by direct internal proofs,
the evidence would point to Tillotson and Scot. There
is no reason why Locke should be held responsible for
the Deists' Bible, and, as we saw in earlier chapters,
there are good reasons why we should think that he is not
responsible for it. Bolingbroke appreciates Locke's
importance as a philosopher, but he also saw clearly that
between him and the author of the Essay there was a
fundamental difference, which was shown in his per
sistent polemic against Locke's views on religious
problems. And Morgan, though he claimed to be a
disciple of Locke in most everything save the doctrine
of innate ideas, shows no evidence of it in his books.

The internal evidence shows that Locke's influence

§

on the deistic movement, when it was at its height, was
small, that it was greatest in Toland and either negligible
or without significance in the writings of Wollaston,
Tindal, and Morgan, who wrote the most important and
most characteristic deistic books. As the movement
advanced, it seemed to get farther away from Locke, and
either ignored him or assumed a critical attitude toward
him, more especially toward his religious views.

' When it is recalled that at this time Locke was the
most important English philosopher, and that he exerted
a molding influence in other fields, the Deists' inde
pendence of him becomes a problem. It is so contrary

Direct Evidence 171

to what we would naturally expect that it challenges us
to seek an explanation. Probably Bolingbroke suggests
the reason when he criticizes Locke for asserting the
insufficiency of human reason in its great and proper
business of morality, and the imperfect knowledge of the
religion of nature, which the heathen had, when com
pared with the perfect knowledge, which we have in the
gospeD When Locke makes this contrast between
natural and revealed religion, to the disparagement of
the former, "what he advances stands in direct con
tradiction to truth." As has been shown, Iboth Locke
and the Deists were rationalistic, but Locke emphasized
the limits of reason and the necessity of a supernatural
revelation, while the Deists emphasized the sufficiency
of reason in morals and religion and its normative
authority over revelation. We know that Bolingbroke
understood the significance of the difference between him
and Locke; it is probable that Wrollaston and Tindal
understood it also, and that this accounts for their
indifferent attitude toward him. Had they considered
Locke a supporter of their views, Wollaston, who seldom
quoted from other writers, might have been silent, but
Tindal would have paraded it in his book. Locke and
the Deists differed radically; and the Deists knew it.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

The nature of this problem called for a study of the
relation of Locke and Deism on the background of the
speculation of that period. This study has been
completed. We shall now bring together the results,
define and compare Locke's religious opinions with those
of the Deists, and test the several possible theories
concerning the relation of Locke and Deism by the
relative facts that have been gathered.

I. RESUME

We saw in the fourth chapter that the age was
V dominated by two focal concepts, nature and reason.
These were the two distinguishable but inseparable
poles of liberal speculation. In order to be adequately
grounded, institutions and principles must be both
natural and reasonable.

Just as the idea of development dominates speculative
thinking today, so the leaders of English thought three
hundred years ago undertook to account for all institu
tions and principles by nature. It determines the
character of things and gives them authority. In this
all progressive thinkers agreed — the liberal theologians,
the philosophers, including the Cambridge Platonists
and Locke, and the Deists. As an ultimate concept
for grounding things it characterized the whole age.

172

Conclusion 173

When we ask what is meant by nature, opinions differ
widely, and there is confusion. We can, however,
bring the various conceptions into two general groups.
We found that the liberal theologians, Locke and the
Deists, regarded nature as the fixed world or world-
order, made by God and revealing Him and His will, and
that the Cambridge Platonists tended to conceive nature
as a fixed and immutable order more or less independent
of God. Generally speaking Locke and the Deists agree
in their way of thinking of nature and stand in the line
which comes down from Hooker ; Chubb is the only clear
exception to this; Morgan and Bolingbroke speak in
uncertain terms.

Furthermore, all liberal thinkers agreed in the
demand that everything, including religion, should be
reasonable. There was an increasing conviction that
authority was an inadequate foundation for the faith of
rational beings. If religion is true, it must vindicate
itself before the court of reason. No one dissented from
this thesis; practically everybody accepted the rational
istic way of looking at things. But there was wide
divergence in the way this principle was applied, with
consequent variations in results. Most writers on
religious problems were content to use the scholastic
formula, that revelation could give us that which was
above reason but not that which was contrary to it.
The liberal theologians, the Cambridge Platonists,
Locke, and several of the early Deists held this view.
Butthose Deists who represented the movement when it

' - vjff* '

was at its height asserted that, if there was such a thing
as revelation, it could not give us anything above
reason. They tended to become more and more hostile

174 John Locke and English Deism

to positive Christianity. All parties were rationalistic;
but the Deists were more radical in their application of
the rationalistic principle.

Passing to the study of the difference between Locke
and the Deists on disputed points, which constituted
the fifth chapter, we found that nobody questioned the
existence of God, but that there was some difference as
to how it was proved. Locke considered the cos-
mological proof a demonstration, criticized the ontologi-
cal proof, and probably ignored the teleological proof;
while the Deists, though they paid little attention to
proving God's existence, at first taught that we have
innate ideas of God, but this doctrine was given up later,
and when the movement was most influential they
emphasized the teleological proof and practically ignored
the cosmological proof. Locke and the Deists proved
the existence of God in different ways.

There were also found unexpected agreements and
some differences in the way God's relation to the world
was conceived. Locke and all of the leading Deists
accepted the doctrine of Providence in the traditional
sense, though it was rejected by some unnamed writers,
whom we know through the criticisms that were directed
against them, and who were called Deists. Locke and
all, or almost all, of the Deists accepted miracles as
historical facts. But generally the deistic attitude
toward miracles was hostile; they challenged certain
biblical accounts of miraculous events and explained
others away. Locke nowhere shows the skeptical atti
tude toward miracles that characterized the Deists. He
accepted and emphasized repeatedly the importance of
miracles as evidence of revelation, which was the pre-

Conclusion

175

vailing view of the time. The Deists, with the exception
of Toland and Bolingbroke, denied all evidential value
to miracles, and frequently emphasized and gave reason
for this denial. This view characterized Deism; it was
a radical departure from the views that were generally
accepted, which were held by Locke.

Perhaps no points of dispute in the deistic contro
versy were more significant than the place and authority
of revelation and of natural religion. Locke accepted
supernatural revelation, which he identified with the
Bible, and its authority, on rational grounds, as did
practically all other progressive thinkers. It supple
ments reason with that which is above it, but not
contrary to it, which unaided reason could not attain.
He also recognized fulfilled prophecy as a proof of revela
tion. The Deists, with some reservations, accepted
revelation as a fact, but they did not identify it with the
Bible, and insisted, as a rule, that it could not supple
ment reason, and some believed that it was superfluous.
All Deists except Woolston deny that prophecy has
any evidential value. Though they did not deny
revelation, their attitude toward it was more and more
skeptical as the movement advanced; at last they
reduced the supernatural almost to the vanishing-point.

All the liberal writers that have been studied recog
nize the importance of natural religion; but all save
the Deists emphasize its limitations and insufficiency.
They sought to show that it must be supplemented by
revelation; they denied to it all legislative authority
over against revealed religion. But the Deists emphasize
the limitations of revealed religion and the importance
and normative authority of natural religion.

1 76 John Locke and English Deism

There was also a difference between Locke and the
Deists in defining religion. The legalistic way of con
ceiving religion prevailed in England at that time. But
this, when joined to the more radical rationalism of the
deistic movement, resulted in defining religion almost
wholly in terms of morality. Locke in his definition of
religion did not neglect the ethical side, but he empha
sized the supernatural factors more than the Deists.

It was also shown that all progressive thinkers
advocated toleration. This was a subject that was
debated between them and the defenders of rigid con
formity. It is really not a part of the deistic controversy.

2. DEFINITION AND COMPARISON OF LOCKE'S RELIGIOUS
OPINIONS AND DEISM

In summing up the results of this study we have
really defined Locke's philosophy of religion and Deism.
By taking into consideration the speculations of others,
we have found that some very prominent elements
common to both Locke and Deism are not characteristic
features, but that they mark out and characterize the
age rather than any particular writer or movement of
the age.

Both Locke and the Deists were rationalistic and
critical in their method of treating religious problems;
both appealed to reason as over against authority. But
Locke was conservative and the Deists were radical.
He and all , other liberal thinkers except the Deists
emphasized the authority of an externally given revela
tion. He is reverential in his attitude toward old
beliefs, and uses his rationalistic method to establish the
traditional supernatural sanctions, as do the other

Conclusion 177

progressive thinkers; the Deists are hostilely critical
toward old beliefs, and apply their rationalistic method to
discredit the traditional supernatural sanctions in the
interests of establishing the sole normative authority of
natural religion. Both Locke and the Deists recognize
the importance of natural religion. Locke insisted that
it was insufficient and must be supplemented by revela-
Jk tion; the Deists held that it was sufficient and normative
for revelation and all religion.

The resemblances are in the principles which shape
their thinking, which were rationalistic and critical, and
were common to the whole progressive movement; the
differences are in the way these principles were applied
and in the consequent results.

These differences were recognized at that time. Not
even Locke's severest critics classed him among the
Deists; and Leland, the persistent foe of Deism, writing
only half a century after Locke's death, recognized
Locke as differing from and separate from the deistic
movement.1 Bolingbroke was aware of an irreconcilable
difference between his views and those of Locke, and
probably Tindal was also. And Locke in the Reason
ableness of Christianity classes himself as differing from
the Deists and among their critics, for against such was
the book written.2

'John Leland, The Principal Deistkal Writers (London 1754), I,
51 ff., 380.

2 There has been some difference of opinion as to whether Shaftes-
bury should be classed as a Deist. We are now in a position to deter
mine where he belongs. He accepted revelation and inspiration as facts
and expressly dissents from the deistic attitude toward revelation
(Characteristics [1732], I, 535 H, 210;. Ill, 74). He would not exalt
reason above faith nor dare to oppose the sacred histories of religion

178 John Locke and English Deism

3. THEORIES TESTED BY FACTS

The data from which we are to form a theory as to
the nature of the relation that exists between Locke and
English Deism have been collected and critically
reviewed. The problem now is to devise a statement of
this relation that will fit the facts, that will enable us to
co-ordinate our historical data with the least remainder.

The possible theories that might be formulated for
setting forth this relation between Locke and English
Deism were set forth in the closing section of the first
chapter. We are now in a position to test them by
facts.

a) It may be that the relation that exists between
Locke and English Deism is causal, that the one in large

(II, 207). In a striking passage he asserts his orthodoxy (III, 315, 316).
" In the first place, it will appear, that through a profound respect, and
religious veneration, we have foreborne so much as to name any of the
sacred and solemn mysteries of revelation. And, in the next place, as
we can with confidence declare, that we have never in any writing,
public or private, attempted such high researches, nor have ever in
practice acquitted ourselves otherwise than as just Conformists to the
lawful Church; so we may, in a proper sense, be said faithfully and
dutifully to embrace those holy mysteries, even in their minutest particu
lars, and without the least exception on account of their amazing depth.
And though we are sensible that it would be no small hardship to deprive
of a liberty of examining and searching, with due modesty and submis
sion, into the nature of those subjects; yet as for ourselves, who have not
the least scruple whatsoever, we pray not any such grace or favor in our
behalf: being fully assured of our own steady orthodoxy, resignation, and
entire submission to the truly Christian and Catholick doctrines of our
Holy Church, as by Law established."

If Shaftsbury had been a Deist he could not have written this.
From what we know of his moral character we are justified in accepting
his own statement.

Leland, in The Principal Deistical Writers (I, 57 ff.), classes Shaftes-
bury among the Deists, but he probably confuses Shaftesbury's

Conclusion 179

degree accounts for the other. This wrould readily
explain the likenesses. But a causal relation may work
either way: Deism may be responsible for Lockian
thought, or Locke may be responsible for Deism — the
"progenitor" of the Deists, as Stephen expressed it.

i) If Deism is responsible for Locke, it is the Deism
before Toland, the doctrines of Herbert and of the
unnamed Deist against whom Stillingfleet wrote, and
of the writer of the letter to Blount in the Oracles of
Reason, and of Blount. The time relation makes it
impossible for Toland and the later Deists to have
influenced him in any way. Both Locke and the early
Deists were rationalistic and they emphasize nature and
reason as did many others; they probably understood

approval of critical methods in the study of Scripture with hostility to
revelation.

Tillotson, Archbishop of Canterbury, who was a famous preacher
and a leader in the church, has often been classed among the Deists.
Perhaps more than any other writer, outside of the camp of the Deists,
Tillotson emphasized the importance of natural religion. He taught
that natural knowledge of God is the foundation of all revelation and
that revelation must be in harmony with natural religion. But he also
pointed out the defects of natural religion. It does not suffice. "Its
sanctions have proved ineffective, and it has therefore been supplemented
by revelation. The function of the latter is not to destroy or correct

natural religion, but simply to make it clearer and more effective

Certain requirements are added by revelation, particularly that we
should recognize Christ as the Son of God, worship God in His name, and
receive the sacraments, but these are enjoined with the same purpose
of promoting virtue."

Tillotson is evidently close to the Deists. But his insistence that
revelation supplements natural religion, and that prophecy and miracles
are proofs of revelation, show that he assigned a much greater place to
the supernatural factors in Christianity than the typical Deists were
ready to admit. He was probably one of the most radical of the super
natural rationalists, but not a Deist (McGiffert, Protestant Thought
before Kant, pp. 194 ff.).

180 John Locke and English Deism

nature in the same way. But they differed as to reason.
Herbert claimed that his five universal articles of '
natural religion or the religion of reason were universal
because they were innate, and Blount agreed with him
in this, which was contrary to Locke's philosophy. They>
also differed radically in their attitude toward revelation
and Scripture, and in their view concerning the authority
of natural religion. As has been shown, they agree inS
those things that characterize the age, they differ in that!
wThich distinguishes Deism. These important differences^
make this theory untenable.

2) But perhaps the causal relation may be found
to work the other way; it may be that Locke accounts
for Deism. So many important movements can be
traced to Locke that it would be natural for one, who
chances upon marked resemblances between Locke and
Deism, to assume that he shaped the movement. Locke
was rationalistic; so were the Deists; Locke emphasized
natural religion, so did the Deists; and there is internal
evidence that the later Deists used Locke's writings,
though in a way that was not significant. But there
were radical differences between Locke and Deism. As
has been shown, they agree in that which characterized
the age and they differ in that which characterized
Deism; this would suggest that they were products of
the same period but that they developed differently, not
necessarily that one was the cause of the other. If
Locke was the cause of Deism, there should be conclusive
evidence of the dependence of the Deists on Locke;
such evidence does not exist.

Furthermore, the time factor makes it impossible
that Locke should account for the deistic movement. It

Conclusion 181

began in England with Herbert, who died in 1648, and in
1678 it had become so strong that Stillingfleet attacked v
it. Whoever the anonymous Deist was, against whom
Stillingfleet directed his polemic, we learn from the
quotations in his Letter to a Deist (see note 3, p. 107) and
from references that he makes to him that he held
practically all of the views that characterized the
writings of Wollaston and Tindal and Morgan. The
same is true of the letter to Blount in the Oracles of
Reason. The deistic movement was present in all its
essential features before Locke could have influenced it.
Locke could not have been the father of Deism.

b] The theories that we have considered thus far
set Locke and Deism over against each other and treat
them in a more or less complete mutual isolation. It
may be that this is wrong, that they belong together,
that they form one and the same movement, that
whatever else Locke was he was one of that group of
liberal thinkers in England of the seventeenth century,
commonly known as Deists, who fostered free and critical
thinking in matters of religion. If there are differences
between him and Wollaston or Tindal or Morgan, these
are due to the fact that they represent a later and more
radical development of the movement. Deism is but
Locke's philosophy of religion grown up; they took his
principles and followed them to their logical conclusion.
Thus all differences between Locke and Deism would be
differences in the stage of development along one line;
both were rationalists; the Deists were more radical than
Locke.

But, as has been observed, practically all of the
characteristic features of Deism had been developed

182 John Locke and English Deism

before Locke. Stillingfleet's unnamed Deist, though
probably much less important, was as much of a Deist as
the author of "the Deists' Bible," and the same can be
said of the writer of the letter to Blount. But assuming
that there was no time factor to argue against this
theory, it would still be clearly unfair to identify Locke
with the deistic movement in this way; for those prin
ciples of Locke, which the advocates of this theory say
the Deists simply developed farther, were not peculiar
to Locke but were held by practically every other repre
sentative of the liberal movement. The rationalistic
' and naturalistic motives in the speculations of Locke
are not characteristic of him, they characterize the whole

liberal movement. Even if the deistic doctrines are but
i

the normal development of these rationalistic principles,
it does not argue that Locke is identified with the
deistic movement any more than many other liberal
writers.

c) The theories that would define the relation
between Locke and Deism as causal, or would conceive
them as forming one movement and marking different
stages in it, were rejected because they could not provide
adequately for certain differences between Locke and
Deism, and because they fail to meet the temporal
conditions. The chief argument for them was the
marked resemblance between the two systems. But as
has been shown, the likenesses between Locke and Deism
are no greater than the likenesses between Deism and
many other liberal writers of this period; probably
Tindal resembles Tillotson and Sherlock more closely
i than he resembles Locke. The Deists and Locke agree
'. in their rationalistic way of looking at things, which

Conclusion 183

characterized the whole liberal movement, and they
differ in that which characterized Deism. This suggests
another way of stating the relation that exists between
them.

/They are co-ordinate parts of one and the same
general movement. The rational theologians, the Cam
bridge Platonists, Locke, and the Deists constitute the
party of progress. They are all rationalistic; they
protest against scholastic tradition and intolerance in
the name of nature and reason; they face the same foes
and use the same weapons.X Locke and Deism would
then appear as different manifestations of the same
spirit of the age, which was seen also in all other writers
of the liberal party. They are distinguishable parts of
one whole. Their common elements are the character
istic marks of the age, and their points of divergence are
the characteristic features of the respective systems.
The resemblances between Locke and Deism are not
those of parent and child, but rather those of fellow-
members of the same family. They are related, and
losely related, but their relation is not causal, nor do
hey mark different stages of the same movement.

If we accept this theory, all difficulties with the time
factor disappear. If they are co-ordinate parts of the
larger liberal movement, deistic views may be held
before or after or at the same time with Locke. The
important differences between Locke and the Deists are
provided for; they are the characteristic features that
show that they are different parts of this one movement.
And the significant resemblances, which are common
to the various parts of this movement, show that in
certain fundamental respects they are one.

184 John Locke and English Deism

If Deism is more radical in its application of the
rationalistic principle, it is no more a further development
of Locke than of the liberal theologians. Possibly
Locke influenced some of the later Deists, but there is no
evidence that he determined the movement to any
appreciable extent; certainly he cannot be held respon
sible for the radical spirit which is the characteristic
mark of Deism.

If this is a correct statement of the relation between
Locke and English Deism, the prevailing views are
wrong; Locke cannot be the father of the deistic move
ment, it cannot be merely a further development of the
principles that he held, nor can he be considered a part
of the movement. As was set forth in the second
chapter, most students of the history of philosophy
represent Locke and Deism as closely related in one or
the other of these two ways. The special study of
Crous, which makes Locke a Deist in almost all essen
tials, is also wrong. Crous misinterpreted the points of
agreement and failed to observe many points of dif
ference. The views of von Hertling and McGiffert and
perhaps also that of Windleband are not necessarily
contradicted by the theory concerning the relation of
Locke and Deism which is advocated here. They seem
to have grasped it partly, to have been moving toward
it, but they did not understand it fully. Accordingly,
this theory, which makes Locke and English Deism
co-ordinate parts of the larger liberal movement of that
time, either corrects or supplements the views that have
been held hitherto.

INDEX

rvK \

INDEX

Abelard, i
Absentee God, go ff.
Academic freedom, 4
Albertus Magnus, 47
Aquinas, Thomas, 47, 54
Atheists, 8, 84, 116, 146, 159
Augustine, 109

Bacon, Francis, 6, 10, 20, 38, S3, 165

Bacon, Roger, 3

Berkeley, Bishop, 109

Blount, s, 25 ff., 40, 58, 74, 88, 92, 96,
I38, 154, 155, i?9ff.; on revelation,
106 ff.; on prophecy- 112; on natural
religion, 127 ff.

Bolingbroke, 61, 99, 100, 149, 151, 154,

165 ff., 170, 173, 175, 177; on nature, 60;

on reason, 76 ff.; on revelation, 109;

on prophecy, 113; on natural religion,

13°
Boyle, 6, 10, 38, 55, 73, 90, 93, 95, in,

112; on natural religion, 121
Bruno, 2

Burnet, 38, 96, 160
Bury, 26
Butler, Bishop, 119 ff.

Cambridge, 7

Cambridge Platonism, 8, 10, 15, 23, 28,
38, 61, 68 ff., 71, 77, 81, 116/134, 140,
142 ff., 147, 149, 150, 173, 183; on
nature, 34 ff-; on reason, 68 ff.; on
natural religion, 120 ff.

Carrol, 159

Chillingworth, 10, 142, 143, 159. 160; on

reason, 66
Chubb, 27, 41, 93 ff., 99 ff., ii3) I3I> I4g>

154, 169, 173; on nature, 61; on reason,

78; on revelation, m
Clarke, 92, 95, 97, 98, 115, 159, 160, 162
Collins, 20, 25, 40, 88, 92, 97, 108, 112,

149, 154, iS9, 169 ff.; on nature, 58;

on reason, 73; on natural religion, 128
Condillac, 20
Conservative party, 39
Contemporary thought, survey of, 36 ff.
Cromwell, 10

Crous, 243., 137, 146, 130, 184
Cudworth, 54, 69. 71, 134, 140. 143, IS9
Culverwell, 10, 71; on nature, 34; on

reason, 69 ff.

Dante, 2

Deists, 10, n, 12, 17 ff.; on natural reli
gion, 131 ff.; on toleration, 148 ff.
Deist's Bible, 160, 163, 170, 182
Descartes, 7, 88, 139, 165
Digby, 8
Dogmatism, age of, 3

Ecclesiastical authority, 2
Edwards, 137 ff.
Enlightenment, 21
Erasmus, 139
Essays and Reviews, 132

Faith, defined by Locke, 103
Falkenberg, 21
Faulkland, 10, 142, 139
Fischer, Kuno, 18, 27
Fraser, 91 ff., 136
Freethinker, 22, 51, 160

Galileo, 2
Gassendi, 163

Genetic method, 28 ff., 31; error of
G. M., 44 ff.

Gildon, 38

God, proof of existence of, cosmological,
845., 89, go, 174; ontological, 87, 90,
174; teleological, 88, 89 ff., 174; from
innate ideas, 88, 89, 174

Grotius, 46, 139 ""'•

Hales, 10, 142, 139

Harvey, 38

Henry IV, i

Herbert of Cherbury, 10, 15, 24, 41, 33,
37, 74, 88, 96, 138, 140, 148, 133, 159,
161, 179 ff.; on revelation, 106; on
natural religion, I26ff., 136; the five
articles of religion, 137

Heresy, laws against, 4

Hertling, von, 23, 28 ff.

Hildebrand, Pope, i

Hobbes, 10, 20, 24, 38, 46, 33, 34, 67, 88,
120, 153

Hoffding, 22 ff.

Hooker, Richard, 10, 37, 77, 78, 79, 134,
159. 173; on nature, spff.; on reason,
64 ff.; on natural religion, 118

Hume, 20

187

i88

John Locke and English Deism

Laud, 6

Lechler, 18 ff.

Legalism, 133 fi., 139 ff., 176

Leibnitz, 22

Leland, 177 ff.

Leo, Pope, X, 2

Liberal party, 9, 10, n, 39 ff., 79, 116, 173

Locke, ioff., 17 ff.; on toleration, 8,

145 ff.; on nature, 55 ff.; on reason, 56,

71 ff.; proof of existence of God, 84 ff.;

on prophecy, 112; on natural religion,

121 ff.; legalism in thought of, 135 ff.;

the essay, 153
Luther on persecution, 3
Malebranche, 109
McGiffert, 115, 179
Milton, 10, 144, 159
Miracles, as proof of revelation, 94 ff.,

100 ff., 106, 174

Miracles, non-biblical, 96, 98, 99
Moore, 143, 159
Morgan, 27, 41, 61, 89, 93, 99, 149, 167 ff.,

170, i"3, lolj on nature, 60; on reason,

77 ff.; on revelation, 1 10; on prophecy.

113; on natural religion, 130; religion

as morality, 139 ff.

Nature, different meanings of, 48; origin
of concept, 50; conceived in two ways,
62, 172 ff.

Nature, law of, 51 ff., 58 ff.

Natural light, 48 ff.

Newton, 38, oo

Noncomformity, 141

Norris, 156

Nye, 160, 162

Oxford, 7, 8 ii, 141, 157

Pattison, 132
Petrarch, 2

Politico-economic interests, 37
Pomponazzi, 2
Popery, 116
Pridaux, 119 ff., 160
Protestant intolerance, 4 ff., 38, 145
Providence, Locke on, 90 ff.; Deists on,
92 ff., 174

Ramus, 8

Rational Theologians, 45 ff., 64 5., 118 ff.,
133 ff., 149, 150, 183 ff.

Reformation, 3, 5, 7, 9

Religious interests, 37 ff.

Restoration, 153

Revelation and the Bible, 102, 115; de
nned by Locke, 103, 175

Right of private judgment, 4, 9
Royal Society, The, 6, 38, 153

Scholasticism, 7

Scholasticism, Protestant, 21

Science, 38 ff.

Scot, 160, 164, 170

Scotists, 47

Shaftesbury, First Earl of, 146

Shaftesbury, Third Earl of, not a Deist

177 ff-
Sherlock, 81, 119, 132, 156, 160, 164; on

nature, 52; on reason, 67
Smith, John, 69, 143
Socinians, 22, 159
Socrates, 75, 140
Spinoza, 151

Steven, Leslie, 19 ff., 29, 156
Stillingfleet, 18 ff., 81, 105, in ff., 142, 153,

is6ff., 1792.; on nature, 51; on reason,

66; on natural religion, 119; Letter to a

Deist, 107 ff.
Sydenham, 6, 10, 38, 151

Taylor, Jeremy, 10, 142, 160; on reason, 66

Tillotson, 10, 51 ff., 81, 95, 115, 119, 159,
160, 164, 170, 179, 182

Temple, 8, 159

Tindal, 27, 40, 52, 88, 90, 92, 98 ff., 112,
114, 154, i6off., 1695., 177, 181; on
nature, 59; on reason, 75 ff.; on revela
tion, 1 08 ff.; on natural religion, 128 ff.;
on religion as morality, 138 ff.

Toland, 12, 18 ff., 25. 66, 88, 92, 97, 100,
112, 1154, 156 ff., 169, 175, 179; on
nature, 58; on reason, 75; on revela
tion, 1 08; on natural relig on 128

Toleration, 3, 26, 37, 42; the liberal party
and, 141 ff.

liberweg, 17, 27
Unitarians, 20, 66, 156 ff.
Virgil, 2
Voltaire, 20, 44

Warburton, 66

Whichcote, 54, 68, I2O, 128, 134, 143, 159

Windleband, 21, 23, 29

religion as morality, 139 ff.
Woolston. 40, 98, 112, 115, 131, 149, 154,
169, 175

Zscharnack 158 ff.

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